THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF KARL MARX

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in the

Department of Political Science
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by

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and

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NOTE: The last seven meetings were devoted mainly to a discussion of Das Kapital by Mr. Cropsey. These meetings were recorded but have been only partially transcribed. The tapes will be preserved, however, and may be borrowed by subscribers for a reasonable period of time.

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Marx seminar, first meeting. March 30, 1960

(The tape commences with the lecture already in progress).

. . . description as distinguished from the qualitative differences. Now modern philosophy as it emerged since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is, as I said before, anti-socialistic in this older sense of the word. Man, the individual not a member of society, not even as a potential member of society, is primary. Society is simply derivative from beings who are not as such social beings. Man is -- the fundamental phenomenon, therefore, is freedom, not obligation. All obligation is derivative from free acts of previously non-obliged individuals. That's the meaning of the strict -- the strict meaning of the doctrine of the social contract. Therefore the fundamental moral phenomenon does not have the character of duties, but of rights. The rights of man in the strict sense are a modern notion. We must here make a distinction as I have made it on a former occasion between various waves of this modern thinking. The first wave is represented most clearly by Hobbes and by Locke and this Hobb-Lockian version of which I have to say only a few words is the origin of political economy. The second wave embodies political economy, but does not create it. Now what is characteristic here? The fundamental phenomenon is self-preservation, the preservation of life and limb. To understand this, one must contrast it with the Thomistic doctrine. According to Thomas there are three kinds of natural inclinations. The first is directed toward self-preservation. The second is directed toward social life. And the third is directed toward cognition. Self-preservation is the lowest and cognition the highest. Now what men like Hobbes and Locke did is, as it were, to disregard the two higher or to deny that they are natural inclinations and concentrate only on the primary, self-preservation. The reason for that was what one can call "realism." They wanted to have a doctrine which was not in any way utopian or visionary, but solid. Low but solid is, I think, a beautiful formulation due to Winston Churchill, to this doctrine. Low but solid. Not trust such fanciful things as inclination toward society and natural desire for cognition, but self-preservation. That we run -- we take cover when someone points a gun at us; that's the real stuff. And of the same kind, of course, also food. That is also necessary for self-preservation. And food is almost the same thing already as property, as will appear when Mr. Cropsey will take over. This kind of doctrine is, of course, also characterized by an immense simplification. If you have three fundamentally different natural inclinations that gives the complicated doctrine, but if there is only one: great simplification. Therefore it was possible to present the doctrine in quasi-mathematical form as Hobbes did openly and Locke in a slightly concealed manner. Now self-preservation, while being the basic phenomenon, is not the complete phenomenon as far as the human will is concerned because man, as we all know, is not satisfied with self-preservation alone. He also wants to be happy, and we have to consider the relation between self-preservation and happiness in order to begin a possible understanding of Marx.

The view which Hobbes and -- (by the way, you can find a chair, I believe, so you don't have to stand; there is a chair) -- now Hobbes and Locke admit, of course, that man desires happiness and that he's not satisfied with self-preservation, but they say, in our language, happiness is entirely subjective. Someone finds his happiness in eating a special kind of cooked apples and another in reading novels; others perhaps even in writing novels and so on: infinitely subjective and nothing can be built on that. Self-preservation is the same in all men. Therefore it is objective. Therefore something can be built on that. Happiness cannot be the end of civil society because of its subjectivity. Civil society can only guarantee the conditions of happiness. Without -- because without life you cannot be happy.

In other words, to introduce a formula used in the Declaration of Independence, civil society makes possible the pursuit of happiness, but not happiness. That is the affair of the individuals. From this follows a point with which Marx was very much concerned: a split between the public life and the private life, between the citizen or subject, on the one hand, and the private individual. The citizen is concerned with self-preservation. The whole apparatus of the state is nothing but a big apparatus for self-preservation as you can see even today if you consider the importance of police officers. But now it is important: while the self-preservation is the basic thing which has an objective character, that -- what we desire, what we desire, is happiness, because we want self-preservation but no one is satisfied with mere self-preservation. So the higher is private. The public is the basic but not very exciting. One -- in the language of Locke, for example, one would have to say there is a difference between self-preservation, bare self-preservation, and comfortable self-preservation. The bare self-preservation is guaranteed by the government. Comfortable self-preservation: that is everybody's own business. Now you see here in germ the distinction between state and society. The state takes care of self-preservation by guaranteeing the security of each, but the real life of man, the interesting life of man, concerns not bare self-preservation, but the comfortable self-preservation which can even consist, for example, in going to theaters. Yes? Some people need that for their happiness, but that is nothing for the state. So when -- state, the formula of Max Weber, is characterized by the monopoly of compulsion and that has, according to the original notion, the function of guaranteeing self-preservation. Society is the sphere of freedom where everyone tries to do and does, to some extent, what he wants. The freedom -- but naturally freedom in and through competition, and one of the great objections of Marx against the earlier doctrines is that they did not succeed in bridging the gulf between state and society and therefore the only solution in his opinion is abolish the state in the end, but that stems from this basic principle which we see already in the first wave.

Now we could turn to the second wave which is much closer to Marx and about which I have to speak at much greater length. Now I would like first to say a very general word about Rousseau. I think it is time that this be said again. When we look at these great antagonists around 1789, after Rousseau's death, but still he was still very much alive because there was a French Revolution going on, namely: Burke and Rousseau. I, for one, cannot help feeling that Burke is a much sounder, better helper for practical politics than Rousseau is, but on the other hand one must also say, and especially today where we all are so very conservative that however impossible Rousseau's doctrine may be he was a much broader thinker than Burke. Rousseau began to think at the place where Burke stopped thinking. To repeat, that is not meant to say that Rousseau's doctrine is true, but it is a very profound and seminal doctrine. Now Rousseau began his career with a prize essay on the sciences and arts, the so-called First Discourse, in which he attacked the sciences and also the arts in the name of virtue. Within -- the political meaning of this writing is this: it is an attack on modern political science and the political science of Hobbes and Locke in the name of the ancients. One characteristic formula is this: the ancients talk in their political writings all the time of virtue. The moderns talk all the time of trade and money. You see how strong the economic element was at the very beginning in modern political thought and Rousseau takes, in this respect, the side of the ancients. Furthermore, in the first wave of modern political philosophy enlightenment played an absolutely decisive role. One can state this precisely as follows. Self-preservation is the principle and self-preservation means also, practically speaking, fear of death. What Hobbes says or presupposes -- he says fear of death is the greatest power in

human life and that is by no means necessarily so as no one knew better than Hobbes because many people fear punishment after death more than death. So Hobbes' doctrine presupposes, in order to become operative, that the fear of punishment after death ceases to be important and this will cease to be important only by means of enlightenment, by the fact that people learn either that there is no punishment after death -- yes, that there is no punishment after death in any serious sense. So the enlightenment is absolutely essential for the first wave of modernity and Rousseau begins his career with an attack on that enlightenment. We must keep this in mind. We must see what this means. There is a connection between Rousseau's attack on the Enlightenment and his appeal to virtue because this teaching of men like Hobbes and Locke degrades virtue to a means for self-preservation. It makes virtue instrumental or utilitarian. Why -- what is goodness? Goodness is the habit by virtue of which you have a greater chance to survive. That is not what decent men understand by virtue and Rousseau acted -- reacted correspondingly. But the -- so this is -- but Rousseau is simply a protest of -- Rousseau begins with a protest of moral common sense against these subversive doctrines. Yet Rousseau does not simply reject Hobbes or simply return to Aristotle. He never does that. He transforms Hobbes on the Hobbian basis and that is important to understand and I will proceed step by step. I have to read to you a passage from Hobbes to show that. Yes -- now, Hobbes had taught regarding virtue: virtue is identical with peaceableness. Self-preservation is possible only in peace as you know either from your own experience or from many historical books including TV. So that habit which enables man to live in peace is peaceableness which consists of various parts. Now one part is especially interesting in our present connection: Hobbes' Leviathan, chapter 15. "The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of mere nature; where, (as has been shown before,) all men are equal. The inequality that now is has been introduced by the laws civil." All inequality, in other words, is legal or conventional. "I know that Aristotle in the first book of his Politics, for a foundation of his doctrine, makes men by nature, some more worthy to command, meaning the wiser sort (such as he thought himself to be for his philosophy;) others to serve, (meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not philosophers as he;) as if Master and servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of wit: which is not only against reason; but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish, that had not rather govern themselves, than be governed by others. Nor when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force, with them who distrust their own wisdom, do they always, or often, or almost at any time, get the victory. If nature therefore have made men equal, that equality is to be acknowledged: or if nature have made men unequal; " -- Hobbes reminds himself for one moment of his own wit. You see? ". . . yet because men /that/ think themselves equal, will not enter into conditions of peace, but upon equal terms, such equality must be admitted." In other words, Hobbes does not really say all men are equal, but he says you have to -- we don't know whether they are equal or not, but we have to act on the principle that they are equal. "And therefore for the ninth law of nature" -- law of nature means here a moral law -- "I put this, that every man acknowledge another for his equal by nature. The breach of this precept is pride." Now -- pride, regarding the ones that are superior. With a view to natural equality, man ought to treat everyone else as his equal by nature. Yet, as Hobbes admits, civil society is a state of inequality. You at least have the inequality of the governors and the governed or also the rich and the poor. Furthermore, the right of self-preservation which -- from which Hobbes starts implies the right ofeveryone to be the judge of the means of self-preservation. That follows under certain conditions. Yes? I mean, if you are -- have the right to self-preservation you have the right

to the means of self-preservation. Otherwise the right would be nugatory. But then who is going to judge of what are and are not good means? Either the wisest men -- well, that is bad for you -- for us -- because the wisest men may not think that we are so much worse preserved as we do. Therefore everyone must be the judge as to what are means for self-preservation. And now -- that is according to Hobbes the natural law. And now look at society, at Hobbes' society. Who judges of the right means of self-preservation in Hobbes' society? The sovereign. That may very well be a king, one man. And how does a king judge of the means to my self-preservation? By making laws because laws are public judgments on means of self-preservation, as you can easily see when you look at certain individuals who steal -- yes -- or rob. They try to get means for their comfortable or maybe simple self-preservation and the law judges differently and the law decides the matter. So in civil society this fundamental natural right of equal judgment regarding the means of self-preservation is rejected. Civil society is essentially a state of inequality in Hobbes' teaching. But on the other hand morality implies or consists in recognition of the natural right of man which includes the right to be the judge of means. Civil society is immoral because the basic moral phenomenon is the right to self-preservation which includes, according to Hobbes, the right to be the judge of the means. Civil society takes this away. But as Rousseau says from the very beginning morality is the one thing needful. That is the only consideration which ultimately counts. Peace, mere peace, is the lesser good than justice and justice consists in the recognition of the rights of each, including, naturally, myself, to be the judge. Therefore justice, consisting in the recognition of the right of each to be the judge, consists in recognition of freedom because all freedom is concentrated in that right effectively to judge of the means to self-preservation. This is then the point, the starting point of Rousseau's criticism of Locke, which became crucial, as we will see.

Now -- we have to turn now to the precise procedure of Rousseau: how he tries to refute the Hobbian doctrine on the Hobbian basis. The Hobbian basis, to repeat, is self-preservation and the right of everyone to be the judge as to the means of self-preservation. Now Hobbes had taught that to understand a thing means to understand its genesis and Hobbes accordingly understands the commonwealth or the state by understanding its genesis. There he acts consistently. But Hobbes doesn't apply this demand, this general methodological demand as we can say, to the more fundamental phenomenon, to man himself. Hobbes takes man for granted. He takes for granted that man has an essence, that he is a rational animal, and yet Hobbes has no longer a right to do so because his doctrine doesn't allow for essences in any sense. More specifically, reason, allegedly the characteristic of men, is not possible without language and language is, as we all know, a social phenomenon. So man's rationality presupposes his sociality and yet Hobbes taught all the time that man is by nature a pre-social man, a manifest contradiction, because if man is pre-rational it follows from Hobbes' premises that man is pre-rational by nature. It becomes, then, necessary for Hobbes to understand the genesis of man's essence, the genesis of reason, and he never did that and what -- that is what Rousseau does. For Rousseau the study of man becomes the study of the history of man, of man's -- the study of men's -- of "man" becoming man. This process is the great -- of man's becoming man is the theme of Rousseau's Second Discourse, the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, and I say only one word about that. This process of man becoming from a kind of orangutan a man is presented not as a teleological process, that the orangutan was meant to develop into man, but as a strictly mechanical process. These slightly -- these beings slightly different from orangutans were compelled by external, accidental causation: by floods or by ice or by heat -- I don't know -- to change, to come down from trees, as they say today, and then to become man. There is no -- not a teleological pro-

cess. That is of the utmost importance for Marx. Now this history of man which takes, in a way, the place of the philosophic study of man shows also and particularly, that inequality, inequality is not natural, as Aristotle had taught and as Hobbes had almost admitted, but that inequality has come into being by virtue of certain accidents. The early original men, this almost orangutan, were equal. Now but if inequality has come into being by certain accidents a practical conclusion is obvious. It can be abolished again. Inequality, in other words, is only a historical fact, not a natural fact. Differently stated, man does not have a stable nature to speak of. There are such things which are stable. For example, that we have five senses and have a digestive system and so, but that's terribly uninteresting politically. You know? In all politically interesting respects, man doesn't have a nature. Man is infinitely malleable or rather, as Rousseau himself puts it, he is infinitely perfectible because he does not have an essence to speak of. You see how terribly practically important this seemingly theoretical question regarding essences, for instance, are. Rousseau says all philosophers prior to him have painted civilised man, man as he has been hitherto, man as we know him from history, but they claimed to paint natural man. All previous study of man was not -- not scientific, as it would becalled today. Man's experience of men is no guide to the nature of man because what we experience are always men molded by customs, molded by traditions, molded by accidents, and therefore no inference is possible as to what man can do from -- as to the possibilities of man from what man actually has. No arguments against political improvement basedon experience is valid because the experience only says that it was possible hitherto. No inference from present day men or from history as to what man can be despite the fact that all societies, or all civilized societies, have hitherto been unequal. A strictly egalitarian society is possible. We get, then, this fundamental scheme. There was equality at the beginning when men had not yet developed the truly human faculties, and then the whole historical process, to use a Marxian expression, is inequality; always, everywhere. And -- but at the end, again equality. I mention another point which is -- by which Rousseau differs from Hobbes and Locke and prepares the Marxian view of the problem.

Hobbes and Locke had conceived of the state of nature as inconvenient, to use the understatement of Locke, inconvenient for man in the state of nature, which meant that the men living in the state of nature were dissatisfied with their situation. If this is so, the state of nature points to civil society as such. Man -- and therefore men in the state of nature project civil society in their minds before they establish it, but that is an absurd suggestion, Rousseau implies, because these fellows didn't have any reason. How could they make up any project, to say nothing of a project of a sensible civil society? In other words, Hobbes and Locke are guilty of crypto-teleology; that -- of a crypto-teleology. Rousseau accordingly teaches that men in the state of nature are satisfied with the state of nature, perfectly satisfied, or to use his simple statement, the state of nature is good. That does not mean, necessarily mean, more than men living in it cannot but be satisfied with it. But that's not the only reason. It is also objectively good because it is a state of equality. Now no -- Rousseau, in other words, takes the great step in that famous liberation from teleology which is characteristic of modern times. A teleological view presupposes a number of stages leading from the germ to the completed thing and the stages are all imperfect compared with the perfect stage. Now in Rousseau we find a very important exponent of the view of the equality of the stages, as we may roughly put it. One simple and important example: childhood. Childhood -- that childhood is a stage as high as adulthood -- yes -- which is denied by all the earlier thinkers, of course, and perhaps also denied by common sense, but it follows from the consistent rejection of teleology.

Each stage is as meaningful and self-contained as any other. We must keep this in mind also for the understanding of the Marxist doctrine.

Another point which I have to mention here. The just or rational society as Rousseau understands it effectively recognizes natural equality or rather the equal right of each to be the judge of the means of his self-preservation. Therefore Rousseau can say that in that just or rational society everyone remains as free and equal as he is by nature. In the decisive respect, in the making of laws, of public judgments as to the means of self-preservation he is equal to everyone else. Now let us look at the mechanism of that. The judgment on the means of self-preservation is the laws. Rousseau demands that everyone subject to a law must have a say in the making of the law. Everyone must be a member of the legislative body; that is to say, of the sovereign. For Rousseau the legislative body and sovereign are identical and to be distinguished from the government which we may say is the executive and the judicial part. In civil society everyone must be subject to the general will. The general will is not opposed simply to the private will, particularly. The general will is my own will modified; my own will survives necessarily in the general will. Otherwise the general will could not bind me. If I am subject to the private will of another man then I'm a slave, but if I am subject -- but I -- if I am subject to the general will which is the generalization of my private will I am subject only to myself. I'm a free man. But that is -- that -- so the free society is essentially an egalitarian society, but more than that this solution that everyone be subject only to the general will, which is a modification of his own will, and not to the subject of any other man, this requires that everyone and everything be subject to the private will. It requires, in Rousseau's formula, the total alienation of each associate with all his rights to the whole community. (Unquote). Here you have the word alienation which plays such a great role, but in Rousseau the accent is different. The whole -- the total alienation of every individual is necessary if there is to be decency, if there is to be a just life in society; or as Rousseau also put it, if you want to have freedom and equality every individual must become totally denaturalized, totally collectivized. These things will come up with characteristic modifications in Marx. Rousseau's argument, by the way, is not so difficult to understand. He says if there are any limitations to the power of the community then these excluded areas can become the locus for private power, for private government, as it was then called by certain liberals in our age. Yes? And if you want to prevent the non-legal or the trans-legal dependence of individuals on other individuals this area must be susceptible of being brought under social control. That's all Rousseau means, but the principle is, of course, that there is no sphere which can be excluded from social control. The total collectivization of each is the condition for the freedom of each. The formula is identical for Marx and Rousseau. The concrete meaning differs. Total collectivization, to repeat, is the indispensible condition of the freedom of each in society. You had the freedom of each originally in isolation -- you know, in the state of nature -- but that is not interesting. The interesting point is freedom in society. This -- now Rousseau goes on to say that this alienation of the natural self, that he transforms himself completely into a citizen, into a member of the sovereign, and ceases, in a sense, to be a natural being; this alienation is the acquisition of morality. This man in the state of nature who was concerned with his self-preservation and made his own judgments and so, that was not a moral being. Man becomes a moral being only by becoming a citizen and that is to say by divesting himself radically of his natural freedom. The rational society demands self-alienation according to Rousseau. I come back to this part of his argument. From this it follows that all society, however just, is bondage. That Rousseau says with all clarity at the beginning of

the Social Contract: "Man is born free buteverywhere we find him in chains. How did this happen? I do not know. What can make this change legitimate? I believe I can answer this question." And that's the meaning of the book. It will answer the question of how the transition from freedom to bondage can be legitimate. He is concerned with the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate bondage, but bondage it is in both cases. Therefore society as society cannot give the true solution of the human problem. The true solution of the human problem cannot be a social solution. Rousseau found it in a form of living which he described as the solitary dreamer who lives at the fringes of society but is not really -- truly a member of society; a man communing with nature; we can say a man of religiosity as distinguished from an adherent of any positive religion. You can also say the artist because this little thing in Rousseau has grown in the meantime to tremendous proportions. The decisive moral formulation is this: that what covers the civil society is morality and this morality is called by Rousseau by such words as virtue or duty, a rational morality. But there is something else and that is what Rousseau calls goodness and which means a kind of instinctive goodness, compassion. This is at home beyond society: among these radical individualists who live at its fringes in a fundamentally precarious existence although from Rousseau's point of view they are the salt of the earth. Why is this necessary? If society is bondage then it is fundamentally not a happy state, but society is the home of morality. Virtue is truly at home in society. Morality is then divorced from happiness. If you want to have happiness you have to leave society, and that is to say, you have to cease to be a responsible citizen. Happiness belongs to the state of nature. Morality belongs to civil society. That is the simple formula for virtue. Now this antinomy between the individual and society -- not every individual, but some individuals like Rousseau -- is absolutely crucial for the understanding of what happened afterward and especially what happened in Marx and I will show it by reflecting for one moment on one special reason why this antinomy is necessary and that has to do with the problem of property.

Rousseau makes it clear even in the Social Contract, more emphatically in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, that civil society is necessarily more advantageous to the haves than to the have-nots because the protection of the means -- of self-preservation, of the means of self-preservation is, of course -- how shall I say -- richer, more fruitful in the case of the rich than in the case of the poor. I mean, the famous stories of Anatole France about the law which forbids the rich and poor equally to sleep under bridges and to beg in the streets. You know that. . . that's the idea. And Rousseau has this clearly in mind. The have-nots lose the natural right of appropriating land which they need for self-preservation. They can no longer take this land away from those who have enough land and to spare. That's a crime, as you know. Yes? The Social Contract is therefore, as Rousseau puts it in that extreme statement which he never retracted, in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality -- the social contract is a fraud perpetrated by the rich against the poor. There is only one step here to the formula of Babeuf in the French Revolution, Babeuf: property is theft, legalised theft but nevertheless theft. Now you see here -- here one can get the simplest formulation of what Marx is doing. What happened after Rousseau, especially in German idealistic philosophy to which I will turn soon, was to say throughthis away. There is a perfect social solution, a perfect political solution to the human problem and that is the rational state, the state of Kant or of Hegel, whatever it may be. Then there were other people who were certain that no state could solve the human problem and they were such people like Thoreau, individualists, anarchists or whatever you call them. Yes? However that may be called. In other words, they minimized this element, the globo. Rousseau originates both the anarchism and the

statism because he -- in this sense, he was much more comprehensive than any of the followers. Now Marx, of course -- you see -- follows the German idealists in the social solution, but with wone great difference: society, not the state. Not the state. That is the point where -- and why society and not the -- why does society, a communist society, give, supply the solution to the human problem? Because of the necessary implications of property. That's much more refined in Marx but that is still the German element. But Rousseau's position is, of course, different from the Marxist position because Rousseau doesn't tire of teaching that society as such, with or without state, is essentially imperfect and there is the necessity of something transcending society or at the fringes of society, however you might call it, which really gives society its rubric. This is what I would like to say about Rousseau and then I would like to turn to German idealism as far as it is absolutely indispensible to discuss it in this connection. But there may be -- it may be -- that may be an opportunity to see whether there are some things which I need of clarification at the present moment. You wanted to say something? I see. Well, I don't want to force you. But I ask you to keep in mind this absolutely crucial point: the Rousseauan doctrine of the necessity of the total alienation of each individual to society for the sake of the freedom and the equality of each -- that is absolutely preserved in Marx in a new element as we shall see. And also, of course, the other point: the fact that in Rousseau this is regarded as bondage, if an inevitable bondage. You can put it this way: from Rousseau's point of view it is a morally inevitable bondage, but he questions the ultimacy of morality, of what he calls virtue and duty. Well -- Mr. Faulkner?

"Why does he write a political treatise, then, and not a -- all in favor of creativity."

Both because Rousseau saw that there is one root, one root, out of which there grow two things with equal necessity and both are in a necessary tension to one another. That is -- Rousseau makes another reflection going beyond Hobbes and Rousseau (sic) which shows this root more clearly, namely this: self-preservation presupposes that life is attractive. Yes? I mean, life is pleasant or however you call it. There must, therefore, be an experience of that fundamental pleasantness of life, or as Aristotle puts it, of the sweetness of living as living. What someone in Homer mentioned when he spoke of seeing the sun. Yes? The light of the sun. That Rousseau calls the sentiment of existence. The sentiment of existence is the basic human experience and it is radically pleasant. And that is at the bottom of the desire for self-preservation. Now you desire, then, to preserve yourself and then you have to do something about it. You have to work. . . and quite a few other things. Yes? But then something terrible happens. Being engaged in the acts conducive to self-preservation you do no longer sense the sweetness of mere being. This is, therefore, the preserve of those who do not work, fight, govern, etc. These are these idlers like Rousseau. Yes? That is the scheme so it follows from what he says. And one can understand the later development of European thought up to so-called existentialism today by starting -- you see how rich Rousseau's whole project is. The great change came in the moment in which the sentiment of existence was found to be, or believed to be, not pleasant and sweet but terrible. Yes? And so. I think the most, the clearest expression of this change is still Nietzsche and that is, of course, very important now in existentialism. That I mention only in passing. So for Rousseau, therefore, both were necessary and the paradoxical fact is that the best guide for those who govern and who are governed are not governors, but the idlers at the outside. I mean this notion plays in practice a very great role. You know? There are sometimes people who are regarded or regard themselves as the conscience of society. You know? And they are by this very reason somehow marginal. Yes? Something of this

kind was -- so the teacher of legislators as distinguished from the legislater is not a political man. Yes? That is -- it is much more the sensitive poet than the man in the market place. Something of this Rousseau had in mind. There is a connection between that and classical thought. Only for Rousseau this man is no longer a philosopher. That is at least obscured and therefore it is convenient to say rather the artist than the philosopher. Well then I will go on as far as I can come today. (Will you remind me of the time? Yes.)

Now we have to go -- make now a transition to Hegel because Hegel is the immediate starting point of Marx, but we -- it is impossible to do so without speaking of Kant because Kant effected a radical change in philosophy as a whole on which Hegel builds. And we can understand Kant, for our purposes, best by considering a fundamental difficulty in Rousseau and this is the contradiction between his moralism, his discovery or re-discovery that the one thing needful is morality, and that morality cannot be understood as mercenary as Hobbes and Locke had understood it -- mercenary and utilitarian are the same. This is contradicted by Rousseau's opposition between virtue and duty on the one hand and goodness on the other. What I mean is this: this contradiction I spoke here. Here is the world of bondage and morality and here is the world of true freedom which is not, strictly speaking, a world of morality. Yes? An anarchistic but noble world. That is the point. Now the -- the clearest solution would seem to be, as I indicated before, to forget about that and that is what Kant tried to do. One must abandon Rousseau's reservation against society. Why? Precisely because that reservation has no moral basis. Society and morality are co-extensive. Why -- what is the reason for Rousseau's error? Answer: the obscurity of the status of morality in Rousseau's doctrine. It is in no way clear in Rousseau whether morality is ultimately in the service of self-preservation or whether it is not connected with the spirituality of man's soul. The latter view is presented most forcefully in the "Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar" in the Emile. I mean, one -- that is a very difficult question, where Rousseau really stood. This contradiction, to state it simply, between a materialist account for morality and a spiritualist account for morality is the most obvious difficulty in Rousseau. That is the starting point of Kant. Kant tries to get out of this difficulty of an either materialistic or spiritualistic base for morality. Yet in spite of this profound difference between Kant and Rousseau, Kant agrees with Rousseau regarding the content of morality. Morality is chiefly and primarily the recognition of the rights of man, of man's equality. Men are equal because they are equal in the decisive respect: in respect to the possibility of morality. Every man is as capable as everyone else to be -- have a good will and the good will is the one thing needful according to Kant.

(Change of tape).

. . . nature to civil society which is not guided by morality yet morally relevant is a necessary process. It is not -- it is a necessary process. It does not depend on the human will decisively. Now -- I try now to explain the Kantian position as simply as I can. From Kant's point of view Rousseau is confused regarding the principles or the status of morality and this is due to the fact -- to an error which Rousseau shares with all preceding philosophers, namely: that morality can have a basis in theoretical philosophy, call it metaphysics, call it physics. It doesn't make any difference. That morality can have a basis in knowledge of nature, in particular, in knowledge of the nature of man. As long as you assume that morality must have a theoretical basis, a basis in the knowledge of nature, you are confronted with the alternative of a materialist or spiritualist basis of morality. Both positions, materialism as well as spiritualism, are wrong, Kant asserts, as theoretical assertions. Both are dogmatic and Rousseau succeeded as

little as any other previous philosopher from liberating himself from that dogmatism. Kant has stated his position clearly by two references to earlier thinkers. He has said of David Hume that Hume awakened him from the dogmatic slumber. Hume's skepticism awakened him from that dogmatic slumber. But of Rousseau Kant said Rousseau has brought me into the right shape. In other words, the influence of Rousseau is deeper and more comprehensive than the influence of Hume. To Rousseau he owes the positive direction. To Hume he owes the negation. Another explanation -- another statement of Kant regarding Rousseau is this: Rousseau proceeds synthetically, Kant says; namely, he proceeds by starting from natural man to civilized man and therefore the Rousseauan investigation has the character of a scientific, physical investigation. It implies the absolutization of scientific knowledge, which is perfectly true because Rousseau's account of the genesis of civilization in the Second -- in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality has methodically the character of any cosmogony of -- either of Kant, Laplace, or of Descartes' or other formulations. The alternative would be equally dogmatic, namely, what Rousseau did in his "Profession of Faith": a spiritualistic metaphysics, which -- a spiritualistic metaphysics. That is equally impossible, as Hume had shown. Now Hume questioned the rational character of the principle of causality. This alone implies the rejection of speculative metaphysics, but it also endangers science, which stands and falls with the principle of causality as the rational principle. Hume has shown to Kant's satisfaction that the principle of causality is not rational, not demonstrable like a mathematical theory, nor, on the other hand, a legitimate generalization from experience. Experience could never supply the universality of the principle of causality because experience can only say hitherto this and this was the case, but not always. To justify the principle of causality there is needed a radical revision of the traditional concept of reason and understanding. This revision will entail the supremacy of practical reason or of morality. In other words, whereas according to the traditional notion of reason theoretical reason is higher than practical reason, the new concept of reason which Kant will develop in fighting back against Hume will necessarily imply the primacy of practical reason. I will explain that. The radical revision of the concept of reason or understanding consists in the -- according to Kant -- in the discovery of the spontaneity of understanding. The understanding is not, as it was for Plato and Aristotle and for the tradition, generally speaking, a receptive faculty: perception with the mind's eye of "essences." But the understanding is productive, not receptive. In one formula of Kant the understanding does not receive passively the laws of nature, the Newtonian laws, say, but the understanding prescribes nature its laws. The fundamental principles of physics are projects of the human mind. They are not the essential characters of nature in itself. Reason -- understanding is productive. That is -- that means the essence of man is productivity. You see how crucial that was for Marx. I mean, man is not only a being which produces in order -- produces things in order to live from them. That would be purely external and that was never denied. But the essence of man, the core of man, is productivity, and that is -- the core, the essence of man is productivity and not contemplation. That is the fundamental change. Yet, the understanding as understanding is productive only on the basis of sense perception and in connection with it. You cannot have a physics merely on the basis of this fundamental project of nature. You need also experiments in order to give -- to acquire specific laws and so on, i.e. to fall back on sense perception. Now this -- what we get by virtue of the cooperation of the human understanding. . . that which we get by virtue of the cooperation of the human understanding and sense perception is the phenomenal world, the world as it necessarily appears to us as human beings, not the world as it is in itself. And Kant uses somewhat awkward expressions here, but I have to use them for a moment. The phenomenal world, the world of which we know regarding -- whether in science or -- I have sci-

entific knowledge -- is the phenomenal world. And the true world he calls the noumenal world, the world as it would be for a pure nous, for a pure mind, if -- for a pure mind if we could imagine that. I mean, we know it as a possibility, but we cannot say anything beyond that: that it is a possibility. So the understanding as understanding is productive only on the basis of sense perception. It is productive only in connection with a receptivity, receptivity being the opposite of productivity. Therefore the understanding points to a higher faculty, if I may use this somewhat inappropriate expression, which is called by Kant reason. Reason. Reason, in contra-distinction to the understanding, is free and not merely spontaneous, spontaneous being lower than freedom, but only as practical reason, not as theoretical reason. As theoretical reason it is always in need of sense perception. Practical reason and only practical reason is self-sufficient. Practical reason alone can constitute a kind of world, the world of morality. So practical reason -- in practical reason alone we transcend the merely phenomenal. Now -- I will try to show you now in a few words why this is so terribly important for things with which everyone of us is concerned whether he cares for philosophy or not.

Why is practical reason necessarily free from sense perception, from sensuality, from anything given, and hence, why is practical reason necessarily purely rational? Morality must be independent of any preceding end or purpose; whereas all earlier moral philosophers had started from the ends, Kant denies that the ends or purposes can be the beginning of morality because, according to Kant, ends or purposes can be known only empirically or at least not without the help of experience. The end of morality, happiness, was supposed to be the natural end, the end toward which man is by nature inclined. One assumes therewith, according to Kant, that the natural ends are good and surely that was a tacit premise of all classical philosophy, that the natural ends are good. How else could you say by following the natural inclinations, as distinguished from their perversions, you act well? If you do not assume that the natural inclinations are good. This, in its turn, presupposes, of course, that nature is good, but is this not a dogmatic assumption? Must it not be established first that nature is good before we are invited to follow our natural inclinations? If the ground of morality is the natural end the moral law is given to man or imposed on man by God or by nature, as indeed everyone who had spoken of a moral law had said. But Kant says before we bow to a law which God or nature imposes we must know first that God or nature is good. We cannot assume that. Hence, the moral law cannot be conceived of as in any way imposed by either nature or God. The moral law must be understood as self-imposed, as self-given. Morality requires the emancipation of the will from the tutelage of God or nature. The freedom of man must be understood in an infinitely more radical way than it was ever understood before and this teaching of Kant has an indescribable influence later on on many people who never heard the name of Kant. A law, Kant says, which precedes the will, the human will, is accepted on the basis of the expectation of rewards or punishments. It is therefore accepted in a mercenary intention. At least it is accepted on the basis of a pre-existing need. Hence, these pre-Kantian thinkers started from the desire for happiness, but happiness is something radically different from duty. The moral law cannot originate in men's needs or be relative to such needs. It must originate in men's freedom, in man's sovereignty. The moral law cannot be based on anything preceding it. The understanding of the phenomenal world, of the world we know, either scientifically or pre-scientifically, does not give us any help toward the understanding of morality. We do not -- we do not -- how can -- but how can there be a moral law? Where do we get the content? Strictly speaking, there is no content. The moral law or ethics, as Kant calls it, is necessarily formal ethics. The content is engendered entirely by the form and the formula of Kant for that is the famous

categoric imperative: act in such a way that the maxim of your action can become a universal law. I will speak of this a little bit later. Now I will first say how can a formal law supply the content. Here Kant simply follows Rousseau or modifies Rousseau. Kant's notion of morality is modeled on Rousseau's notion of civil law or of right. According to Rousseau right or law which is legitimate comes into being through the generalisation of particular wills and thus makes it possible that through subjection to the law man acquires his freedom. Now what does he mean by that? You enter the legislative assembly with a firm decision not to pay any taxes. That's your particular will. And now when you -- but you can't get up and say, "I don't want to pay any taxes." You have to say, "There ought to be a law that no one has to pay any taxes." Then you come to your senses and see who will take care of the roads and bridges if everyone would think as I do and then you say there ought to be taxes. In other words, by thinking of your selfish wish in the terms of law, in terms of a universalized wish, the wish of everyone, you change your wish. You transform yourself from annatural, selfish being into a citizen. Kant radicalizes this thought, but it is exactly this thought. Morality consists in the universalization of maxims. In other words, Kant is not concerned so much with an individual's proposition, "I don't want to pay any taxes," but with the maxim, with the moral principle on which you act habitually. For example, some people act on the maxim that anything which is inconvenient should be avoided. Yes? I mean, that is not something which they do this moment, but that characterizes their whole life; and there are other maxims of that kind -- or one should cut any corner is also such a maxim which can determine a whole life. Now what Kant says is this: I have to look at the maxim implied in any proposition I make to myself and then see whether it is -- whether I can still agree to that proposition if I make it a universal law for everyone. Yes? In other words, I don't wish to give money to a poor fellow. It's my wish and I make it a maxim for my life. I will never do that. And then I say, from now -- I consider now whether it is possible to imagine a world in which everyone is a crook if he helps a poor man: well, assuming, of course, that there are poor men around; otherwise it wouldn't make sense. And then I see -- that is, at least, what Kant says -- that that I didn't wish, that I didn't mean. And only the universalized maxim -- is the only test of morality. Only by this universalization of maxims does it become possible that man acquires his inherent or -- internal or moral freedom through subjection to a alaw which he has imposed upon himself. He never becomes subject to a heteronomous law, to a law imposed on him by other beings, by nature, for example. External freedom, of which Kant also speaks, is defined independently of any specific purpose. Morality is defined independently of any purpose. In the case of right, of civil law, all members of a particular society impose the law on all members of that society. In the case of morality the individual imposes a law valid for mankind, of which mankind he is a member, and thus transcending not only his individual self-love -- that is done, to some extent, by the citizen -- but he transcends also the collective self-love of a particular society. This moral law, as Kant understands it, is the beginning of moral orientation. It has no support outside of itself. It cannot be deduced from the nature of man or anything else. And it has the character of an unconditioned command. No reasons are given why you should be decent. You should be decent -- period. It is, as Kant says, therefore the only fact of pure reason. In every other phenomenon, every other fact, pure reason, even while entering, is mixed with something else. Here alone is reason pure. It is the only absolute fact, the beginning of any possible understanding. Now what is -- does this practically mean? The crucial implication and which is much more radical in Kant than in Rousseau: there is no possibility of any objection based on experience to any moral demands because the moral demands are -- have a much higher dignity, a much higher rationality, than any empirical observation can possibly have. Possibility -- for example, the just society, the

rational society -- Plato and Aristotle would have said yes, but the rational society is possible only under certain conditions and if these conditions are not fulfilled it cannot become actual. That's absolutely rejected by Kant. For Kant it is perfectly sufficient regarding the just or rational society to show that it does not contain a contradiction in terms. For Plato and Aristotle that would not be enough. That would merely show that you don't contradict yourself in your proposal, but it might still be impossible, namely incompatible with the nature of things, with the nature of man. That is impossible for Kant. You can see that the daring which was made possible already by Rousseau's notion of the infinite perfectibility of man and the impossibility of drawing any conclusion regarding the future from past history, from what we know of civilized man, is infinitely increased by Kant. Reference to the nature of man has no bearing on the fundamentals of moral politics. I wonder whether I should go beyond that. Let me see. Perhaps there are certain points which are surely in need of clarification. Perhaps I devote the rest of this meeting to that. Mr. Cole.

"Just one thing about your remark concerning Kant's -- your presentation of Kant's statement that the essence of man is productivity and not contemplation. Is this peculiar to Kant and couldn't it be said the same of Hobbes and Locke?"

For Hobbes and Locke, every productivity is based on receptivity in every stage and not only in knowledge. They would, of course, admit the primacy of sense perception. Such a thing -- morality. What is the basis -- look --

"Why do you separate productivity from receptivity? Why is that so important?"

Well, is there -- I mean, I used it in order to make clear the radical difference between Kant and the whole tradition. I mean, well, in Plato and Aristotle the essence of man is contemplation. Man was born to behold the universe, the ideas, however you call it.

"Yes, well here by productivity don't you simply mean moral productivity, the products of practical reason, and not productivity of material things?"

That I've made clear, but the -- you see, but the essence of man is not -- I mean, that man has to be productive in order to live or to live reasonably well, that was always admitted. I mean, houses do not come into being without human production. That's clear, but the highest activities of men, those which are most truly human, were considered prior to that as not production but contemplation. In Kant that is impossible because the object of contemplation would be the thing in itself: nature or being as it truly is. That's inaccessible, so that contemplation can only have a very subordinate position. Our -- the highest activities of men, cognition, is production. That you learn today in every logical positivistic course. What is science except organising sense data? You know, making projects, making models: science? So that is productive activity and regarding morality -- yes, morality means to do the right thing, but according to Kant you cannot do the right thing if you do not know that the right thing has -- is imposed by you on yourself. It is your own legislation, a productive action.

"You said this becomes very important for Marx."

Because Marx comes -- Marx is, so to say, is prepared by Kant in the following way: Marx's attempt to understand the higher life of man in the light of

economic productivity presupposes a universal philosophy of man in which man as man was understood as productive even -- certainly in the highest activities. Take a parallel: art. What we now call art with a capital "A" was understood as an imitation of nature, imitation of nature. Today that's very generally rejected and the words are productivity is to lead these people to their creativity. You can also -- I mean, I have no objection if you want to introduce -- you can say, Kant laid the foundation for the understanding of man as a creative -- as essentially creative and not imitative, although Kant doesn't use that word but it is permissible to say that. And that is a very radical change. Now in the case of Hobbes and -- of course, that is, in a way, prepared by Hobbes and even by Bacon. Never forget the simple fact that the motto for the Critique of Pure Reason is taken from Bacon so Kant knew something about this pre-history, butstill there is a great difference of -- there is a difference not only of degree but of kind between these earlier men and Kant because -- I mean, you only have to read the classic passages in Hobbes about our making. How infinitely crude they are compared with Kant. And to say nothing of the fact that the moral principles are, of course in Hobbes absolutely imposed upon man by his natural instincts, so to say, and in no way self-imposed. In this respect, Hobbes is very old fashioned. Hobbes says the principles of morality are to be found by experience. Yes? We look how people behave and we see, for example, that fathers, believe it or not, lock their money away from their own children. What does this mean? Well, that they have a great distrust of their fellows and that you analyze more deeply, then you have the nature of man, the unchangeable nature of man; man as a selfish being cannot be changed. Kant, by -- Kant can deny the radical selfishness of man by the simple device, that is how man actually behaved as far as we can see in most cases if not always. But that doesn't mean that he cannot be unselfish. The fact that the moral law tells me to be unselfish -- I use now this simple formulation -- proves the possibility of selfishness -- of unselfishness. "Thou canst because thou oughtst," if that is possible. That is Kant's formula, and that no objection on the basis of theoretical knowledge of the phenomenal world is possible because that tells us only the outside and -- the outside and in addition something -- a mere human construct. It doesn't give us the core of the matter. Yes?

(Inaudible question).

The test -- well, take a simple case of immorality. Yes? A very simple case. A man who embezzles money because he needs it or he, as Kant wisely says -- he believes to need it because that is never such an absolute a priori certainty as the moral law itself could have been. Now what does he do? What should he do, according to Kant? He should say, wholly regardless of the positive law which forbids that -- he should say, is this -- my present intention to embezzle money -- compatible with a universal law commanding everyone to embezzle money when he believes he needs money? And then I see I didn't mean that. I only want to make a little exception for me on this particularoccasion. That is for Kant the root of immorality: to regard yourself, your present immoral action, as a little exception which has no meaning. That is the point. But it is, of course, more than that. Kant also says, means, by the categorical imperative, take on responsibility. You are not like a little -- be not like a little child -- yes -- who simply obeys, but take on responsibility. Regard yourself as the founder or creator of a world of which you would wish to be a member. If you look at your action in this perspective then, and only then, do you have a sufficiantly broad perspective for judging. I mean, that is not Kant's -- entirely the word -- but I try to explain it. In the perspective of the founder transcend selfishness. If you are a founder of a commonwealth and not merely just a member who might wish to exploit the commonwealth -- the founder is interested in the existence and of the happiness of his

foundation. By this you transcend selfishness, but on the other hand you must also view yourself as a member; meaning, the world which you will found must be bearable to human beings as such and you are an example of that. You see, the combination of the perspective of the founder and of the member gives you the broadest moral perspective. That is what he also means. It is, of course, a great question whether formal ethics as Kant meant it is possible, whether you really get beyond a certain notion of human nobility. Take in the present day form, there a number of cultures, as people say, and the contents of these moralities differ considerably in many points. Yes? Monogamy, polygamy, and many many other things. Now but all these cultures share one thing: there are -- a notion of noble things, noble actions, noble human beings, and despicable actions. Yes? You know? And these respective members of the different cultures understand one another in this particular thing, but that is only something formal in itself because the content is given in each case by the different cultures. Now Kant, of course, claims that by understanding this principle of nobility you get one and only one content -- you know? One can also state it as follows: morality, according to the ordinary understanding consists in doing the right thing in the right spirit. I mean, if you do the right thing, for example, abstaining from murder, merely out of fear of the police, you don't do it in the right spirit. Now what Kant says, as it were, is this: the right spirit alone is sufficient because the right spirit necessarily engenders the right thing and in the same way for all at all times and here is the difficulty. I mean, I can -- that would lead us to find out how Kant tried to believe that he couldn't do it without introducing as a matter of course that every being which universalizes a maxim is concerned with happiness and therefore no human law, no moral law, which is incompatible with human happiness can be a moral law. But the difficulty is that the same Kant had -- dppreciated happiness as a hopelessly subjective concept. You know, that is one of the more detailed difficulties into which I cannot go now. Did I answer your question?

> "Yes, I think so, but still I believe he can explain this only in the content of a society, whereas I would say the understanding doesn't exist outside of society. It might to the extent, as you said, that there are various cultures and what Kant. . . explains is their sense of all these -- (?) "

Yes, but when you say a culture then there is, of course, a danger that the self-preservation of this culture as a collective ego becomes a part of it. In other words, you are in danger of replacing simple egoism by the collective egoism and the only society of which we have to think, according to Kant, is all mankind. Yes? That is crucial for his notion. Yes, we can -- I do not know; can you restate your question?

(Inaudible reply).

That he denies. I mean, that man is -- although man is a social being and practically all his actions affect, directly or indirectly, other beings. That's quite true, but that doesn't mean, of course, that the peculiar moral content of this particular society or culture necessarily enters a man's moral principles. Do you see that?

"Yes, but it must have relevance at some stage to society."

Yes, well Kant would -- no, no. Kant would question that. Kant -- I mean, Kant would say you have to obey the law -- yes -- of the land. That -- I will speak of that later. That you have to do, but that does not mean that you are in

your moral horizon limited by the law of the land. Kant would not admit that: that you have to embrace the values of your society. He would say that's a very immoral principle. You know? That is as immoral as to say you have to accept the opinions of your father and grandfather regardless of what they were. I mean, if these principles of your society prove to be compatible with the moral law, all right, but if not, no. But there is one and only one moral law and there is one and only one notion of the just society. That is as -- and that is the same in Kant as in the earlier thinkers, only according to Kant these notions of the just society are -- must not be derived from any preceding end or purpose. Now the practical meaning is clear. The consequences are familiar to all of you. For Kant there is only one natural right and that he calls the right to freedom. I mean, the external freedom. Regardless of what the purpose is -- that is what we understand by liberalism. You know? If you say, say, self-preservation is the end there is the possibility to say self-preservation is better taken care of by a wise, benevolent despot than by a republican society. Could be. Yes? But if you say the only natural right is the right of freedom regardless of what the purpose is, that's clear. Republican or perhaps even democratic consequences follow from that and that is the tacit premise of present day liberalism as it still exists. That doesn't make it a true principle, but still it only shows that these seemingly abstruse reflections of Kant have a very definite and powerful practical political meaning. What we understand by freedom today -- by "we" I mean those who do not have their roots in something older than modern thought -- is the Kantian notion. Freedom which is not a freedom for; yes? Freedom itself is the highest good; politically, external freedom; morally, moral freedom. And that -- therefore that is both. Whenever you have a preceding end or purpose -- that is what Kant says -- you admit a principle limiting freedom. Is it time? Yes, then I have -- I'm sorry. Perhaps we can be -- today I have to leave.

Marx seminar, second meeting. April 4, 1960

I remind you of a few points I made last time regarding Rousseau because they are especially necessary for the understanding of Marx. The first point is that according to Rousseau no conclusion can be drawn from man as empirically known or as historically known to what man can be or what man should be. Rousseau must therefore develop a special method for finding out what man could be and that cannot be the observation of empirical man. Very generally speaking, he must find a way toward the natural man, toward the natural man, and the main point is that man is characterized by infinite malleability or by infinite perfectibility, by infinite perfectibility. This given the case, a society of free and equal men is possible. The fact that no such society ever existed cannot be held against that. The second point: in order to get a society of free and equal men it is necessary that each man, each member of the society, alienates all his powers to the community so that there be freedom in society, but this alienation of the individual to society means, of course, also the other way around that society is bondage. Society is possible only as civil society, as a state. This is somehow connected with the fact that civil society is based on private property and a certain element of injustice inevitably enters civil society on that score. There is, therefore, an inevitable antinomy between the happiness of the individual and his being a member of society. This shows itself, according to Rousseau, as follows: whenever man lives in society and this does not yet have to be civil society vanity develops, amore propre, as Rousseau calls it, competition with others and a competition which poisons the minds. Therefore happiness is possible only in withdrawal from society or in solitude. In other words, society -- for this reason there is a limitation not to human perfection but to the perfection of society. In all society as long as man lives in society you cannot get rid of this poisoning element which Rousseau calls amore propre, vanity you can say, pride, competitiveness, but this ceiling can be overcome in the case of the few men who can live outside of society. Now if we limit ourselves -- disregard this problem of competitiveness and amore propre we have the clear limit of society in the fact that society is devoted primarily to the protection of property. Therefore it would seem that you can overcome the difficulty, I mean, which I state in this formula. Here is the circle of civil society and here is that free individual at the fringes of society, in a way, outside of society. He is happy. He is truly a human being. They are somehow alienated and this alienation is the price they pay for freedom. They become completely citizens. They cease to be individuals. Now the simple solution -- Marx looked at this theme -- was to abolish property, to abolish property, to abolish the state and therefore, by this way, in this way, to have no longer a need of withdrawal from a fundamentally imperfect society. Rousseau's reply to that, if he had known of the Marxist solution, would have been you do not solve -- you can never solve the human problem by a solution, however perfect, of the social problem and that this point is reasonably well taken is shown empirically by a protest against Marx which arose long after Marx and with which you are all familiar. The antipode of Marx on a common sense level today is Freud and Freud's statement in Discontent of Civilization (sic) or however -- in Civilisation -- however it is called, this is simply a restatement of Rousseau's point of view. Civilization is as such a thing which leads to misery and therefore the solution of the problem of happiness cannot be found by any social means and -- well, if we take it in the crudest form we would need, in addition to communism, also psychoanalysis because people would not be satisfied by -- even by a perfectly just society. There would still remain the so-called personal problem. On another level the same, of course, is done by existentialism. There are existentialists who are

Marxists, as you know, in France especially, but they are distinguished from the Marxists by the fact that they are aware that the solution of the social problem is not a solution to the human problem. There is still -- perhaps the human problem is essentially insoluble, but then it is important to face that fact. That one can say simply is the thesis of this kind of existentialism.

Now I turn then to Kant who radicalises the Rousseauan position profoundly and Kant just as his other successors -- get rid of that satellite -- who are of the society and simply try to find the solution to the human problem in a properly constructed society. Kant said what man should be cannot be deduced, determined in any way by man's nature. Man's end can be determined only by man's becoming free from the tutelage of nature and of God. If he applies this to Rousseau's problem it is not true that man cannot become free from vanity in society. The mere fact that man's -- the moral law demands from man that freedom from vanity proves the possibility of it. Man can be free from vanity because he ought to be free of it, free from it. The end of man must be determined by disregarding all ends which either nature or God impose upon man and that means also, of course, self-preservation as an end. Pure reason alone determines the end of man and therefore the structure of the just society. For the question of whether a certain social project is possible or not you do not have to go into the question of whether it is compatible with the nature of man. You have only to see whether it is compatible with reason and this means also the possibility is determined by the absence of self-contradiction, not a study of the nature of man. Freedom -- freedom -- freedom in the sense in which it is now understood, not a freedom for certain ends, but a freedom -- freedom as an end in itself. Morality means the exercise of such freedom: self-legislation, self-determination. And this freedom consists in the fact that you conceive of yourself both as ruler and as ruled in a universal society. That is the meaning of the categoric imperative. The political counterpart of this universal society as a society of minds is -- would be a league of nations in Kant's teaching, a universal human society. But there is here a great complication which is characteristic of Kant's teaching to which I must turn now, and this is due to the fact that in Kant's doctrine the Rousseauan distinction between the individual and society reasserts itself in this way. Social progress, progress toward the just society, is not necessarily moral progress. The progress -- the outer, the social, the institutional, is radically distinguished from the inner, from the moral. I will explain that. Morality as Kant understands it is primarily the recognition of the rights of man. Such recognition is possible in two entirely different ways: in a calculating spirit or sincerely. Or to use the Kantian terms: in the spirit of legality or in the spirit of morality. From the legal point of view there is really nothing, strictly speaking, sacred. Only calculation prevails. Kant states the problem in this way: the perfect -- the usual view was that a perfect society, a just society, requires the complete regeneration of men, or to exaggerate, it requires that men become angels, to which Kant replies, that's nonsense. The perfect -- the just society is possible among -- in a nation of devils provided that devils have sense. By sense he means provided they are shrewd calculators. The perfectly just society can be established without any moral regeneration, but let me go a step back. Kant makes it possible by his moral teaching to regard the rights of man as sacred. Because morality as he conceives of it is not utilitarian but irreducible he does not try to deduce the rights of man from the right of self-preservation which is something which is hardly distinguishable from what one could ascribe to the brutes. It is this way: it is a sacred duty of each to bring about the recognition of the sacred rights of men, even of those men who are not moral, even of those who are prompted only by calculation. The just or rational society, the

society based on the recognition of the rights of men is necessary and possible both for immoral men and for moral men, for a nation of angels as well as for a nation of devils, i.e. mere good calculators. That means the state is in one sense morally neutral. It is not directed toward virtue or toward the development of man's faculties or even towards outward decency as such or public welfare. It has -- the state has no function but to guarantee external freedom, freedom of movement. Yet this external state, this night watchman state as it was called later on, is required by morality and therefore this seemingly immoral, but in fact amoral state is of the utmost moral relevance. The state as state is concerned only with legality, meaning that everyone in fact respects the rights of everyone else and fundamentally the natural rights of each. The reasoning is this: the law, compulsion, coercion, is unable to produce morality, but on the other hand it must not interfere with the moral freedom of each. A compulsory morality would not be morality. The foundation of right, therefore, is freedom, external freedom which is needed by everyone regardless of what his purpose is, regardless of whether his purpose is moral or immoral. You cannot pursue your purpose if you are not free to pursue it and therefore this freedom is wholly independent of any purpose or end you may pursue. Only for the sake of that freedom which every man manifestly needs, whatever his purpose may be, can the freedom of anyone be abridged. In other words, a certain abridgement is necessary, but this abridgement is justified only to the extent to which it is needed for guaranteeing the maximum of freedom to each. This is really a classic formulation of the liberal position. The state guarantees the security of that freedom to each under equal laws. The crucial point which I must repeat is this: that only through Kant, through Kant's revolution, do the rights of man, which played such a great role already prior to Kant, become sacred because they are derivative from a non-utilitarian morality. Now we are here confronted with the following predicament. We are obliged as moral beings to act morally and that means to recognise indeed the rights of man; for example, never to treat a man as a slave. That would be a simple example. But thisrrecognition of the rights of man is necessarily incomplete if we live under laws which prevent such recognition. On the other hand, we are under a moral obligation to obey the law of the land and revolution is strictly immoral, according to Kant. The reason is extremely simple: no revolution without preceding conspiracy and no conspiracy without lying, and lying is absolutely immoral. We are therefore -- how can we get out of that according to Kant? We are morally obliged to hope for the establishment of the just society, but we cannot take this crucial conspiratorial step. We are -- we must therefore see whether this hope is altogether fantastic or whether it has some basis in fact, in the "is." We must, in other words, look at history with philosophic eyes. We must approach history with the a priori premise of a possible teleology of nature. Teleology of nature: that was the old Aristotelian doctrine which still lingered on in various ways but which was fundamentally exploded by the development of modern mechanistic physics. So from Kant's point of view -- who accepts Newton -- the teleology of nature is theoretically unfounded. It is not, it cannot be, a theoretically true teaching. Yet, in a way the teleology of nature must be restored because it is necessary to establish a link between the is -- the mere factual is -- and the ought of the moral. And philosophy of history in Kantian sense is only the culmination of this natural teleology. Morality guarantees the moral necessity of a just society; the moral necessity meaning that it is our duty to strive toward it. Morality also guarantees the physical possibility of the just society because the principle is: thou canst what thou oughtst -- if that is intelligible, the literal translation of what Kant says, "Du kanst den du sollst." Historical proofs to the contrary possess no validity whatsoever for the conclusion from "never hitherto" to "never in the future" is not valid. Yet there exists some historical proof of progress toward the just society which supports our hope. The

weak traces of progress which we observe tip the scale in favor of probability of the emergence of the just society as distinguished from the mere possibility and therefore these weak traces of progress are very important. The realization of the just society is beyond the powerof any one individual, say of a mighty prince. It is even beyond the power of the collective effort of mankind. Therefore we need support, some support, apart from the moral law or the categoric imperative. The natural or unintended or mechanical must act as if it intended the just society. Now when I'm through with this exposition we will see why this is relevant for Marx, but for the time being you must be a bit patient. I say now one point: philosophy of history. Kant was the first philosopher of the first rank who dealt with philosophy of history as such. Now philosophy of history is necessary because we need some theoretical, not merely moral, support for morality in its political implications. The fact that we know what the just society is and that it is possible is not enough. We must have some greater support for our hope because we cannot act towards it, acting being conspiratorial and therefore immoral. Now within his systematic writings Kant has sketched the principles of his philosophy of history only in the Critique of Judgment and even there only in the appendix. The philosophy of history has in Kant a lower status than the natural teleology in general. Why? Let us look at the substance of Kant's philosophy of history. Philosophy of history postulates a teleology, a directedness of historical process, and more fundamentally a teleology of nature, a directedness of nature which shows how thehistorical process, apparently a meaningless web spun chiefly by crimes and follies, can be understood as a meaningful process; because if the word teleology is in any way embarrassing to you say meaningful because that's exactly the same thing. It shows the wise and moral meaning of those follies and crimes we find at the surface of history. It shows the necessity of those follies and crimes. Now the necessity not mechanically: that this fellow had an Oedipus complex and therefore had to murder his mother or whatever they do when they have an Oedipus complex. But that this action was meaningful with a view to its end. Yes? That's the point. Moral actions, good or evil, are actions of human individuals which cannot be subject to natural necessity because they are teleological or mechanical. They are free acts. Philosophy of history must therefore bridge the gulf between moral freedom and mechanical necessity. An inkling of how this is possible is supplied by statistics regarding suicides, crimes, etc., which show that these free actions of men have a strange regularity. These actions areffree and hence unpredictable -- actions of individuals. Yet we find regularities and hence predictability when we turn from the individuals to aggregates, as Kant puts it. The actions of human aggregates are subject to natural laws. Hence, history as the account of the action of aggregates as distinguished from individuals may lead to the discovery of laws of non-moral necessities controlling the sequence of those actions and this necessity may even be, in a way, a teleological necessity. The sequence may be shown to lead to an end, the end being the just society. Now how is this sequence, this progress, to be conceived? How was it conceived prior to Kant? The probability of the actualization of the just society was thought to be guaranteed by the overwhelming power of the end which this just society was the thought to serve. Self-preservation, as the object of the strongest and most powerful desire, or fear of violent death, as the strongest passion, is the support of the just society according to the Hobbes-Lockian scheme. Now -- but why do we not have such sound society in spite of the power of the fear of violent death of which we are all aware? Answer: the power of the fear of violent death is counteracted by the fear of powers invisible in the Hobbian phrase, i.e. by religion. The just society becomes, therefore, possible in proportion as the fear of powers invisible is weakened. When people cease to fear punishment after death the fear of death comes into its own and then a rational polity is possible. In other words, the solution to that prior to Kant was the just society comes about by en-

lightenment, the spreading of the truth, and this spreading of the truth is the necessary consequence of the discovery of the truth. They somehow believed that. Yes? That someone -- a man has discovered the truth -- he cannot keep it; he must do that and then the consequence here. Yet there was a difficulty here which was clearly seen by Rousseau. Men enter society for the sake of self-preservation, but society makes men oblivious of the supremacy of self-preservation. Society necessarily endangers vanity and thus weakens primary self-love, self-preservation. It thus makes men willing subjects of despotism and therefore the discovery of the political truth, which means the discovery of the character of the just society, is not sufficient for bringing about the just society. The case would be hopeless if the powers detaining social men -- determining social men, civilized men, love of gain, love of dominion, love of honor and so on, did not themselves compel men to move toward the just society. The moral degradation, if I may say so, brought about by society, must itself be an instrument for bringing about the society which is in accordance with morality. That is Kant's improvement of Rousseau, one can say, Kant's correction of Rousseau. Not the return from the imperfect civil society to the state of nature, but the progress from the imperfect civil society to the perfect civil society is possible and necessary. The general schema is this: vanity -- Rousseau makes a distinction between self-love as the same as self-preservation, amore de soi (?), and say self-love and amore propre, let us say vanity, vanity or pride. Now this leads -- vanity is the root of the passions proper, love of gain, love of superiority of various kinds. Now this leads to the passions and also to wealth, comfort, and all these other dubious goods of society. It also leads to discord. The competitiveness is necessary to discord. Ever increasing wealth, ever increasing discord; ever more costly wars, enormous public debts -- they spoke of that already then, you know -- and therefore the need for perpetual peace impresses itself on the most wicked hoodlums who may be princes, you know. They see simply it is not to their interest, to their calculating, devilish self-interest, to have any further war. Nature, as Kant puts it -- nature achieves its end; this perfect just society which would be a federation of republics, a universal federation of republics, brings it about through antagonisms. There is no moral motivation here necessary. You see, the situation becomes -- the solution becomes much easier. If the salvation of the human race depends on moral regeneration we cannwait until doomsday, but if the very immorality of man necessarily contributes to the bringing about of the just society we can be sanguine. Men are compelled by their passions and the consequence of their passions to become receptive to the just society. Morality does not enter here. Therefore the thing is fundamentally easy. Yes? I mean, it is difficult enough but the greatest difficulty has been overcome. Yet, given man's freedom is he not able to resist the overpowering trend toward the federation of republics. Yes? The federation of republics; perpetual peace. No! And that's the beauty of Kant. Freedom as moral freedom categorically demands the just society so both the wicked and the good, the wicked for wicked reasons, the good for good reasons, must promote this progress. The just society is demanded at all times by morality. In our age -- I mean, in Kant's age -- it is necessitated by intelligent immorality as well and the latter is, of course, much more powerful than morality. Morality commands the just society. Calculating egoism is driven into the just society, but this driving is much more powerful than the commanding or demanding. It looks as if -- Kant doesn't go beyond that cautious, agnostic "it looks" -- it looks as if there were a purpose of nature which leads to the achievement of the same thing that ought to be the work of moral freedom. The just society ought to be the work of moral freedom, but it isn't the work of moral freedom. Mechanical, amoral, immoral necessity brings it about. This is a remarkable, a marvelous convergence and harmony; in fact, a paradoxical convergence and harmony. The teleology is assured

a priori. We cannot have any empirical knowledge of it. We cannot even have a theoretical a priori knowledge of it. We have only a practical a priori knowledge of it, i.e. we are morally obliged to hope for it. That's the meaning of that. What we can observe is only the necessity of certain effects; for example, the effect of bankruptcy coming from the cause of public debt or coming from costly wars. That is the mere mechanical non-moral necessity. The mechanistic system by its inherent necessities, without any interference on the part of morality, leads from the passions to the just society in a way which is at no point interrupted. Yet it so happens that this mechanical necessity leads to the result which is demanded by morality. It is truly paradoxical for the following reason. What morality commands cannot be simply the same thing as that to which men are compelled by mechanical necessity. Therefore, the philosophy of history deals only with institutional progress, not with moral progress. These devils who are driven into the just society by calculation don't cease to be devils. Well, that they are now members of a republic which in its part is a member of a universal federation of republics. So there is only institutional progress; no moral progress. Philosophy of history deals, to some extent, with intellectual progress; naturally, because the understanding of these devils needs some intelligence supplied by social science, economics, etc. But intellectual progress in this sense has nothing to do with moral progress, as I think is empirically known. The condition for the establishment of the just society is a victory of the spirit of commerce, selfish gain uniting the nations, over the spirit of positive religion which as positive religion is divisive. This is the most important part of the philosophy of history as Kant understands it. You see here the importance of the so-called economic element. This mechanical necessity includes as a crucial factor the victory of trade over positive religion. This again -- but the intellectual progress which is implied -- and there is a connection between trade and intellectual progress which is quite obvious. The name for that intellectual progress is the development of economics. Now this is however not simply -- is however simply the intellectual progress or enlightenment which brings about this change. The passions engendered by ecclesiastical misrule and ecclesiastical wealth are much more important than the enlightenment itself. The enlightenment only gives some idea of the direction to which you move, but the power comes from the passions. You see, that also -- and how does it work? Yes, the envy -- I mean, the indignation against ecclesiastical misrule, the envy of ecclesiastical wealth, leads to such things as the Reformation, i.e. the religious wars, and -- religious wars -- and then that -- the contrast between the religious wars and the commercially profitable character of tolerance, empirically shown by , and these are the real elements, these are the weak traces of progress pointing toward the just society. This makes clear what Kant emphasizes: that we are concerned hereafter with a moral progress but with a morally relevant progress because as good men we must be concerned with the establishment of a just society even if it is established by the immoral passions. And the argument can be stated as follows: the immoral passions are effective at all times, in the Peloponnesian War and wherever you might look. But gradually the situation is now this: that these immoral passions which were always effective in men now become effective in the right direction. We can only be grateful for that. Philosophy of history cannot deal with moral progress. Moral progress cannot be achieved by any teleology of nature. Philosophy of history deals with the necessary progress toward the just society, toward the goal of the highest moral relevance. Now is this possible? I repeat. Legality in Kant -- I'll elucidate this by the distinction between legality and morality. The just society is possible as an automaton driven by enlightened self-interest as distinguished from morality, a soulless mechanism. All men do the right thing but not for the right reasons: a nation of devils. This can be brought about by compulsion:

legal compulsion or compulsion by the passions or compulsion by starvation or what have you. And that -- institutional progress which is in itself not moral progress is, however, of the highest moral relevance, but there is a radical difference from moral progress. Now let me see. Now I will not go -- I mean, I may perhaps take this up later; there are certain points here where Kant is compelled to prepare a harmony and perhaps even a coincidence of the moral progress and the intellectual progress. I will drop this now for the time being and go on to a point after Kant.

One way of stating the problem with which all these men were concerned from Rousseau till Marx and beyond is that -- is the problem of morality and happiness. Rousseau's solution or statement of the problem was this: you have and you can have morality proper only in civil society; only there can be duty and virtue. Happiness, on the other hand, is possible only in the state of nature which means, practically, beyond civil society: the individual at the fringes of civil society. Kant's thesis regarding this point, happiness and morality, is this: we are morally obliged to hope for the happiness of those who are worthy to be happy, but this hope does not make sense regarding this life so we must hope for the happiness of those who are worthy to be happy in another life. As regards this life, our duties consist, according to Kant, to take care of one's own perfection, the cultivation of natural gifts, and of the happiness of others. Now that is of some importance for what I'm going to say. If you try to -- the happiness of others means, for example, to protect them against war, against illness, and this kind of thing. That's your moral duty. It is not your moral duty to take care of your own happiness because you do it anyway. There is no moral merit if someone takes all kinds of medicine in order to -- not to get sick -- you know? But on the other hand you are obliged to cultivate your natural faculties. You are not obliged -- as a matter of fact, you transgress if you regard yourself responsible for the perfection of other men because that means paternal despotism. That's his business, to take care of his perfection. You must help him, but in the decisive respect, regarding his -- the cultivation of his natural gifts, you cannot really help him except as far as the externals are concerned. I start from this distinction in order to turn now to a famous successor to Kant who in some respects comes closer to Marx than even Hegel. His name is Fichte and I take the statements I'm going to use from his small writing -- well, the Die Bestimung des Gelehrten(?). How could you understand that? Literally, the destiny, the destiny of the scholar or scientist. The word gelehrer had at that time in Germany still the full meaning where it could mean the scholar, the scientist, and the philosopher as well. Yes, the function, you could almost say, of the scholar. Now Fichte starts from Kant and -- man is as a rational being -- is an end in itself. This is the Kantian doctrine already. It is implied in what I said before. Morality consists in recognizing the rights of man, in recognizing the dignity of each man as a being capable of morality. Man as a rational being is an end in itself. That means, as Fichte points out, he is because he is, i.e. not for the sake of something else. Hence, as rational being he is an absolute being. More precisely, man is meant to be the absolutely rational being because he is it -- he is -- that's not in fact (?). To be subject only to himself and to subject everything non-rational within him and outside of him to reason. Man is meant to be the ruler or fellow-ruler of the whole, but man is also a sensual being, not merely a rational being. Therefore the absolute rationality toward which he is destined can only be an infinite goal. He could only achieve it by ceasing to be a rational sensual being which he is as a human being. Man is destined, furthermore, to live in society. Society means the mutual interaction of individuals through freedom. This mutual interaction leads to -- as a human fight is a spiritual fight among the minds in which, according to Fichte, the higher or better always wins. You remember certain statements

of Justice Holmes; that is Fichte, but in Fichte it is based on the fact, because the spiritual or rational character of the fight itself guarantees the victory of the higher, of the more rational. In brief, and that I think is the crucial point, the increase in intimacy, in rationality, is an increase in universality. Now that is, of course, crucial for Marx too. Why can this final society which embraces all men be the solution to the human, to the most personal problem? Because the most universal society is the most intimate society. That's a paradoxical assertion, but which we must understand. Take Aristotle. There is always, apart from civil society, friendship, and the problem which cannot be solved by the polis in any way is solved by friendship. Friendship is essentially an affair of very few, classically of two. You know, in all the famous stories of friends there are two: Horace- and what have you. So the political association is not the most intimate association and therefore friendship can have a much higher function than political society can have. If you want to find the solution to the human problem which is a social solution you must somehow assume that the increase in universality is an increase in intimacy and the link between this thought is that universality is possible only by rationality. Yes? I mean, nothing short -- only reason, something rational, can by its nature be common to all men, universal. And this -- yes, but the rational, the meeting in the rational, is the most intimate relation. Both partners, all partners, think identically the same which you cannot say of any other human association. But, according to Fichte, society is not the state. The state is characterized by compulsion and compulsion means the presence of imperfect rationality. You do not have to compel a man to the rational thing if he is rational. So therefore the state can only be a means for establishing the perfect society, but in the perfect society itself pure reason would be universally recognized as the highest judge. You know? The highest society, the final society, is a stateless society so the state is only a means for bringing about the final society. . . just as in Marx. The specifically human potentialities, potentialities characteristic of man, peculiar to man, are founded on reason, naturally, if man is a rational animal, and therefore these specifically human potentialities are equal in all men. Consider that carefully. That is not a new thesis. The traditional view was that the intellectual inequalities among men are due to the body. You can find this in Thomas Aquinas for example -- to matter. The intellect as intellect is the same in all men, but because the intellect is always found in a body the body affects the intellect and therefore there is a great variety of levels of the intellect. So the specifically human potentialities are equal in all men. Hence, if man's destiny is to become perfectly rational it follows that it is man's destiny to become perfectly equal and therefore the function of man is to develop in each all faculties equally, i.e. to the highest perfection. The rational society is a society in which all its members are perfectly equal, not only, as they are in liberal society, equal before the law. That's nothing. They are perfectly equal if the faculties in each individual, the same faculties, are equally developed. Otherwise you have, for example, the difference between painters and non-painters and so on. Those of you who have read Marx's German Ideology will recognize some Marxian thoughts here. By nature men are different and unequal. This is -- this "mistake" of nature -- Fichte's own word -- in other words, nature is, in a way, unjust. She made men different and unequal. This mistake of nature is corrected by society. Society develops all faculties of its members to the highest degree, but only severally. In -- (it's really hard; it is not only due to my handwriting, but also to the light; at least that is what I believe). Yes, in this way -- why are all faculties developed in society? Because what one individual cannot do another can. Say, the one is developed to a perfect painter and the other is developed to a perfect blacksmith and the other is developed to a perfect fisher. Now the different faculties are perfectly developed, but in different individuals. That is what society

does anyway. Now there is a fight of reason against nature. The ideal goal would be the complete victory of reason over nature, of egalitarian reason over unegalitarian nature. Now here a difficulty arises: what should we do in the meantime because this perfect egalitarian society and stateless -- the liberal state has withered away -- is only in the infinite future. What should we do? Should in the meantime a division of labor prevail or should we already try now to have jacks of all trades. Fichte says one must leave this open. The moral law does not determine that. It is simply a rule of prudence for the time being. And Fichte assumes, then, the premise of division of labor and under that premise he asserts the supremacy of the scholars or scientists. If there is to be division of labor, if men develop different faculties differently, then those who develop themselves to the highest degree, the scientists or scholars, should occupy the highest place. They are the supervisors of the progress of the human race for the whole progress of mankind depends on the progress of the sciences. Now I point out to you two differences -- the Marxian phrases are very obvious -- very obvious but there are, of course, also differences. The differences which are most familiar are these. Marx's objection would be this: it is fantastic to set a goal to mankind in which man has ceased to be a sensual being, i.e. a perfectly rational being. In historical terms, here is where the influence of Feuerbach, of Feuerbach's sensualism, against the spiritualism of people like Fichte, comes in. The second point is that Fichte assumes an infinite progress. The stateless society where each develops the same faculties as everyone else equally is -- will never be achieved, is an infinite goal. And here the difficulty enters which Hegel had pointed out against Kant emphatically: namely, the absurdity of the notion of the infinite progress.

One can even state this more simply as follows. Kant taught that it is a moral law -- a moral law demands for us to strive toward perpetual peace, but perpetual peace is an infinite goal. Yes? Infinite goal. That means, of course, in plain English, as Hegel with his hard common sense saw, perpetual war. Yes? And then if you think concretely about it you see that doesn't make the wars any way better or sweeter, that they become -- but much tougher, much tougher because you have the constant -- you act on the delusion, we are closer to peace -- you know -- because we are after the last war, and then this leads into infinite troubles. In other words, what Hegel -- Hegel's whole criticism of what he called bad infinity comes into Marxist doctrine and therefore his objection to Fichte would be this goal of the abolition of the state is a meaningless goal if it is not within reach of men in the relatively near future. It cannot be an infinite goal. It must be a goal to be achieved within a few generations.

Now there is one more point which I have to mention and I'm through with my introduction. (Who has the time? What is the time? Thank you). I must now say a few words about the most important predecessor of Hegel (sic). I will speak much less about Hegel than about Rousseau and about Kant because quite a few characteristic elements of Hegel's teaching are implied in what Kant and Rousseau said and furthermore in the case of Hegel we shall discuss Marx's own critique of Hegel and therefore we do not -- I must say only some very general points. Now I begin from a problem of Kant -- as it appeared in Kant, and that concerns the teleology of nature. The teleology of nature is not knowable. We must -- we are morally obliged to assume it, in a way, but it cannot be known and we can state the reason why the teleology of nature is not knowable in a very simple way. God is not knowable and in Kant's view teleology presupposes a wise God. God is not knowable, i.e. we cannot demonstrate the existence of God. We can only postulate the existence of God on the basis of moral reason, but that is not knowledge, properly speaking. Hegel's -- and since the teleology of nature is a problematic thing for

Kant, the philosophy of history is a problematic thing. You see, I mean, that is for Kant only a kind of sketch, a sketch which has a certain plausibility, but -- and which probably meant more to him than his expressions say, but theoretically it does not have a good basis. Hegel's critique of Kant can be reduced to this simple formula. Kant had tried to prove the impossibility of a metaphysics proper, i.e. of a speculative or theoretical metaphysics, and that was the root of all the troubles according to Hegel's diagnosis. According to Hegel, Kant had discovered the true metaphysics without knowing it. Now what did he mean by that? Kant showed in reply to Hume -- I have alluded to that last time -- that the world as we know it, scientifically and pre-scientifically, is decisively a work of the human mind, of the human understanding. On the basis of sense data which the mind only receives -- the mind organizes these sense data to use the now familiar expression. It brings order into that chaos. The order inheres in the human understanding, not in the sense data. To that extent the world as we knowiit is a work of the human mind. But since it is the work of the human mind -- that was Kant's conclusion -- it is not the true world. It is the phenomenal world. The world as it truly is, the noumenal world, is inaccessible to us as theoretical men. Hegel makes this very simple observation: the understanding which creates the phenomenal world is not a part of the phenomenal world and cannot be understood as a part of the phenomenal world and that can easily be shown, that it cannot be understood as a part of the phenomenal world. Every psychological explanation of the human understanding and of science leads to nonsense. The human understanding which creates the phenomenal world is not a part of the phenomenal world, but what then is it? That is the noumenal world. More generally, the organizing, legislating, constituting mind, theoretical or practical, is the absolute. This absolute, a word which came into usage at that time in Germany -- the absolute is not something which we infer by demonstration of the existence of God or what have you -- or immortality of the soul. We find it by simple analysis. The hidden ground discoverable by analysis of the acts -- of the world and of the acts of the mind which constitute the world -- that is the discovery of the absolute. So Hegel arrives at the extreme thesis -- the absolute is mind, that could have been said by Aristotle in a different way: the absolute is mind -- but everything rightly understood, if we go through the immediate appearance, say the rock or of the stellar system or what have you, we discover mind, we discover mind. Now let me see. Everything that is is mind -- yes, of course, the rock or stellar system is not mind in this way. Hegel has a formula for that: it is alienated mind, mind which does not -- mind which does not present itself as mind, which is even non-mind, but as non-mind only intelligible as a work of mind. I can now use only these deceptively simple formulas, but they are essential because they are the starting point for Kant's criticism. Let us call the principle of the whole -- let us call. . . .

(Change of tape).

. . . conscious of himself. This is, one can say, the formula of Hegel's metaphysics. A crucial part of Kant's critique of metaphysics was that if the theoretical mind tries to think about the principle of anything it becomes entangled in what Kant called antinomies. The antinomies mean, very roughly, this: that it is possible for -- it is possible to prove contradictory assertions -- you know, when I make a contradictory assertion regarding this piece of paper, it is here or it's not here, I talk nonsense. On the highest level, Kant says, this same nonsense occurs, but not arbitrary because this contradiction I can avoid, but necessarily. In other words, the mind must think the world has a beginning in time and the world has no beginning in time. It can demonstrate both. Therefore, a complete breakdown of pure reason regarding the highest things. That was, one can say, the

most important refutation of metaphysics which Kant tried and here Hegel again says, don't you see that you have the solution to the problem in your hands? This contradiction, the essential contradictorialness of reason is a vehicle of reason because this -- the fact that on this level here -- that on this level here you arrive at a contradiction proves the necessity of going to another level where the contradiction is overcome and you find that this contradictorialness is the fundamental logical equivalent to what Kant had discerned in his philosophy of history as antagonisms. The antagonisms among human beings -- you know, the passionate amoral or immoral antagonisms among men bring about the just society. Similarly, these seeming absurdities of reason contradicting itself: that is the highest activity of reason. A formula for that which is of old origin, but rejuvenated by Kant, was dialectics and that is the key -- only for Kant dialectics meant the collapse of reason. For Hegel it meant the triumph of reason. So the Hegelian metaphysics is then and in this sense dialectical. To repeat, what Hegel saw here -- contended against Kant is this: the noumenal world, the thing in itself, which according to Kant is wholly inaccessible to us, is according to Hegel accessible to us partly in the work of Kant itself. Kant's analysis of pure reason and of the understanding is a part of an analysis of the thing in itself, of the noumenal world, because that is no longer the phenomenal world. The noumenal world is the mind and the things as the works of the mind, the objectivations of the mind, but the mind essentially develops. Therefore, the noumenal world is the true world, the object of metaphysics is the mind and its development: history, rightly understood. So the thing in itself, far from being inaccessible or accessible only as a moral postulate is accessible to us if we intelligently look at the historical process. This implies, to mention one point which is crucial, that this process is, of course, as a process of the mind a rational process. I mean, just as these crimes and follies of vulgar history -- yes -- prove to be already on the basis of Kant meaningful because they bring about the just society at the end, in the same way for Hegel still more these crimes and follies are only the smoke and the noise which accompanies the true process, a silent process of the progress of reason. In this process the earlier stages are necessarily preserved in the later stages. The earlier stages are imminent in the later. So the crimes and follies were necessary, were necessary. Theearlier stages did not merely miss the truth, so, say, some Persian or Hindu notions or Chinese notions are not simply wrong. It was essential -- I mean, necessary -- that men thought these thoughts and thought them through for long periods so that the mind was enabled to rise to a higher stage. The mind is the absolute. This means the rational society, society in accordance with the mind, must become fully actual. Now if it is to become actual in an infinite process it will never become actual. I mean, if you say it becomes actual only in an infinite process you say also it will never become actual so there cannot be an infinite process and therefore Hegel can now develop a teleological doctrine of the whole with a good conscience. The whole process is teleological. The development, the unfolding of the mind until it has reached -- it has manifested itself fully. This all implies that the historical process must have been completed. If the historical process is not completed you cannot -- never prove its rationality. You do not know what will come out later. The rationality may only be up to a certain stage and then it may lead to a tragic end. So the historical process is completed. That means in political terms the just society exists. It's not a matter of the future. Now how could Hegel say that the just society existed? Well, he did this on the basis of Rousseau and Kant. The just society is the society in which the rights of man are recognized. This happened in the French Revolution. The French Revolution, according to Kant, was the attempt of man, the first attempt of man to stand on his head. That was not a criticism on Hegel's part; the greatest job (?). That man stands on his head means he tried to build society on reason and the rational society being one which recognizes the rights of man as

man: that was done in the French Revolution in the famous Declaration of the Rights of Man at the beginning. Yes surely, then the French Revolution became a great scandal as we all know and therefore the French Revolution is not sufficient as such, but that -- it needed stabilization. The recognition of the rights of man is not sufficient. You must also have a government which is capable to protect the rights of man and while the rights of man are fundamentally egalitarian the need for government cannot be understood in egalitarian terms. Not everyone who has rights has -- can therefore have full political rights. As it was put some time ago by President Eisenhower, federal employment is a privilege, but not a right. Now still more the presidency of the United States and a cabinet seat in the cabinet is not a right but a privilege. Government cannot -- is something to be distinguished from the rights to which -- which everyone can have. And who was it who put the crown on the French Revolution by recognizing not only the rights of man, but making possible government on that basis, legislation, lasting legislation on that basis? Napoleon. And therefore Napoleon -- the Napoleonic empire was for the younger Hegel the establishment of the final and just society. And then, as Hegel may have thought in some moments without publishing it, then these people, the Germans and Italians and so, fell back on their nationalistic dreams, destroyed the Napoleonic empire -- the Holy Alliance, you know, and then you got the famous reaction and this -- it was Hegel's misfortune to live under that regime and from 1815 until his death in 1831 and therefore Hegel brought out a somewhat more acceptable, at that time acceptable, solution. That was his Philosophy of Right. In the Philosophy of Right he accepted the Prussian monarchy, for example, of which he was an employee, and he accepted it as a post-revolutionary state. In other words, by a certain -- yes, Hegel adapted himself. All right. There is no question. But still, he -- but that was not a mere act of adaptation. That was some very good reasoning because the Prussian monarchy already since Frederick the Great had become a rational state somehow and to a higher degree under the influence of the reformers of 1812 to 15 with Hegel was in sympathy. I do not want to go into this question. It is very important for the details of Marx's criticism because Marx criticized, of course, Hegel's Philosophy of Right which was this document of Hegel's adaptation to the Prussian hereditary monarchy and then he had, in many ways, easy going. But I must mention only -- and there are other great difficulties -- there are many loose threads in Hegel; there is no question. For example, from Hegel's point of view a war at least among European states is, in his opinion, absolutely impossible because there is no longer a problematic principle involved. The fundamental issue is settled. There can no longer be a genuine issue. Trivial things like a little bit of a frontier: that's not worth a war, and yet the war plays, in Hegel's political doctrine, a very great role. And there are other things. I will mention only a few more points as a transition.

For Hegel it is as essential as for Kant and for Rousseau to make a distinction between the state as that work which guarantees the rights of man and therefore has the sacredness of the rights of man and even a higher sacredness, and what they called with an untranslatable word, die burgerlichergesellschaft. I don't know; the term occurs in Marx all the time and I don't know what the English translators do with that. Yes, bourgeois society is really not a bad translation. It is, of course, not an entirely good translation because burgerlicher gesellschaft is simply originally civil society. Now the ambiguity is worth looking into. The German word burger, burger in English -- yes -- has an ambiguity which was first pointed out by Rousseau because the French word bourgeois has a similar ambiguity, but burger means on the one hand the inhabitant of a burg, of a burg, a town, and the towns had -- the townspeople had a greater freedom already in the Middle Ages than the non-noble country people. Therefore, from this point of view,

the burger reminds of the citizen of the ancient republics and they called themselves, perhaps citoyen in France -- yes, they called themselves citoyen. Rousseau simply laughed at it and said these French burgers -- they're no citizens. They're subjects of the French king and to be a citizen and a subject is mutally incompatible. A citizen means you are a member of the sovereign and a subject is you are subject to the -- simply a subject to the sovereign. So Rousseau made a distinction between the citoyen, citizen, and the bourgeois, the bourgeois being the subject and probably the wealthy subject of a half-feudal king or monarch of the ancien regime. Now this. . . this distinction was taken over by Hegel and eventually by Marx and Hegel especially is very important here because Hegel gives a philosophic definition of the bourgeois. The bourgeois is characterized by fear of violent death. You know, that had been Hobbes' definition of man, of the reasonable man, at any rate, but what Hegel says is this: the subject of the old regime is not a soldier, of course. He does not defend the fatherland. That is done by mercenaries who are hired by the absolute king. The citizen fights for his country. The citizen is a republican concept and bourgeois is a modern, monarchic concept and from this there was -- yes, now how does the distinction show itself? The bourgeois are burgers engaged in trade, commerce, industry, and from this there developed the meaning, Die Burgerlicher Gesellschaft, bourgeois society, as a society of the market, organized by the market -- not the marketplace, but the market and -- the economic society. Now Hegel makes, therefore, a distinction in accordance -- between the state as the overarching and sacred association and the -- yes, burgerlicher gesellschaft, the bourgeois society, which however as a competitive society must be a free society. As I have read -- only Mr. Cropsey can tell us whether it is true or not -- Hegel fundamentally adopts Adam Smith's doctrine and incorporates it into the Philosophy of Right. So it's essentially true? Yes. So, in other -- but this bourgeois society is accepted but only as subordinate, only as subordinate, but the distinction of the two is absolutely essential and is one of the beginnings of Marx's criticism.

Now we can state Marx's criticism of Hegel, the initial criticism, very simply as follows. Hegel's state, this rational state, Prussia 1920 (sic), following -- Metternich -- is not a rational state. It is not a rational state and therefore the historical process cannot have reached its end, but on the contrary the establishment of the rational state is a matter of the future and if we think through the rational state, Marx says, we cannot be satisfied with any rational state for the Fictian reason: because if men are rational they don't need compulsion anymore. Therefore, the withering away of the state. But in order to achieve all these things Marx has to take a much bigger step: namely, to develop not only another philosophy against Hegel in particular, but to reject philosophy altogether and that we must try to understand, which -- I can only say the thesis: Marx says all -- not only Hegel, but all philosophers have been wrong and this was due to the fact that they were philosophers, not to any particular error, for philosophers as such believe in the primacy of thinking. That is their professional disease. But thinking is derivative and hence the philosophers -- philosophers are wrong. Now someone would say but that may be true of these fantastic Germans, but what about the sensualists and materialists of these enlightened countries in the West, England and France? They did -- they always said thinking comes afterward. First you have impressions, sense impressions -- you know, Locke, Hume and so on. Why are they also -- do they suffer from the professional disease of philosophers in a somewhat different way? What do they say? What is so wrong with them? The fundamental phenomenon is not thinking, they admit. The fundamental phenomenon is sense perception, they say, but what is sense perception according to -- I mean, what is the character of sense perception? Receptivity. You don't do anything. Something hits you and then you have a sensation of colors, or sounds, sor what

have you: merely receptive. That is the form in which the professional disease shows itself in the sensualistic or materialistic philosophers. The true thing which is -- the true thing is human labor: man not merely as a perceiving, sensually perceiving thing, but man as a being which has needs and which, in order to satisfy these needs, must produce. At this producing angle the Germans come in somehow -- you know, productivity, but of course not their productivity -- of which they spoke -- the productive activity of the mind, primarily, but this tough primary productivity which consists, for example, in taming animals or in digging a ditch and this kind of thing. Yes, I think I have to leave it here for reasons of time, but I would feel very badly if we would leave the room immediately without having seen whether there has been any contact because I -- there was no question and exchange today at all. So may I suggest that we stay here for another ten minutes, Mr. Cropsey. Yes? Good -- no, but because we do it together and therefore we must have a peaceful agreement. Otherwise it would beunjust. Now -- we are supposed to teach justice. . . at least in public practice. Now is there any point you would like to raise because some of you may not know -- may not have known anything of these German speculations and other -- there may be other difficulties. Mr. Benjamin.

"How does bourgeois society differ both from -- well, differ from civil society as opposed to differing from the state?"

Civil society -- I mean, if we accept the Hegelian doctrine, the civil society is a state. Yes?

"Then the state is all inclusive of everything social."

Yes, but only the state as Hegel understands it must keep its hands off bourgeois society. Yes? It must make it possible by -- for example, if someone commits a bank robbery -- robs a bank, the state enters -- yes -- but if these people are legally honest the state leaves them completely alone. This distinction between the state and civil society is, of course, part of the later tradition which today has become a dogma: the distinction between state and society. Rabbi Weiss.

"In Fichte I didn't understand -- did you say that the same faculties are developed to the same extent by everyone or to a different extent or different faculties to the same -- "

No, the ideal goal would be the highest development of all faculties in each. I'm sure that Fichte and not even Marx meant that everyone should become a first rate tight-rope dancer. You know? Tight-rppe dancer. I believe they would have said if someone is not so good at that that's not so terribly important, but the other faculties, the artistic faculties, the intellectual faculties, the faculties of deliberation -- you know, all the really important human faculties, should be equally developed in all. That doesn't mean the mediocrity, however -- you know, universal mediocrity, but in each case to the highest degree. In other words, a race of heroes, a whole human race consisting of geniuses: that would be the goal.

"Are they equal, are they on the same level -- "

Well, I mean, that is then a question to which they don't seem to have given thought, but you could say, perhaps, Shakespeare was a greater dramatist than Goethe; at least Goethe himself believed that. Yes? Well, let us say, if there are such differences that some are like Shakespeare, others are only like Goethe, that would still be terrific. That I do not know, but theoretically it's an

absolutely relevant question because if equality is so terribly important then this embarrassing situation that some should be lower than others -- yes, that Goetheris lower than Shakespeare -- still would have to be considered, but that has some time, for instance. Yes?

"Perhaps you will deal with this next time, but if not I wonder if you would elaborate on the point you made which was that Marx got more from Kant than he did from Hegel."

That I didn't say.

"I thought you did."

No. I only -- no, I said probably this: so many things of Kant enter into Hegel. Therefore, I do not have to speak of them anymore when I speak of Hegel and for this reason I could be briefer in regard to Hegel. And a second reason and equally accidental -- and clearly accidental reason, because regarding Marx -- or Hegel -- here Marx himself will speak of him. . . . (Small portion inaudible because of airplane overhead).

(Inaudible question).

Oh no. Happiness is -- I mean, the problem of happiness in Kant is very complicated, but I mention only the most massive discussion. Morality -- yes? Morality is the one thing needful, but we are not satisfied, Kant says, to see a truly good man perhaps because of his goodness suffers terribly and we want some compensation or moral understanding demands some compensation. This compensation, however, cannot be expected in this life. Therefore we -- as moral men, we must hope for another life where those who deserve to be happy are happy. That's -- that is the most important argument for Kant on the subject. Hegel rejected this altogether and he simply said that -- he speaks in contempt of those people who want to have a reward for not having betrayed their creditors. Yes? Do you know? Do you see? Do you get that here? A man who is not satisfied with acting decently and wants to have, in addition, some money or decoration for that is not a decent man. In other words, the other life, the immortality of the soul, plays no role anymore after Kant in these German philosophers and in Marx, of course, completely out. Whereas I did not mention that for the sake of brevity, the interesting thing. . . in Kant's philosophy of history is this: the reason why Kant did not develop a philosophy of history was the belief in the other life, because he found the solution, the satisfactory solution, in the other life. Therefore, the need for a satisfactory solution in this life, i.e. for a politically satisfactory solution, was proportionately smaller. That one -- I think one can prove from the text. That must supply the -- for Hegel, the -- Hegel, one can say, replaces the concept of happiness by that of satisfaction. If you are engaged in a satisfactory activity you are happy. You do not need an additional happiness. Now the free member of a free society who has that job which he has chosen -- yes -- is, in the reasonable sense of the word, happy. Now he may be melancholy and you may not find a woman to love: that is private and Hegel has utter contempt for these private things. Then you must be a man and live without. That's easy, but what you can expect as a rational being from society is that you are recognized in your human dignity by the law and that the society is free in the sense that you can choose the profession or job, however you call it, for which you are fit and for which you have a liking. Even that much is, of course, only imperfectly true, but that Hegel regarded as something which has to be overcome. He wanted -- in this respect he wanted to have a perfectly model society -- you know -- with a hierarchy roughly

corresponding to the hierarchy of activities. . . . (about 2 inaudible sentences). Yes?

"Did Hegel himself reconcile or pursue the contradiction between his just society and the need for a stabilizing instrument, the need for government?"

That he did. Sure. That he -- he took care of that all right. The governing cannot be dependent on the popular will. . . . One can say this: what Hegel did in this respect has a great -- I mean, is not very original -- it has a very great similarity to Burke's view. The character and the need of government is not deducible from the rights of man. According to the simple rights of man doctrine as you have it in Thomas Paine, for example, it is essential for the legitimacy of government to be elected by all who have the same rights in everything. Rights -- or differently stated, rights of man and political rights are coextensive. That is a gross exaggeration, but everyone who has the rights of man has by this very fact the full rights of a member of the sovereign. That is denied. That is denied by Burke as it is by Hegel because the fact -- let me take the cognate formula -- the right of self-preservation does not guarantee that you are the best judge of the means to your self-preservation. Yes? You have a right to the means of your self-ppeservation if you have a right to self-preservation, but that does not mean that you are the best judge of these means. Yes? Hence, government cannot be simply popular government and how Hegel tries to construct that -- that's a long question. That he tries to do in the most elaborate form in which a philosopher tried, and the form which he took was -- he wanted to have a kind of representation, but that was much closer to what came to be called in our century the corporate state than to democracy, and especially it meant, of course, at the top of the whole thing a hereditary monarchy. Yes? That's the primary doctrine in a fantastic construction and that brings about this conclusion, but nevertheless the nerve of Hegel's political doctrine, if one does not get oneself bewildered by these adaptations to the German national state, is that the ruling -- the elite, the political elite, to use a present day expression, is the estate of intelligence. I mean, there are estates -- yes -- and elites. There is an estate, for example, of the peasantry. There is an estate of the merchants, the free professions. But there is also an estate of intelligence and this is the higher civil service plus universities. That Hegel thought of -- what Hegel had in mind was a monarchy which would be actually governed by a very conscientious and very highly educated civil service without any regard to the origin -- to the origin, I mean, nobility or commoner; that played, of course, no role. That is what he had in mind and this -- the nobility he adopted because he had to adopt them, but that is not the essence of his doctrine. The doctrine is that there must be an institutional seat for public spirited intelligence and that is to be -- what would you call, , properly trained, properly trained. That is -- and, of course, Marx -- Marx was, in this sense -- started simply from the democratic tradition -- you know? I mean, you know, that these fellows are simply -- can at best be technicians, you know, , as they were called by Lenin, and they can't rule in their own right. Yes. That must be the last question. Yes?

"Does Hegel or any of the other philosophers mentioned attempt to prove -- or I think they only assume -- that man is rational?"

They -- that is a hard question. I would simply regard it, if I may --

"A self-evident question; theydon't prove it. WIt's not self-evident."

Why is it not self-evident?

"To me it isn't."

Yes, all right. Butywhy?

"Well, assuming -- it depends on how you define rational. You might define it simply as being able to act on the conclusion. . . . That's onedefinition of it and you find in empirical events this isn't true. Or at least define rational as a set of consistent ideas within one person, which you don't find, I'm sure."

That is not quite what they did mean. They knew how foolish, moronic wishes, passionate we all are most of the time. I mean, that -- every child knows that, but the crucial point is this: can any human conduct, however stupid or vicious, be understood without this being possessing reason. Can it be understood? For example, if you look at a mad dog or even at a non-mad dog or a duck in its worst moods, and then you see a human being in its most impossible condition -- yes -- doing terrible things, eating human flesh and only God knows what, you could still, while giving a concrete analysis and not merely -- you know, going into it -- you would discern the presence of reason. You see, the mere fact that most of these impossible human beings speak -- yes? speak -- as the social scientists put it, use verbal symbols. That means the presence of reason. That man is a rational animal never meant that all men are always -- conduct themselves in an absolutely rational manner. No one would say that.

"This is not enough. Men speak. Dogs bark. They communicate. Cats meow. They communicate too."

Yes, but obviously the level of communications --

(Inaudible remark).

No, but communication is not reason, but speech, speech, the presence -- I mean, if I may use a Lockian term which should be unobjectionable to everyone of you, words. . . stand for abstract ideas. You know, this is what men have: abstract ideas. . . . That is what they meant. . . by reason. (Audibility here somewhat fragmentary).

"That's all theymean by that?"

Yes, sure. I mean, that -- but they meant something more by that. Since reason is that which is peculiar to man or since all other peculiarities of man -- for example, that he is the only animal which laughs and cries -- yes? Almost, say. Yes, sure. Which are the exceptions? Which other animal laughs?

"Monkey."

Laughs? Is this true?

"Yes." (Uproar of laughter).

(Series of inaudible exchanges).

Yes, but at any rate the thesis is that all peculiarities of men, whatever they may be -- is erector, a statuary and so on and so on -- all can only be un-

derstood with a view to his rationality, and therefore that man's perfection consists essentially in the perfection of his rationality, both theoretically and practically. That was the conclusion and, of course, was elaborated first by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle and was still accepted. . . up to Hegel inclusively. There hade been some underground murmerings against that, especially in the eighteenth century, but it remained victorious, I would say, until Hegel inclusively and today, of course, everyone says that Freud has proven that Aristotle is wrong. Yes? The question is whether that is really so, whether the evidence adduced by Freud is of any relevance as far as this matter is concerned. I'm sorry we have to leave it at that.

Marx seminar, third meeting. April 6, 1960. Mr. Cropsey

. . . work for the day. I must say, I regard it as somehow appropriate or suitable that the doctrines of perhaps the most prominent enemy of the division of labor should be treated according to the external circumstance that prevails in this course; that is to say, by a massive division of labor. I think that this would be simply a frivolous remark except for the fact that there is a most substantial reason for our having undertaken to proceed in this way. Let me try to state that reason and the purpose for taking it into view briefly as follows. Economics can be viewed from outside of economics. It is imaginable that there could be something called meta-economics, as the scientists of science now like to say, and what point of view one would adopt for viewing economics from outside would be, strictly speaking, essentially different from economics. Someone who looks at economics from outside must, in a manner of speaking, cease to be an economist and must take some other point of view which I won't try to specify too exactly, but which I think would deserve to be called, if it were adequate, a philosophic point of view. It is, in other words, possible to view economics from outside economics, i.e. from the point of view of philosophy. There's a very real question as to whether philosophy can in its turn be viewed from outside itself adequately. Economics may be viewed adequately non-economically. I wonder whether philosophy can be viewed adequately from outside without simply ascending to a higher stage or a different level of philosophy. Now the reason that that question arises is not simply the superficial one that Dr. Strauss has been in the course of treating this question from a non-economic point of view and I will be presumably treating it from an economic point of view. It isn't only that more or less ad hominem reason that I mention this, but also the character of Marx's doctrines calls that question into view.

One could say that what Marx attempted to do was once and for all to get to the bottom of the economic question: to say absolutely and of necessity what is true about the economic relations that exist among human beings and to connect the understanding of the economic relations and the economic facts with the ultimate truths about human society as such. Now I will, for certain purposes of convenience, refer to this as Marx's project towards the absolutization of economics -- his project towards the absolutization of economics, an attempt to state once and for all what economics is about, what it rests upon, andaalways under the influence of the prepossessing idea that the most real phenomenon of human life is an economic phenomenon. I think that without this predisposition or without this preconception the attempt to absolutize economics, at least in the way in which Marx did it, would have been impossible or at least unlikely even as an attempt. Marx, as you know, said in a number of places that the truly real underpinning of human life is the set of circumstances of production, what it is that really lies at the bottom of social existence and not only social existence, but the inner life of individual men as well. Now Marx was not the first man to have raised the economic question. The economic question was raised repeatedly; the economic question was raised from the beginning of speculation on political philosophy as we have any record of it. It is a matter of some interest to us to note the course of the progress or regress or at any rate the motion towards this effort to absolutize economics, to try to raise, in other words, the question, what are the alternative modes of raising the economic question. Try to understand what has been traditionally, to begin with, and then in more modern times the articulation of the economic and the supra-economic questions as they were at one time thought to exist. It goes without saying that if the effort to absolutize the economic problem or to absolutize economics should succeed then references to the supra-economic would be out of order. So, to begin with, we notice this fundamental distinction.

The economic question was traditionally raised in the context of political philosophy with the understanding that political philosophy somehow supervened over economics

and economics found a home or a place within a much wider horizon of speculation about human things, the understanding being that the widest speculation on human things did not fundamentally rest upon a reality which was reducible to the economic relations. Now we could, I suppose, have begun with some reference to Plato, say in the Republic, where at the outset, not literally in the first pages but very near the beginning of the substantive discussion as apart from the setting of the dialogue there is discussion of what we might call the economic considerations, the mode of life, the mode of production and consumption, that would have prevailed in that highly moral but not very intelligent and far from commodious community which later on is called, with some irritation by one of the protagonists, the cityof pigs. And we could, by following the course of Plato's argument through surely Books VIII and IX see the inter-weaving of the economic motifs with the consideration of political philosophy on the highest plane and that would serve our purpose very well, but for certain reasons I prefer to speak of Aristotle's point of view in this respect, because -- well, for certain reasons, let me say.

Now Aristotle referred to the economic themes in three places particularly: in the first place, in Politics, Book I, primally, but not only in the first book of the Politics; also in Ethics, Book V -- Nichomachean Ethics, Book V, what are now called chapters five and six. I would point out to you incidentally that the first locus is obviously a place in which Aristotle is discussing political themes. The Nichomachean Ethics is not throughout a book on politics obviously, but as it happens, that portion of Book V where Aristotle deals with economic questions and particularly with value theory in the modern sense -- that part of Book V is on the question of justice, a -- let's say for the time being -- a political virtue. Now in the third place -- in the third place, economics is discussed, or economic themes are raised by Aristotle in a book called the Economica which it wouldn't be profitable for us to make much reference to here. Among other things the text is difficult in the technical sense and there is some question as to how much of the Economica was written by Aristotle, and so on, and some evidence, internal evidence points to the necessity that some part of it was written by one of the successors of Aristotle. Now it would be impossible for me to summarize the doctrines of Aristotle with respect to the economic things. I only mean to give you some notion of the broad outline and how it might bear on our subsequent discussion. Aristotle takes as his modus vivendi the recurrence to the beginnings and he says that things are well understood or perhaps best understood by resorting to the origins of them, not exclusively but begin with the beginnings. One cannot end with the beginnings; one must only begin with them. If one properly understood that remark I think we could simply stop now, and say after five minutes of deep reflection on that observation you would have it and it wouldn't be necessary to go any further. But unfortunately, or for better or worse, that's not a feasible proceeding and we have to pursue the thought a bit.

Aristotle begins with the beginnings and in this respect he might remind you of, say, Locke. Locke also begins with the beginnings, and Hobbes; not the beginning of man, but the primary or proto-condition of man. Rousseau begins with the beginnings, and, in a certain manner of speaking, Marx also begins with the beginnings. Now these men end in very different places, although they all apparently concede that it is indispensable that one understand what eventually happened in the light of how it started and then came about. Why does Aristotle deal with the question of the beginnings? It isn't, for example, for the sake of proving that there is an inalienable right of man to the means of preservation and that, as Locke thought it necessary to point out, as Aristotle would have thought it absolutely absurd to dwell on, man has a right to the things which occur in the natural environment surrounding him. I think if you reflect for a moment you'll notice Locke had to give some attention to the articulation of man and nature because the scheme of thought which dominated the reflection on these matters in the time of Locke was very much affected with the teaching regarding the relation of man and nature as overhung by super-nature. Now in a certain way this question didn't come up for

Aristotle. In other words, it was not necessary for Aristotle as it was necessary or desirable for Locke to show that man had an immediate right to the natural things; that the articulation of man and nature, in other words, had to be proved in the light of a contrary teaching which ran generally to the effect: the right of man to the natural things was derivative from a certain act of donation; that somehow or other there supervened over the common framework of man and nature a super-nature which essentially governed. So we can say Aristotle's beginnings are not affected by the need to prove the articulation, the at-homeness, so to speak, of man in the natural context. That is taken for granted in one respect, but it is not taken for granted simply. The way in which the complication with respect to man's articulation in the natural whole is raised is through the notion of necessity, of need. Now this is not, perhaps, the best place to speak of the ambiguity that resides in the term necessity. I'll only mention it here. When we say that certain things are necessary for man we mean in the common sense that without them his life would be impossible. Now since we're speaking of Marx and, in the background, Hegel and also Kant you will immediately be reminded of the fact that necessity has another meaning or bearing. That is to say, if it is true that (a) exists, whatever (a) is -- (a) might be some condition of man or it might be some proposition, some assertion, or whatever -- if it is true that (a) is, then necessarily it must be true that (b) either is also or, which is much more interesting, will be sometime. This sense of necessity it is important to keep in mind because, as you know, this arises for Marx and has very much to do with the solution, not to say the presentation, of the economic problem. The economic problem for Marx is connected with a necessity that has transformed the necessity of the following of proposition (b) by proposition (c) with the following of some historical condition (b) by some historical condition (c) in the same ineluctable and inevitable way.

Now it goes without saying, or perhaps it doesn't go without saying and should be said, Aristotle speaks of necessity in the former sense and not in the latter sense. Man is confronted with certain needs which affect his life in the most profound ways. The notion that how man makes a living or what acts of production he does and must engage in -- that was not discovered by Marx. It would be an amazing thing if the world had to wait until the middle of the nineteenth century for somebody to observe that how people make their living has an effect on them and a very deep and profound effect. This was known, of course, to Adam Smith. Some of you will be aware of his animadversions on the organization of society under the principle of the division of labor. It was not Marx who discovered for the first time that when a man is set to do some petty job and he spends his whole life at it that this is likely to have some effect on him, and, moreover, that if he has to spend all his time in an office in a sedentary occupation thinking of nothing but calculations of gain and loss that this might affect his character. This was not the discovery of the nineteenth century. It was known a very long time ago. Now Aristotle asserts that the manner of living, the way of making a livelihood, is of great importance for the characters of the men. He gives the examples of the nomads, the shepherds, the agrarians, the hunters, and so on and so forth, and apparently deduces nothing much from that. It is not Aristotle's point, in other words, that the manner of production leads ineluctably to a certain character of men, but rather something different which it is my purpose from here on while discussing Aristotle to speak about.

What is the lesson that Aristotle means to teach by speaking of man's articulation with the natural whole and man's being confronted by necessities which he can only overcome by doing acts of production? Aristotle makes his way into the discussion of the question by some observations about nature. In this respect he differs from Marx, I mention only in passing. The number of reflections by Marx on the extent to which the solution of the problem is affected by some nature of man or some connection of man

with a natural surrounding that's a very small extent and the reason for that, as you know, is that in a certain way nature was replaced by something else in the Marxian formulation: say, for the time being, by some process called history. But that, of course, doesn't exist for Aristotle and what Aristotle -- Aristotle is perfectly well aware of the fact that there is history, that is to say that events succeed each other and that there are rises and falls of empires and that there are follies and vices and crimes and so on and so forth, and even that there is a principle that underlies this succession of events, but still it doesn't add up to a necessity in the historical sense that I spoke about before, but rather the governing necessity is that much more simple and immediately visible one: man somehow having to exist in a natural environment. Now what is the connection between this natural environment and the human beings that somehow or other have to find their home in it and exist in it? The problem is complicated by the fact that they don't simply live in it, but they are themselves an essential part of it. Man doesn't simply live in nature, but man is himself a manifestation of nature and then the question arises how provident has nature been or how provident is the natural order in taking care, so to speak, of its own. There is the vast surrounding, the heavens above and the earth and the waters, the birds and the bees and all this innumerable congeries of things, and man in the middle of it. Aristotle's formal teaching is nature is benevolent and means the good of man. The things which are here have been put here for the sake of man, almost going so far really as to say that all the animals are present for the sake of contributing to man's well being, his preservation, his life, and so on, which is a manifest absurdity, because if one reflects for only a moment on the variety of animals, the fleas, and the lice, and the vipers, and the serpents and toads and all this kind of thing, not to mention wild animals who can hardly ever become of any use to man, then it becomes clear that however it might be true in some sense that there is an economy of nature and that man fits with a perfect articulation into this natural whole, the sense in which that is true is not the simple sense that nature provides for man. Nature provides for man in the sense that there is a great mass of material, let's say of unformed material, and it is necessary for man somehow or other to appropriate, to make of himself those things in a way or in ways which are not strictly prescribed to him by nature as immediately visible.

We could even go further. We could say that when man confronts nature in the course of satisfying his needs then he finds that nature is indeed helpful in some ways, but is a very tough enemy in other ways; very tough, has to be overcome. The soil is rocky, infertile. Nature is frivolous in the way in which it provides the fertilizing materials. Sometimes it rains and sometimes it doesn't. The frost comes too soon and kills off the crops. The birds come and eat. The birds can be used for food, but the birds have ways of adapting themselves to certain acts of men and they reverse this natural process. Then there are the various blights and so on. Everyone knows that the farmer's life is very difficult and Aristotle recognizes this, speaks of it, and if one thinks a bit one can see the potential enlargement of this theme, of the difficulties that nature confronts man with so that one could say not only in this visible and external sense is it true that benevolence of nature with respect to man is a rather qualified or equivocal benevolence, but that there is a certain sense in which viewing man's own interior construction nature might even be said to be at odds with him, his own nature representing a kind of inner conflict showing the respects in which he may even be thought of as not a simple being, but as a compounded being the parts of which may even be thought of as being at war with each other. Now to speak more concretely, it was not only peculiar to the Aristotelian teaching but perhaps even more massively conspicuous in the Platonic teaching that man is a compounded being, not a simple thing, and that the elements so compounded live in a rather uneasy equilibrium and that that equilibrium is subject to pressures and that is where the question becomes most interesting for our purposes. What is the level on which this equilibrium of the elements of that compounded being will eventually occur? What is the level? Now I can't go into the details, but let me try to put

it this way. Aristotle apparently understood human life as taking its character from the human being, from the nature of the human being. The human being is an absolutely unique combination of things which are unchanging and things which are changing, of the eternal and the sempiternal on the one side and of the transitory, the things that come into being and pass away, on the other side. The human problem could be said to be reducible or to be expressible as the question how to achieve the articulation of those two elements, those two kinds of things, which seem to have nothing to do with each other: the eternal and sempiternal on the one side, and on the other side, those things which come into being and pass away, which are united in man as in no other being of which we have any knowledge. This is, if I may recur to the question which was raised last time, a way of approaching the matter what is meant by the rationality of man. Somebody asked last time whether man was, what's meant by the rationality of man and so on and so forth. I would say that if one understood, at least from Aristotle's point of view, this linking of these two extraordinary -- that extraordinary linking of these two elements then one would understand a bit at least what the ancients meant by the notion that man is really the unique animal in virtue of his rationality. But now to come back.

What does this imply for the Aristotelian teaching with respect to economics and politics? I would say that Aristotle seems to teach that the solution of the human problem so far as there is a solution of it is the articulation or the joining of those two elements in their proper relation, not as if they were equal, the one to the other, but as if one must inevitably govern the other. Now when the ancients, and Aristotle particularly, looked around at the circumstances of human life as almost all men lived it and indeed as almost all men have lived it since they noticed what actually occurs, what might be said to be the reality, doesn't conform quite to this perfect articulation, and then they were confronted with the need to satisfy themselves that what they were asserting as the solution of the human problem was in fact as represented, namely the solution of the human problem. Now that would lead us very far afield if I were to try to say on what grounds it could be asserted that a solution is really a solution although it almost never comes into sight. That would be a very difficult and long procedure, but it wouldn't be necessary. For our present purposes let me put it more dogmatically. Man is confronted with this necessity. He must face it according to the manner of what he is. He is this strange conjunction of the two elements that live so uneasily side by side or contained in his little frame. What is the manner of his producing the solution of this question? The solution of the question of the broad articulation for most men of these two uneasily co-existing elements is political life. That's what's meant by politics. What is the basis of politics? The basis of politics is a certain kind of human making, a certain kind of human production done under the palladium of an overriding phenomenon which is not made by man. So there is a kind of human production which goes on underneath the aegis of what is not humanly produced. The things which are humanly produced might be said to be the conventions and what all that implies, what opinions, notions, and beliefs either underlie the conventions or are generated by the conventions. Those conventions are the basis of political life. So common life, political life: that is the solution of the human problem for most men. It can't be otherwise. There is a solution of the human problem in another sense and I think probably everybody understands this, that philosophy was plainly said by Aristotle to be superior to politics and the life of making money and so on. Our attention is therefore directed sooner or later to the fact that there is a solution of the human problem which transcends politics, but that is a solution for exceptions, for a numerically unimportant infinitesmal fraction of all human beings. For most men, most times, in most places there is a solution which begins and ends with political life and that is brought about by human deeds, by a kind of human production and there is no higher solution for most men. Now it might appear to you as if what I'm saying is going to be made the basis of a remark that

Marx and Aristotle really had a great deal in common; that acts of production really underlie the solution of the human problem for Marx -- that he says plainly in The German Ideology and in the Communist Manifesto and everywhere else -- and also that Aristotle believed that some act of human production was really the solution of the human problem, the most real. I think that one could make that case only if one neglected the qualification that the solution of the human problem for Marx depended upon this absolutization of economics, that is to say, the understanding of production in a certain sense: not only the production of conventions, this figurative act of human generation, but the gross making, the doing of the daily deeds by all men all the time. That is a very different kind of act of production. What Aristotle meant by the supreme act of human production in the political context was something which could be done by very few men, by the great benefactors of the human kind as he himself calls them, the men who were, in a way, responsible for the elevation of human beings out of their proto-human condition, out of what he did not call but what Locke and Hobbes call the state of nature into the state of civil society, i.e. civilization. Civilization and living in cities or living in political bodies: these two things mean the same thing. So the kind of production which was had in mind by Aristotle is of course a very different kind of production from what was had in view by Marx. This is true in a variety of ways.

In addition to that, Marx's solution eventually degenerates, so to speak, into an abstention from politics so that in curious ways the absolutization of the economic leads to a dispensing with political life in the famous formula the withering away of the state. For Aristotle that would have been regarded as an absolute nightmare, as nothing but a fantasy, a wandering of the mind. The idea of beings such as human beings are, that is to say, compounded beings, not all rationality and therefore not all equal but beings affected with all those subtractions from rationality which the incorporation of the mind in a body necessarily involves. For such beings the solution of the human problem by an abstention or an abstraction from politics, i.e. the rule of some over others, would have been a fantastic and inexplicable wandering of the imagination. Now somehow or other that transition was made and the tradition slowly affected moved from the doctrines of Aristotle and those under the influence of Aristotle and Plato and so on, slowly but with an accelerating velocity beginning in the time roughly of the sixteenth, seventeenth centuries. Now to give you one example, but only an example, of the sense in which one could speak of -- it's nothing but a specimen -- I'll recur to it later on -- sense in which one could speak of Aristotle's supreme contempt ultimately for those things which came to be regarded as the heart and the core of social science in the age of the absolutization of economics. To give you only one specimen I'll refer you to -- in fact I'll read this passage from the Nichomachean Ethics which is in Book V and is 1133b, approximately 14 -- about 10 and following. I'm introducing this a bit out of order but in a certain sense any organization would be imperfect. If I omitted it at this point then I would have to remind you of all these things later on and if I read it now then the full context of the later discussion obviously won't be available but that's -- it can't be helped. We will be talking later on about the expression of Marx's absolutizing of economics in a form of theory of value. Now everybody who has had any exposure at all to modern economics will know that there is a part of economic theory now prevailing which is called value theory sometimes. Much more often it's called price theory. The fact that the term value theory can be and is in ordinary speech often replaced by price theory points to the obvious fact: value and price are now regarded as being substantially indistinguishable the one from the other. The meaning of that is that people now tend to deny professionally -- they do flatly deny that there is such a thing as the value of a commodity or of a thing irrespective of its price. It comes to have a price, let's say supply and demand, and then that's about the extent of it. That's about as much as you can say. Now this was not discovered by modern economists.

This was discovered by Hobbes; at least there is a brief passage in the Leviathan in which it becomes perfectly clear that this is what he means: that the value of something depends exclusively on what the buyer of it is willing to give for it and if his needs press on him then, in a certain way, it's an unwarrented interference with his right to preserve himself and the right to exercise his judgment which is better in his affairs than that of a privy counsellor could be with respect to the worth of this thing to him at the time. That leads more or less directly to the notion that the distinction between value and price, if value is objective and price is subjective, disappears.

Now here is what I think is perhaps Aristotle's most succinct expression of his value theory. It contains a passage, or is in a close -- it contains a passage which Marx quotes in Das Kapital in order to show that although Aristotle was in many respects a very intelligent fellow yet there were some things that he couldn't understand because the state of society surrounding him somehow blinded him to facts that came to view later on. Now, this is Aristotle:

> Now money serves us as a guarantee of exchange in the future. Supposing we need nothing at the moment, it insures that exchange shall be possible when the need arises for it meets the requirement of something we can produce in payment so as to obtain the thing we need. Money, it is true, is liable to the same fluctuation of demand as other commodities. /I would tell you parenthetically, that's a rather sophisticated idea. The notion of the demand for money, as you know, has played some part in the formulations of Keynes and other people and is even thought to affect the rate of interest and therefore the price of money. That may be -- is precisely what Aristotle had in mind here, maybe. Let me repeat that last sentence./ Money, it is true, is liable to the same fluctuation of demand as other commodities for its purchasing power varies at different times, but it tends to be comparatively constant. Hence the proper thing is for all commodities to have their prices fixed. This will insure that exchange and consequently association shall always be possible. Money then serves as a measure which makes things commensurable and so reduces them to equality. If there were no exchange there would be no association and there can be no exchange without equality and no equality without commensurability. Though therefore it is impossible for things so different tobbecome commensurable in the strict sense our demand furnishes a sufficiently accurate common measure for practical purposes.

That's the end of the quotation. He continues and there is some interesting matter on the relation of -- the exchange ratio of beds and houses and so on and so forth, but those of you who are reading Capital, and all of you sooner or later will, will know that Marx takes that up and then you'll be familiar with the relevance. Now what is the teaching? It would be very hard to make out of this the foundation for a whole social structure, I think. What Aristotle is saying is essentially men have needs. I assume now the division of labor; they help each other to satisfy their needs. That means exchange is necessary. Adam Smith repeated this, long elaboration; it's all contained in a few sentences here. Now what will be the terms on which people will exchange one thing for another? It's very hard to establish this. A bed is not a house. If it's a question of exchanging one house for another it's comparatively easy. You look at the two and it might turn out that they simply -- two men swap and that's it. But a bed -- that's very different from a house. How do you know that a house is worth five beds? Is there something intrinsic to beds and houses that leads this to be true? Aristotle says nowthe fundamental question is really how much people need the two things. It sounds a bit Hobbian, and as for their being commensurable on the basis of some objective link such as Marx was at infinite pains to draw out and which -- without which he would have been unable to proceed, incidentally, as you know -- that's why there is

a labor theory of value in Marx. But for Aristotle there is no such link between the two. We might say, to use somewhat later language, it's altogether an empirical question. How much one thing comes to be worth in terms of another depends on how much the people are willing to give. There is a general tendency towards a practice of a certain kind rather than another in a given community, but that's it; you can't go any further. And he says that is sufficient for practical purposes. Now I would tell you that the entire science of economics would simply collapse if that notion were to be adopted, taken seriously, by professional economists now. It would be impossible. No: there must be some, some scientific principle by which the articulation of the commodities can be understood. Aristotle does not regard this as a necessity. Modern social science regards it as absolutely necessary. Without some understanding that goes beyond a mere remark, this is good enough for practical, ordinary purposes -- without some understanding that goes beyond that and that rests on a scientific basis, which means ultimately, in modern life, a mathematical basis, it is thought that there is no such thing as a proper understanding.

Now let me tell you what I think this means, skipping a great many steps in the meantime. In order for there to be what I hope I'll be able to explain as the absolutization of economics there must be a science of economics. It can't be left in the realm of merely empirical things, merely empirical things, without some trans-empirical or, let me say, abstract notions. Without ideas, without something to go beyond the mere things seen there would not be a science. Now I think Aristotle was perfectly willing to face this. I think he believed that there was no need to transcend the empirical in certain respects, particularly with respect to economics, because not that much depended upon it. I will not go into the question of what Aristotle would have answered to the question, is it possible to have a trans-empirical economics. I suspect if he were shown the demonstrations in modern textbooks he would have to say this looks very much like a science. It starts -- it does indeed -- it starts from certain premises -- those are not outrageous. It makes deductions from those premises. For the most part, those are not fallacious, and then what else is required in order to have a body of information -- information is the wrong word -- a body of assertions which can be called a science. I suppose Aristotle would be bound to admit such a thing is a possibility, but I believe he would have regarded it as "not necessary." Whether he would have gone further and said it's positively harmful I wouldn't undertake to say, but the non-necessariness of such a science, the willingness to leave it at those empirical rules of thumb, is I believe part of what we could properly call Aristotle's unwillingness ever to depreciate the political as really what supervenes over the circumstances of human life. The government of the relations between men can never fall out of the hands of men. I believe this is what Aristotle meant. Government of men is always by men.

What's the alternative to that? Well, there is a very common formulation in modern times to the effect not men but laws must govern. That is not usually asserted in the context or in the sense that I now have in mind, it's perfectly true, but still it is both relevant and useful from the point of view of what we're now discussing. Laws are not only those things which have been enacted by legislators but there are also such laws as the laws of thermo-dynamics and the laws of motion and the law of gravity and so on and so forth. Now there came a time when men fell increasingly under the influence of the idea that the laws of economics are quite similar to the laws of motion, and to be more precise, that there are natural laws but the natural laws are not natural laws in the same sense, let's say, in which Cicero might believe, or St. Thomas Aquinas, but that the -- in other words, that the natural laws are not primally moral laws but that the natural laws are primarily the laws of motion. Now it happens by some reflection, if one considers what man was to begin with, how he advances out of the condition in which he was to begin with, what he makes of himself -- in other words, the story of the transition from the state of nature to the state of civil society, and the grounds

on which that transition rests then you see that man is, in a way, driven; he's moved. He has emotions. They are the source of his motion. His emotions we now call them. They used to be called passions in some part of this literature. There should be a law of man's inner motions in the same way that there is a law of his outer motions as a heavy body, let's say. If you were to drop two men from the top of the leaning tower of Piza, although one weighed 150 pounds and the other weighed 300 pounds, then we're told by certain formulations that they ought to arrive at the surface of the ground at about the same time. Now -- yes, so if it's possible to speak of laws of motion with respect to man externally because he fits into the natural order and he forms no exception to the way in which things other than himself behave, what about this more interesting aspect of human beings? They have not only an exterior motion, but an interior motion. In fact, what else is there to life generally except some manifestation of the interior motions? What is there about a man which isn't susceptible of motion? When such people as Hobbes and Locke looked around they had great trouble finding something which was not susceptible of motion. I know that this is a very perplexed question surely with respect to Locke because when you read the Essay Concerning Human Understanding of course there are many repetitions of the assertion that there are spiritual beings and that man is not matter alone and so on and so forth, but then when you try to understand what effect this might have on human life or in what way it has any bearing on Locke's formulations with respect to human life one is more or less at a loss.

Now what is the most interesting and for our present purposes most relevant expression of this internalization of the laws of motion. I would say for our present purposes the laws of economics; what we now call the law of supply and demand, let's say. Now in their own way economists are still interested in this question. They still raise the question, as far as they have travelled from any serious speculation on the grounds of their own discipline yet they're still interested in this question, can you repeal the law of supply and demand? This -- if I'm not mistaken this is even the form in which Samuelson raises the question in that infinitely conspicuous textbook on economics, probably -- well, the best textbook, elementary textbook. Can one repeal the laws of economics -- I beg your pardon -- the law of supply and demand, which more generally stated would be can one repeal the laws of economics? To put it more -- I won't tell you what his conclusion is. That's beside the point. But the question's still raised. Why does -- well, I will tell you. Generally speaking, he thinks that maybe you can go pretty far in repealing them. That has to do with a certain tendency nowadays called liberalism in the current sense. That is to say, in other words, that we don't have to be blindly under the influence of the laws of supply and demand, but that something other than the brutal market may also have some effect on how we rule our affairs and, I dare say, that is one way or another true. Now, what -- where does this originate, this notion that there is a question with respect to these laws of nature, i.e. the laws of interior motion of man, i.e. the laws of economics. Where does that originate? Well, I wouldn't undertake to say positively because it could be that I simply don't know of a previous -- of a prior source to Locke's monetary essays, but I know surely that that notion arises there, say roughly in the 1670's and thereabouts. Locke states -- Locke was born in 1632; he was very reticent and didn't publish anything until he was an elderly man practically, and then so it's hard to say exactly when his notions developed. It's not very important. Sometime towards the last half of the seventeenth century Locke has developed the idea that there are laws of economics. They are really natural laws. They have a law -- the law or laws of supply and demand; he uses the terminology quantity and *vent* . Those do not correspond, strictly speaking, to supply and demand but roughly they do, and the way in which Locke opens his discussion that leads into that question is substantially -- well, he asks the question in some considerations on raising the value of money and lowering the rate of interest -- he asks the question, can this be done by law? Now let me tell you very crudely what was

the proposal. Thereswashe certainndifficulty in England atwthe time with respect to the monetary metals. They saw that they had, I suppose it must have been, an adverse trade balance and bullion had a tendency to flow out. Now that was awkward and so some -- because they were constantly being drained of their monetary metal. It made the carrying on of commerce difficult, or so it appeared to them. Now their thoughts were not absolutely consistent in this respect because at the -- on the one hand such men as Locke developed the notion that there is a certain amount of money which naturally fills the channels of commerce in a community at a given time and now much is needed will find its way there and that's -- that's it; a forerunner of the international gold standard doctrines as they came to be developed in the nineteenth century and are clung to with desperate affection by a small and diminishing number of human beings even to this date. Now -- so then there is the idea, on the one hand, that there is a certain amount of money which is appropriate to the level of commerce. But on the other hand they were conscious of some difficulties and they realized that the money would tend to flow out even though it should have stayed there if the amount of traffic called for that amount and, incidentally, if money flowed out they should have regarded it with equanimity because that would be a kind of proof that they didn't need anymore than what was remaining. But somehow it didn't quite seem to them like that and they took pains to prevent the draining away of their money supply which only shows that common sense will win out over almost all obstacles sooner or later.

Now some of the suggestions that were made to rectify this unsatisfactory monetary situation included the following: in the first place, to do something with the coinage system which we would call now devaluation; that is to say, to take an ounce of silver and instead of forming it into twelve pieces of money, form it into eighteen pieces of money. Now you might have to add a little something else to each piece in order -- so that people won't lose the little coins. They get so small after a while, but that has -- the devices for doing that have been known for hundreds -- literally, thousands of years, and so that was no obstacle. The technology of the coinage was well in hand. The only question was, what about the principle? Now Locke asserted that this is a piece of nonsense -- to do this kind of thing -- that you can't make -- you cannot legislate. There is no human legislation by which the character, the fundamental character of the coinage, i.e. its value, can be tampered with. It can't be done. These things follow a kind of natural course. You cannot for the same reasons -- incidentally, I should say he not only argued that you cannot, but he very strongly argued that you ought not. But Locke was a very complicated man and on some occasions he was known to argue,as for example against the censorship of printed matter in England -- argue against it altogether on the grounds of expediency, whereas it was some other considerations that he really had in view and he is known to have presented the argument in the form which he regarded as being the most compelling, which only shows that he was a sane man: that if he had a certain number of human beings before him whom he wanted to convince and arguments of type "a" through "x" wouldn't do it, but "y" and "z" would, then he would be very willing to ignore the fact that there are 24 good ones and two bad ones if the two bad ones would do the work. It turned out that he was very ingenious in the application of this method and apparently succeeded in killing the last proposal for censorship of printed matter in England that has ever been raised, and on that kind of reasoning. So -- well, now in this case I would say Locke presents both kinds of arguments, but the arguments with respect to the ought not really turn out to be rather weak and almost self-contradictory. You might not believe me, but I refer you to the early part of Some Considerations. There is repeated reference to the widows and orphans. We now take that to be somehow -- you know, a stock quip in speaking of commercial practices, appealing to the conscience of acquisitive men by reminding them of widows and orphans. Now he really did that and he pointed out that there are quite a few widows and orphans and in fact to believe him you'd think that England was nine tenths populated with widows and orphans who would be desperately affected by the

measures which were then proposed. But those are very quickly dropped and the widows and orphans, if I remember exactly, are not mentioned after something like page four or five of a very extensive work and thereafter he gets down to business and he shows that the attempts to do these things simply must fail. There is a law of supply and demand -- that's what he develops at great length -- that's the law that really governs. To try to reduce the rate of interest: that's been going on for ages, as you know -- had been by his time. There were acres of writings on the just price and the just price of money and on usury and so on and so forth. Locke said, are you apt to find some way by which you can prevent men from giving their goods away before you can effectively control the rate of interest? Because a man doesn't borrow unless he somehow or other needs. That's not strictly correct. And after this -- soon after this point in the argument, very early, Locke drops that false notion too. He knew perfectly well that for the most part borrowing is not done by men in need. He takes the example of men who need some more money than they have because they might starve or their families -- that's not why most borrowing is done and he knew it perfectly well. Most borrowing is done for the sake of gain by businessmen in the conduct of their business, now as then. Is there any way of suppressing the rate of interest? No. Locke said exactly the same rules apply with respect to the rate of interest as apply with respect to the price level, as apply with respect to the circulation of the coin, as apply with respect to the devaluation, the depreciation of the coin. There are certain economic laws. Those are not the proper province of government. The beginning of the transcendence of human rule by the laws of economics is surely visible in the economic writings of Locke.

Now how does this come about? Why is it that Locke comes to this point? And incidentally I might mention, Locke was not the only man who saw the matter such. Montesquieu, with very great delicacy, manages to suggest that he believes the same kind of thing is true; only in order to mention this tofypu before we lose sight of the point Book XX in The Spirit of Laws is on the subject of commerce, of laws and the connection which they have with commerce considered in its nature and its distinctions. Now that book forms the first part of the second volume of The Spirit of Laws. The second volume opened, in some editions, with a quotation from Book I of the Aeniad, and that very short line was which by itself doesn't mean very much more than he who was taught by great Atlas, Atlas the Great. Now the surrounding material has this general meaning. This long -- long haired Iopus once taught by mighty Atlas makes the hall ring with his golden lyre. I wouldn't swear that this is an absolutely satisfactory translation, but I think it corresponds pretty well with the sense of the two verses. Now why this reference to great Atlas and what he taught and what he taught the poet, incidentally, in this context, especially in immediate juxtaposition with Montesquieu's invocation to the muse. This is the same place where he -- he starts the second book with the invocation to the muse. Montesquieu is in the position of the poet in that place, invoking the muse as Homer invoked the muse and as other poets invoked the muse. He was like this long haired musician -- I'm sorry, but that's exactly what it says. This long haired Iopus was taught to play on the golden lyre and by whom was he taught? By mighty Atlas, the great worker, the man who by the strength of his bent back and broad shoulders kept heaven from earth and made human life possible, the prototype, perhaps, of the strong backed laboring man. One way of looking at Montesquieu's meaning here is that he was really initiated into the laws of nature by thinking about the working of men, by their economic life, so to speak. Now that's not altogether fanciful, as one may easily observe by going on to consider what follows in Books XX and XXI and so on, the books of The Spirit of Laws in which he deals with the laws of nature. I beg your pardon -- with the laws of commerce and how commerce must eventually provide a solution of the problem for modern man. Now -- so we have, then, this preliminary or provisional conclusion: by a certain transformation of the basis of political philosophy, and it would be absolutely idle, a waste of time, for me to

go over this. That was what -- I mean, if you bear in mind what Dr. Strauss said on the first two meetings and try to assemble that with my present remark then it will make some sense to you. That course of development of political philosophy down through the time of the seventeenth century provided the basis for the realignment of political philosophy and economics and, generally speaking, one could represent this by reference to the two pans of a balance, more and more weight being applied on one side and the other one rising equally into the air. The one that was -- the analogy breaks down because the one that goes down is more gravid, more heavy and more solid. That isn't what I meant in this case. What I meant was simply the difference in direction. Political philosophy subsided by an act of its own being, its own decision. It decided of itself, I'd say more or less in the person of Locke or Hobbes-Locke -- let's combine them, the way. . . .

(Change of tape).

. . . of value and the claim, having a claim to the value of a thing. To take the case of Locke from approximately where we left it, in order to introduce this subject, what is it that originates the valuableness of the thing? What, in other words, is the source of the value? I'm now speaking of exchange value. Locke's answer to that is really substantially everything subsumed under the heading: the law of supply and demand. That's where the things get their value from, i.e. their price is determined that way, and he was thoroughly modern in the sense of equating the value and the price. It isn't -- it isn't labor, as Marx would say; no. Marx made the terrific attempt to eradicate the law of supply and demand and to reduce it to the law of supply. As far as Locke was concerned, this wouldn't have made any sense. It turns out, in fact, that Marx can't live with it either. We'll see that he must make certain reservationswhich so much vitiate the labor theory of value that some people have raised the question whether anything remains of it afterwards and whether he has not in effect been driven back into the same kinds of loosenesses as always perplexed Ricardo, for example, and Adam Smith and surely Locke, although Marx claimed to have got rid of the difficulty. Now what about the claim to a commodity -- to a good? And as for that it's quite clear that Locke said yes, in the state of nature, without any question, what gives a man a right, a title to a thing is his having mixed his labor with it. But in the first place he didn't by any means admit that this was also true after the state of nature had been transcended and in the second place, therefore, he didn't show any particularly important consequences to flow for the state of civil society from that fact. Now what I mean by that is this: in the fifth chapter of the Second Treatise Locke makes a remark about the things that I mix my labor with belong to me; I have a claim to them, title. And then he goes on to give the example, the turfs that my servant has digged and the grass that my horse has bit and something else that I myself have done: these three together. They indicate the things to which I have a claim because of having mixed my labor with them. Now you might say with respect to the grass that his horse has bit that's very complicated. In what sense is it true that he has a claim by virtue of labor to the grass that his horse has bit, and I suppose you have to say, well, he owns the horse and the horse owns the grass and therefore, because property is a relation, he owns the grass. Now that could be, I suppose, because you would say, well, the grass contributes to the horse: bigger horse, more horse and therefore he simply -- he owns the grass -- something like this. But you can't get out -- it makes no sense whatever with respect to the turfs or whatever it is his servant has digged. That's not his labor. That's somebody else's inconvenience and irksomeness and so on and so forth. Now -- well, the resolution of that is very simple. Apparently when Locke speaks of "my labor" he doesn't mean things I do with my own back or my fingers, but he means that I may purchase labor the same way as I can purchase anything else and once I've bought it it's mine the same as once I've bought the horse it's mine. No, as it happens

under the present circumstances I don't buy the servant, not outright, but I can buy pieces of him from time to time, meaning by that pieces of his service, and then while I pay him I have bought him and he is mine and what he appropriates becomes mine. Now -- and unequivocally. Now if anybody likes to call this a labor theory of value in the sense of my labor being -- what I mix my labor with becoming mine in virtue of some sanctity of the working of men, then I think he's entitled to do it, but that's only in a very inexact sense. So Locke has produced this extension of the doctrine which is very visible in the period of the state of nature and the transition to the state of nature and he is silently taking for granted that it is possible for one man to buy the labor of another and to become the sole owner of those things which are produced by the second man having mixed his labor with something else. So, in other words, the whole idea of a man entering into a kind of relation with another man by which the second becomes an instrument for the purposes of the first only in virtue of a money payment having been made, which is obviously at the basis of Marx's whole understanding of the capitalist society. That is very much present in Locke.

Now the thing that is noteworthy is that while Locke was able to assert that the value of a commodity is under some circumstances contributed by labor being mixed with it and the right to it is under all circumstances, let us say, derivative from so-and-so's labor having been mixed with it, yet he did not turn out to have a fully developed labor theory of value of the kind that Marx's whole political and social formulations rest on. Now we might ask ourselves why is it that starting with such even apparently similar beginnings Locke and Marx wound up so very far apart with respect to their propositions, their proposals for civil society. At the present point I have a terrific problem. It's five o'clock and I'm nowhere near the end.

Mr. Strauss: May I make a suggestion? That we devote part of next time to a consideration of your paper, because we are really now in the midst of it -- you know, like a serial. I believe we can make it by shortening a bit the discussion of the Communist Manifesto, and -- or somehow we will find ways and means.

Mr. Cropsey: Yes. Well, of course, the principal way and mean is really up to me. I somehow have to compress this thing and I --

Mr. Strauss: You might even give two lectures on your paper.

Mr. Cropsey: Yes, but considering the remark with which I began about the relation between philosophy and economics, I --

Mr. Strauss: (Inaudible humorous remark).

Mr. Cropsey: Well, let me break off at this point because what I would like to do next is to say something about Adam Smith: the respect in which his doctrines are similar to and yet different from those of Locke. Also Ricardo, and then to lead up generally to some notions prominent in Marx and then to conclude with some general observations on the modes of raising the economic question that we've been over. But before closing entirely, is there any point that anyone would like to raise, an objection or so. Mr. Benjamin.

> "I'm just wondering. Apparently in comparing Aristotle and Locke you're suggesting that for Aristotle economic factors are conditions which wise or political men would have to take into account in his actions, but which are not in any way determinative upon his actions. In other words, you seem to me to be making a contrast between economics as something to be considered and economics as absolutely determinative upon."

Mr. Cropsey: Ultimately, I think that, in order to save time and avoid all kinds of complications, that would be quite fair. Yes.

> "Then you are suggesting, then, that the modern economists would, leaving even Marx out of it for a moment, would postulate that economic conditions do determine political."

Yes, I think surely that there is a growing inclination in that direction, very strong. Even if many economists would recoil from putting it in those terms for certain external reasons, you know, because it sounds too much like something else. But still, even if they wouldn't put it that way I think that they would subscribe to the view that there are such things as the laws of economics and that these have an independent status and that they are not, in the most interesting ways, subject to the discretion of public authority, but that public authority must somehow find a modus vivendi with them. That for example, the question of agricultural surpluses -- the ordinary account given by the economists of the government's manner of dealing with the problem of low incomes in agriculture is by an analysis that shows a rectification of the demand schedule and demand curve on the one side by parity things, and then on the other side a rectification of the supply schedule by acreage allocations and controls, so that -- I mean, I don't object to this. I think it's probably what -- actually, the best way to understand it but unfortunately there is a tendency to leave it at that and then the whole evaluation of a policy of agricultural control comes to turn on the efficiency or some other secondary characteristic of the new articulation of the supply and demand schedules, whereas one might very well say, no, there's an altogether different way of approaching the problem of agricultural relief. You'd call it that; I mean it's not a popular way to call it. That's what it amounts to. And that is, what are the rightful claims of the agricultural population with respect to the rest of the population. Is there such a thing as the national character, to which some contribution is made by farmers or something like this? And is it really true that every problem of distribution of the national income is going to have to be settled in the market or primarily in the market by the operation of the law of supply and demand. I mean, I don't know. Maybe the answer to that is yes, but I must say the question is rarely raised.

Mr. Strauss: May I say something? It has some connection to the question which Mr. Benjamin raised. Now I think I have a special right to raise a question because I'm most ignorant of economics of all the people here. Now I found very illuminating what you said, and that was in a way for me the peak of today's lecture: a confrontation between Aristotle and Marx. In Marx there exists the supremacy of production and let us call it now -- in every respect, in every respect. In Aristotle production is subordinated to something non-produced, something not produced by man. Now there is a connection which you left wisely in a mystery, although I believe I have seen some of the links. In Aristotle, subordination -- subordinate character of production. Hence, supremacy of the political within the human sphere. In Marx, supremacy of production, absolutization of production. Hence, denial of the ultimate relevance of the political. That seems to be really true and very clear. I had a difficulty when you spoke of the passage in the Ethics, in Aristotle's Ethics, and that is linked up strangely with what you said about Locke. I mean, since the principle of contradiction is valid in spite of Hegel and Marx only one of us can be right. Now I always understood Locke to mean that labor is the only natural right title to property. If there is no positive law the only way by which I can have a right to a thing is by having mixed my labor with it. This mixing labor can be such a lazy gesture in certain respects, but it can also be hard work. But this is superseded by the civil law. In the civil law I can become owner of property without doing anything. I mean, by being the heir, for example, the

heir, or -- sure, and mere gifts; begging, for example, is permitted in civil society unless certain pauper -- laws, laws against begging complicate the situation. But in Locke's state of nature there is strictly speaking no begging possible. But at any rate -- that is clear. Labor is a title to property in the state of nature, but no longer the sole title in -- no longer any title in civil society. If I begin to dig -- if another man starts from the morning to the evening that doesn't give me any title or right, of course, because I did not have the right to dig in the first place. It was someone else's property, and that it was not his property because he hadded the ground but because he had sold it or bought it or made some very clever speculation in the stock market and so which has very little to do with his real labor. And so that is clear, but there is one part — I think that is deliberately done in this wonderful fifth chapter. Labor has two functions in that doctrine as I understand it: (a) the original title to property; (b) the sole origin of value. Here we differ and I must be permitted to state my point. And in this respect, as the sole origin of value, the difference between the state of nature and civil society is irrelevant and therefore that's the real McCoy. I mean, the other is no longer valid in civil society, the title to property. Now what is the point? And I don't remember all the remarks of Locke, but the crucial sentence runs roughly as follows: nature gives us only the almost worthless materials. So you need raw materials, but they are in themselves practically valueless. You have air. This is in one sense infinitely valuable; you couldn't live without it for a second. But that is -- yes, that is probably the point where you will try to refute me later. . . . But still Locke's point which he makes by using very long examples, you remember, the bread which we eat: the enormous labor which went into that, the miller and the man who grew the grain and the baker and so. And now, labor is the origin of practically all value. It doesn't have to be my labor. It must be human labor. It has nothing to do with property rights. But stated differently, nature is extremely non-beneficent. Man by his labor is it who makes things beneficent. Good. Now this is connected -- I mean, before I am simply refuted by you I would like to refer to one point in Aristotle which is connected with that and that is the question, what you said in regard to the fifth book of Ethics, the demand as the common denominator ofall things which are exchanges. Yes, that is surely true and there are certain problems into which I will go perhaps on a later occasion, but you seem -- now what about the price of a thing, the just price, which is the key notion not only in Aristotle but in the whole scholastic tradition up to Locke's time. Now I do not remember at the moment whether Aristotle says so or whether only Thomas Acquinas says so in his Commentary, but I would say even in the latter case I believe Thomas Acquinas interprets this correctly. When he gives the example of the shoemaker and the physician or whatever it -- oh no, it is the housekeeper. Now what is -- how do you determine the price? And Thomas certainly answers there are two elements which have to be considered. One is the cost of the raw material and "b" is the work, the work. I mean, and clearly the work is different if it's a very skilled worker, you know, that his work has a higher value than if it is merely carrying of something. So some product of the cost of the raw material and the work involved gives you the just price. That implies and that implication is surely Aristotle, the just price is something which may very well have to be regulated by law and if some greedy speculators try to exploit situations -- you know, scarcities or so, that can very well be made a punishable offense. That is -- whereas from the supply and demand point of view that ceases to be meaningful. I mean there seems to be a certain -- yes -- no, the point connected with it which I mention only as something which we might have to take up: when Aristotle says in this part -- remark in Book V that the homogeneous medium by virtue of which all things become exchangeable -- a house and a bed, as you use -- this I thought not so very good because a carpenter is involved in both cases -- so the house and the shoe, we might say. . . . The homogeneous element in which all those heterogeneous things become exchangeable is, according to Aristotle, the need. According to the modern doctrine, if I understand you, the Marxian doctrine, it is labor. Now this contradiction between need as the funda-

mental phenomenon and labor as the fundamental phenomenon seems to me incredibly suggestive. You know? Whether you start from man's need or whether you start from man's production, his labor. .I.thinBut I would like to hear my refutation.

Mr. Cropsey: Well, I'm not so sure it's a refutation. I think up to a certain point I believe --

Mr. Strauss: Or am I wrong?

Mr. Cropsey: No, no. I believe that we don't really disagree so much with respect to whether it is only labor in Locke.

Mr. Strauss: Yes, but he wishes to say only labor and -- but he can't say it. Therefore the compromise is almost worthless material.

Mr. Cropsey: Yes, well he has this problem if I understand him correctly. There is a disproportion between Locke's formulation with respect to man altogether as opposed to nature, number one, and on the other side, this man and that man with respect to the other men in that same relation. Now with respect to all men taken togetner confronted by their needs and by the natural external, I'm sure that there is no answer other than labor. It's only labor that -- yes.

Mr. Strauss: Yes. Oh, I see. In other words, your statement was partly based on economic matters proper.

Mr. Cropsey: That would be another way to put it. Yes. But when you talk about this man and that man, then it turns out that really supply and demand supersede -- yes. But I think that fundamentally I could agree with what you said because just as that needfulness of human labor to be mixed with the natural things transcends the transition from the state of nature to the state of civil society so also does thelaw of supply and demand transcend, because that's as much a natural law, I dare say, as the law of the rotation of the heavenly bodies.

Mr. Strauss: Yes, yes. That I simply believe.

Mr. Cropsey: I believe — well, as far as I understand it that's the case. So therefore one could say they have equal status as being superior to that transition but taey apply in two different directions.

Mr. Strauss: But what about Aristotle? Did he not over-simplify matters then?

Mr. Cropsey: Yes, I believe so. I took one short passage which is -- which I read, incidentally, mostly because it surrounds the thing that Marx himself makes quite a bit of in Capital when he tries to show the shortcomings of tne Aristotelian understanding.

Mr. Strauss: Yes. I can now state much more simply what I meant. . . . because your statement, taken by itself, would amount to a denial of commutative justice.

Mr. Cropsey: That is to say, of the justice that could prevail between a bed maker and a house builder. Yes.

Mr. Strauss: Yes, because one could say supply and demand, the law of supply and demand, is an attempt to find a self-enforcing substitute for commutative justice. Com-

mutative justice is not self-enforcing, obviously. Believe it or not, you try to cheat, but if you — supply and demand can't be cheated.

Mr. Cropsey: Yes, Rousseau denies that and I think with some --

Mr. Strauss: Yes, but still, the people who believe in the law of supply and demand and want to build on it believe it cannot be cheated.

Mr. Cropsey: Iobelieve generally speaking, except, that is to say, all of those who never heard of monopolistic competition, which is a small minority.

Mr. Strauss: But I understand they try also to abolish that. . . .

Mr. Cropsey: Yes, up to a point. Yes. Are there any other points? Well, then we'll take it up next time.

alternative would be physical allocations in the direction of every industry and every individual consumer. There are only two possibilities now known: either by administration, this individual is entitled to so many shoes, that, so on and so forth, so many cans of beans and, you know, everything; and then this one so much. Then you have the big question, suppose that you want to deal with them both equally, give them both the same ration of beans, but one of them doesn't like beans. Now that's -- no, it's a very important question. Yes, sure.

Dr. Strauss: He wouldn't have to eat them.

Mr. Cropsey: No, he might. Either he would have to eaththem, which would mean to say that you'd tell him no trading. Everybody gets now anrallocatiidrnenfirndibgading. Or else you say we'll start you off with the same amounts but you may trade internally. That would be possible. It's terribly awkward and there is no reason to do that. I mean, why should they make life more difficult rather than less? They've got -- that's not their purpose, I'm sure. I mean, they impose hardships, but they don't go out of their way to make things difficult. Now, moreover, what about the fact that some people you like to give a higher wage than others? It's a very complicated question. If you want one man to have double the wage of the other do you give him two cans of beans for every one can of beans for this man, two pounds of bacon for one pound? I mean, it might be their tastes are such that this would result in a -- you know, absolutely impossible situation. Of if you increase very item by the same factor naturally you become -- get absurdities because, for instance, everybody gets the same salt ration.

DD. Strauss: All right. So you give them money.

Mr. Cropsey: So you have to give them money. I wanted you to see that there are real complications in trying to live on the basis which they had first hoped themselves they could live on. Sure. I mean, that was -- yes, it's now -- but if you give them the money that means that everything has to have a price attached to it. Then somebody has to administer these prices. That means you have to adjust the net money income of all the recipients of income in the community at such a level that the aggregate value of all the consumption goods will be in a proper relation to the aggregate incomes of all the individuals, with the understanding that the disproportions in the money incomes assigned to the individuals will have to bear a proper relation to your schedule of encouragements and discouragements in the different lines of work, except if you want to say you send a post card toevery man and tell him where he goes to work, which is very difficult. If not that, then you have a wage system. You draw some more in here and extrude some out of there by fiddling around with the rates of wages. But that aggregate of incomes has to match the aggregate value of the output on the other side, with all of those prices being adjusted so that there won't be thirty thousand people lindd up outside some department store, all of them wanting to get ironing board covers, let's say, because last month you made it very easy to get electric irons and the month before that you made it very easy to getthe ironing boards. Bub this month there are no ironing board covers so all the irons and the ironing boards can't be used, except if they take the dining room table off and use it, in which case there will be -- then it'll show up -- that's right; honestly -- in fact this is an example which I'm not making up. They had that difficulty several years ago with respect to the irons and the ironing boards, and that is, incidentally, connected with the price of servicing garments in the state dry cleaning establishments. See, if you want to get factors of production out of the dry cleaning industry you say we've got -- I mean, we've a choice: let them all go around looking as if they had lived in their clothing for several years. That's one possibility. Other possibility: give them the means to do it themselves, but the means to do it themselves have to be provided in a certain package, one iron, one ironing board, and then a certain number of covers to go with it over a period of time because irons --

you know, they outlive the covers. Now if you don't adjust the production of all the components in the right quantity and at the right prices -- see, so that demand will just about clear it off -- either you have waste of factors of production, some things being made and distributed without the complementary goods making it possible to use them -- see, that's one -- or else you have inflation, in which you have large quantities of purchasing power in the hands of the people -- money incomes -- and the prices are, by some mistake are set so low that people can exert large demands and then over quantity of the whole goods, and then there's dissatisfaction and savings begin to go down in value and various difficulties. So then -- in other words, what is done automatically by the market has to be duplicated by administration. So they have to recreate by an artificial process the conclusions of the market through administration. I don't say it's impossible. I don't say it's immoral to try to do it or anything like that, but I'm only trying to tell you it is [illegible] achieve it; and Marx made, I think, no particular helpful contributions to the solution of that problem. Please.

(Inaudible question).

I It's the latter; the latter. They're not running into any extraordinary economic problems; and people in this country are very ill-advised if they go around under the delusion that the Soviet Union is bound to collapse because of the intrinsic unworkability of their economy. That's absurd. Their economy isn't unworkable. It's perfectly workable; so is ours. I mean, for example, such a little thing as the development of linear programming and IBM-type machines. That makes the solution of inventory problems and allocation problems very easy by mechanical measures. That means that the work of the planning bureau in the Soviet Union can be made much easier and more efficient, same as in this country. Now to expect them to collapse because of the difficulty of the planning problem: I think that's absurd. Yes?

(Inaudible question).

I would say that what their experience shows is that within wide limits you can do pretty much what you like with respect to the economic arrangements. That's exactly the opposite of what Marx tried to show, I believe: that from the economy you have to move, more or less directly and rigidly on a very short rope, to the political consequence. No, I think that the political solution is what is dictated by judgment and you can shore it up with different kinds of economic arrangements, which more or less depend on your ingenuity. Now I don't say everything will work. I mean it's obvious that some things wouldn't work, but it's remarkable how many things do work, economically speaking, radically quite different and I think that, if anything, really shows us this enormous mistake: to try to deduce the political system rigidly from the economic arrangement. Their own experience belies it. Mr. . Please.

(Inaudible question).

That's a very complicated question and that's about all I could say at the time --

(Inaudible remark).

Yes -- no, not any more. I mean, people in this country -- you couldn't -- two people couldn't meet and look each other in the face without bursting out laughing if one of them tried to say that anymore, but there were times when that was said: before the second World War, for example. Now -- but their enormous technological achievements manifested in their military programs makes it absurd for people in the West to say no, this thing can't work; they can't solve the problem of production. It's ridiculous. Now as to whether they do it at a minimum of cost: that's a very difficult question.

So we say they don't get the maximum allocation or the optimum allocation because of the failureoof the market to supply its own limits and they say it's fine for you to complain but you have fluctuations in the level of economic activity and those fluctuations lead to constant costly readjustments and so now you have thirty thousand thrown out of work in this industry and at least 24,000 thrown out there and resources go unused and the men are on relief and so on and so forth and stock market rise and fall and all kinds of nonsensical results from the operation of the market system, which can't be altogether denied. So I think that what it proves is that you can't argue very far from the mere operation of the economy. Unless you can get above that and look at the problem of that political society from a larger point of view, the mere economic arrangements won't tell you whether it's a good system or a bad system. Now I think -- you might be thinking for a minute of the case of India, where the economic problem is really tremendous, and you can say the political system stands or falls on the basis of whether it can solve the economic problem. Yes, that's true up to a point, but I think most people would be unprepared to say if it's necessary to install a leftist, mainland Chinese kind of regime in India, that's worth it. Quite a few people would say no; that the solution of the economic problem can't be taken as the sole ground for dictating -- you know, in the other direction.

(Remark by Dr. Strauss to the effect that there are sometimes incompatibilities between political goals, for example, freedom, and economic objectives).

Mr. Cropsey: Yes -- no, but I would only say that the economic arrangements include a broad latitude. Yes, and to try to make a rigid connection between these economic arrangements and those political institutions -- I think that tends to break down.

Marx seminar: fifth meeting. April 13, 1960.

. . . although I must say right away you did not do justice to the Communist Manifesto. You approached it with the wrong expectation: that it is a scientific statement. Now the fact that it is not a scientific statement does not necessarily mean that it is merely a rhetorical statement. I will take that up. Do you wish to speak on the paper, Mr. Cropsey?

> "Well, there were a few points. Some of them were really rather small. Mr. Strickland mentioned the problem of the alteration of the means of production under capitalism and how that didn't seem to be given any proper foundation in the Communist Manifesto, which is true; it isn't. But it must be said that that's given a very extensive explanation in Capital and we will come to that."

Yes, and similar considerations apply also to the philosophic things. If I may mention only one point. This is not such an easy contradiction as you seem to think: that the futurecourse of history is determined and yet need for action -- because the action is a part of the chain. Yes? A part of the chain. For example -- I mean, take ordinary determinism, the older type, Hobbes, who says, well, there must be -- he says everything is determined and yet he demands a certain kind of state with law and law enforcement. But why? This law and law enforcement is a part of the determination. If you want to have people behave properly they must be determined to behave properly and that is done by such beautiful things as gallows, jails, and other things. You see -- and if you say, well, but that is done by free agents, by men, Hobbes would say, yes, these free agents are themselves determined in that by their desire for peace, and ultimately Hobbes, the author of the scheme, is determined by his thought and perhaps also by his ambition to propose these things. Yes? And so. That is not -- I mean, the difficulty comes up in a much more subtle way. Yes, and in addition Marx would say that there are now individuals or a small group of proletarians or half-proletarians who see the future, see the trail, and therefore devise a clear and consistent policy. He would say that is not an accident. That belongs to the human situation. There are always men around, given a certain level of articulateness, who do this kind of thing. Now whether it is concentrated in one individual called Marx or in two individuals: Marx, Engels, or in seven individuals. That's accidental. The difficulty comes out in another way and I don't remember a passage in Marx, but in Engels there occurs thisrremark in the Anti-Duhring that this communist world society is bound to come at the peril of the destruction of civilization. There is an alternative. For some reason people might act foolishly or -- well, by determination -- yes -- someone is -- Lenin is killed in 1918. Yes? There's an interesting discussion of that problem in Trotsky's history of the Russian revolution which -- it shows really the difficulty of determining the concrete form. Trotsky must admit if Lenin had been killed that the thing would have run very differently and surely the victory in October in 1918 (sic) would not have taken place and God knows what then would have happened. But the problem is this: this ultimate alternative, civilization might perish, is admitted by Engels and also by later writers. Now this is, of course, very grave. There might be people who say let civilization perish rather than get this abomination. Then the whole case is bust wide open. There is where the difficulty arises. Now the tacit premise of Marx, and I think also of Lenin and of Khrushchev today, is people are not so foolish to ruin themselves when ruin is obvious. In the case of Hitler ruin was not obvious. There was a fair chance from his point of view and it was touch and go. But now, in the age of thermo-nuclear war, it is impossible to play with that

kind of thing. You know, a minimum of common sense suffices to rule that out. It still might accidentally happen. That's also true and that is not entirely irrelevant, but I suggest that we -- or do you wish to bring up some special point?

"Well, they were very small things. I don't know if it's right to -- "

No. Then I'd rather not. Now I would suggest we start from a few dates. The Communist Manifesto was written and published in 1848. Marx was born in 1818. And I mention -- well 1848 was, of course, the year of revolution in Europe -- yes? That everyone knows, I take it, and -- even in Germany, to say nothing of France. And in 18-- I mention only one other date now, 1831, the death of Hegel. These are, I think, the most important dates. Now Marx was 13 years old when Hegel died you can see, and he studied and so on and only about 1837 does he begin to think for himself, which is a fairly young age, and this development was finished, roughly 1846. By 1846 and even perhaps a bit before Marx position was -- the rough position was completed, and then, after 1848, he began his detailed economic work. He had already very clear notions about economics at that time, but the detailed work began afterward and 1859 was his Critique of Political Economy and 1867, I believe, the first volume of Das Kapital. So these are the key points. Now I mention this for one reason which you will see later is of some relevance. Marx had completed his intellectual development when he was 28 or younger. There is a case, a parallel case in the nineteenth century, as I will show later. That is the case of Nietzsche. Nietzsche died, in a sense, very young, as you know, because his insanity began when he was 44, but if you compare the young Marx with the young Nietzsche, the young Marx is much more completed and much less immature than Nietzsche was when he was 28 or 30. In Nietzsche the breakthrough came when he was about 40: much later. That is of some interest as will appear later, but that only in passing. So at the time when Marx wrote the Communist Manifesto his whole doctrine was already clear in his mind and he did not present this doctrine in the Communist Manifesto. The Communist Manifesto reveals nothing of his philosophic origin. The work is, as I would call it to begin with, a political statement, not a philosophic statement. I read to you a few passages from the Communist Manifesto translated from the German. "Every class struggle is a political struggle, The organization of the proletarians to a class and therewith to a political party." So, in other words, contrary to the vulgar Marxist notion the political is really the more intense, the higher, the transformation of mere quantity, one can say, into quality. I remember in Trotsky in his history of the Russian revolution when he speaks of the hunger strikes and this kind of -- hunger revolts in Petrograd and other places during the war and other kinds of economic struggles. That's chicken feed. It becomes interesting only when the struggle becomes political and becomes a struggle for political power. That is perfectly compatible with the assertion that ultimately the relations of production are decisive, but primarily, in the every day life, the real stuff is the political and not the economic. So the book is a political statement, not a philosophic or economic statement, but it is indeed based on philosophy and economics. The situation is this: the addressees know less than the writers. That's clear. Otherwise he wouldn't have to write it. Who are the writers? Officially, a commission of the Communist Party, but in fact, of course, Marx and Engels. Who are the addressees? That's clear. Who are the addressees in the strict sense?

"Well, I wasn't clear on that. I would presume that, first of all, the workers."

Yes, why not use the more precise term which Marxuses, if it is more precise?

"The proletariat."

The proletariat. The last -- the last call: "Proletarians of all countries unite!" So the proletarians are addressees. The writers explain to the proletarians the situations, the prospects, and the tasks of the proletarians. The philosopher-economists address not all men, but only those men whose interest makes them receptive to the message; not the bourgeois, but the proletarians. Why do they do that? Why do they not address all men, but the proletarians? That's a question of principle, which is not explained here but is presupposed. Marx sets forth -- or Marx or Engels sets forth -- an idea, to use a term which was -- is still in common use and was perhaps in more common use at that time in Germany. They set forth an idea. Now what is the relation of idea to actualization? Marx had very definite opinions on that. You make, you elaborate an idea. Well, that can be mere talk, air, but how does it become real and under what condition does it become real?

(Inaudible reply).

Well, sure. That's elementary. But what is the condition for that?

(Inaudible reply).

No, no. Something more fundamental than organization, which comes in only secondarily.

(Inaudible remark).

No. No. Pardon?

"Acceptance of the -- "

Yes, but what makes people accept?

(Inaudible remark).

How strange. There is a simple word which is still used and it is necessary: interests, interests. Marx says somewhere ideas have always made themselves ridiculous if they were divorced from interests. The only people who are interested in this message, who are compelled by their interests to embrace it, are the proletarians, not the non-proletarians. Now interest means here primarily the selfish interest of a class. I mean, you must not be befuddled by the present usage of interests in present day political science. You know, you have a group of people who love cats and form a union for the protection of cats and then he says also an interest group. Yes? You know? That's, of course, absolutely misleading. I mean, then you formalize the concept of interest so that it loses the punch which it always had. So selfish interests, but selfish interests of a class, of a section. We don't have to go now into what class precisely means. Now this presupposes one decisive thing: namely -- to repeat, interests are essentially sectional interests. What does this imply? That latter point is, of course, elementary now via Bentley, Process of Government -- yes? But what is the pre-supposition already in Marx of the assertion that interest is only sectional interest? What is the opposite of sectional interest? Let us proceed step by step. What is an interest which is not sectional? What is that? Pardon?

"National."

Or -- yes -- general, common good, this kind of thing. There is no common good. That's the tacit pre-supposition. Let us look -- I think that is right at the beginning: "The history of all previous society is a history of class struggles" which implies although it is not really stated, every society of which we know consists of sections or classes and therefore the common interest is something very dubious. It may exist to some extent in the fighting against diseases and the building of bridges perhaps, but in a substantive sense it doesn't exist. Now this is the point which Mr. Strickland pointed out. This sentence with which they begin their argument, "The history of all previous society is the history of class struggles," is not evidently true. There were class struggles, we can say, but there were also other things. There were, for example, foreign wars. There were -- or there was the War of the Roses in England and they should prove to us that this was a class struggle. Yes? Two branches of the dynasty. Or the War of Independence is not obviously a class struggle nor is the Civil War in this country. So that is a mere assertion for which Marx says that he has ample proof, but somewhere in his desk. Well, we don't know that. That wasn't published -- you know the earlier writings were published only much later, much -- after Marx's death, some of them only in our century. Now what is the reason for this assertion regarding the class struggle? That there were such classes, rulers and ruled and, if you please, oppressors and oppressed in the past, was generally admitted by all democratic people. Yes? All democratic people; because that was exactly the idea underlying thedemocratic revolution: the abolition of oppression. There were free and unfree men in the Middle Ages or before and now the key sentence here is this. That is about three paragraphs, four paragraphs, later. "Modern bourgeois society which has emerged from the decay -- or the destruction -- of feudal society has not disposed of the class oppositions. It has only put new classes,new conditions of oppressions, new forms of the struggle, in place of the old ones." Now let us see what that means in the context. The modern democratic state, which of course at that time did not yet exist, as you know, but it was about to emerge. It emerged for a moment in France, '48, was destroyed by Bonaparte, but it existed in this country but not in Europe and surely not in semi-feudal Germany or Austria and still less in Russia, and even in England it, as you know, that was touch and go. The key here was there about this time Hegel still was able to protest against the Reform Bill. That was his last writing. So the modern democratic state, the most progressive thing you have and which you have only in very few places in the world, presents itself as a state of universal freedom and equality, the first society in which everyone is free and equal, and therefore as the just society. But now comes the punch of Marx's thesis: this society consists in fact of oppressors and oppressed, just as every society before. The historical assertion about the past is not interesting. The exciting thesis is that the modern democratic state is itself a class state and here Marx appeals to something which was known to the addressees. I mean, it was not merely a far-fetched assertion. Those people who were locked out and tried to associate and were not permitted to associate -- you know, all this kind of thing -- they knew that there was a struggle between labor and capital. That was -- they knew that. Now Marx only says, this -- your experience which you workers have is not an irrelevant thing, your private fate. That is the most important fact of modern society. That is the point which the Communist Manifesto has to make. So, in other words, at this point the whole thing becomes empirical, not in the sense of a social science study, but an appeal to what these people know from their daily experience and therefore much more impressive. The old story of oppression merely continues under new names. Well, names is too weak a word but I will overstate the point. Now let us again proceed empirically and disregard Marx's philosophic premise in order to see where the philosophic premise must come in to give the thing its character, its unity. Now if we look at the situation dispassionately

and accepting the facts as Marx stated them this oppression of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie is one -- the most recent form of that universal human phenomenon of oppression of one class by another. Now what is the difference from the practical point of view? And the practical point of view means, in the first place, from the point of view of good or bad. Now in some respects the oppression is less bad than in former times. Yes? Clear: I mean, there are not chains. The workers are not chained and there is not an overseer with a whip like galley slaves or like Indians in Peru or what have you. They are free workers, but in other respects, however, the oppression is worse, and that is the point which Marx will bring out: that it is in some respects the worst of all oppressions. And therefore, because it is the worst of all oppressions, because it is the extreme oppression, for this reasonsa wholly unexpected solution to the present problem is possible, but we must proceed step by step. So, to return then to the point which I made first, the oppression is in some respects worse, in some respects better than in older -- in the older order. That is again an empirical assertion. The present order will be succeeded sooner or later by another one. That would seem to be the simple, common sensical conclusion. Oppression we find -- everywhere in history we find oppression. We find oppression now. And every particular form of oppression had its time. Therefore, the present form of oppression will come to an end and will be succeeded by another form of oppression where it will no longer be bourgeoisie and proletariat but "x" and "y" and no one can know what that "x" and "y" is because human malice is inventive and can find all kinds of other things. So this would be the old fashioned way of looking at the situation. How does Marx arrive at his solution, at his solution? Now if oppression is the universal fact of human history, then we have to raise the question why. Why is man a being which oppresses his fellows everywhere? That must be in human nature if it is everywhere and that, of course, was always said. Now in the first place it could be due to human malice. There is this trait of malice, of viciousness, in man, and to take one theory which is very pertinent here, that of Rousseau, the viciousness of man is pride, the desire to be superior to others, and that leads man to oppress his fellow man if he can. Rousseau had -- for Marx, Rousseau had disposed of that by the following consideration: pride, malice, viciousness, is itself a product of society. It does not belong to human nature. Therefore we can get rid of that. But then there was another reason, a more pedestrian reason. Why do people oppress others? No, not out of malice; surely there are malicious people but they are uninteresting. I mean, they are exceptions. Real massive things induce men to oppress the others, their fellows, and what is that? The sober desire to have more. I don't want -- I don't want to be admired by you as a big shot, but I want to live conveniently and if you have to live in huts so that I can live conveniently that's your business. If I'm more rational and industrious than you who are lazy and improvident that's your business. Scarcity, in other words, is the reason why there are oppressors and oppressed. And now Marx comes. This true reason why men have always oppressed others, scarcity, has disappeared, and that he proves empirically, for we have a phenomenon without parallel in earlier times and that phenomenon is over-production, over-production. Men produce more than they can use and what is wrong is the distribution, in other words. So this being the case there is no need for future oppression. Plenty makes oppression superfluous. More than that -- but still the present oppression could go on indefinitely. Say, it is the last -- there is no longer a need for oppression but some people are better off in the present system, the oppressors. Why can they not perpetuate their system indefinitely. That might be possible. Marx says no. The present form of oppression is self-destructive, self-defeating, and therefore the emphasis on the progressive character of bourgeois society. That is not a state of things from 1848 which can be frozen and then be forever.

The dynamism is essential to civil society. That means the over-production now is child's play compared with the over-production thirty years hence, fifty years hence, hundred years hence, and so, and therefore every -- the oppressors will become ever richer, the oppressed will become ever poorer, and therefore the system, the present system, is not only the last form of oppression. It is also one which is necessarily self-destructive. That means, to state it in a very general -- in a general way -- to make some advance in the argument, the present oppression is unique. There is not only one special form of this age-old phenomenon, but it is a unique form. In other words, the two classes which we have now, the bourgeois and the proletariat, are not just two classes like any other classes we have in earlier times. They are the absolute classes, the absolute classes. There is a qualitative difference between these classes now and any other classes. Still more precisely, because the class of the future is the proletariat, not the bourgeoisie, the proletariat is the absolute class.

Now what about -- there are a few details which are important to mention right away. I come back to my -- to the question on which I started. Oppression is the universal fact. Therefore, why not forever and ever? And needless to say that our experience up to now with communism, in particular, does not refute the thesis. Yes? Because no one can say that there is no oppression in Russia or China; I mean, to limit ourselves to an understatement. But still Marx, of course, denied that this would necessarily be the case. Now the proletariat is in a unique position. It is the absolute class, and this absoluteness refers to its oppression. It is the absolute oppression which the proletariat undergoes. Now that, to begin with, sounds strange. I refer to the Indians in Peru after the Spanish conquest and for quite some time and one could perhaps also think of other examples. Were they not treated infinitely worse with these bloodhounds -- you know, and all the kinds of things the Spaniards did -- than the modern proletarians even in the worst slums of Manchester or New York or wherever they were? Now what is that? What makes the proletarian oppression so particularly terrible? Now what does -- the proletarian -- the oppression of the proletariat is the most revolting of all oppressions, more revolting than what the Spaniards did to the Indians or the Romans to their public slaves in mines etc. One can perhaps say this, and here I come back to the point which was mentioned by Mr. Cropsey last time, for the first time the oppressed are treated as merchandise, as merely non-human. No, but again, what about these slaves or what the Nazis did to the Jews and others in the concentration camps? Now I mention this only in passing because there is avvery common delusion about this point. When such beasts, as we might say, torment their enemies in a most bestial way they do not act as beasts. Shall I explain that? So bestial is therefore a metaphoric expression which is very meaningful, but it's not precise. What does -- what does the tormentor -- what does the tormentor do with the human being he tormente? He does this only to human beings. Only very accidentally and uninterestingly does someone do this kind of thing to tables or to other things. He knows that the being he torments is a human being. That is essential for the act so what we call bestiality is a particular behavior of humans to humans. And therefore if these Spaniards and the Indians -- they behaved -- they still treated them as humans, in a most inhuman way; that is not the point, but they would not have treated in that way trees or stones. The capitalist, from Marx's point of view, treats his workers in the same spirit in which he treats his merchandise. I mean, in other words, in his way he even takes care of it, naturally, because he doesn't want his merchandise to spoil and he doesn't want his labor force to be inefficient. Therefore, in a very radical sense that's from Marx's point of view the most inhuman treatment. To say -- to repeat: from this point of view the older barbarians were perverted human relations, but they were human relations. This is no longer a human relation. That's

one point. But that is not the decisive point. Let me see: there is another passage, not in the Communist Manifesto, but in his, Marx's National Economy and Philosophy, an earlier writing. Marx gives this description of the situation of the modern proletariat. It is -- the dwellings of the modern worker, he says, are caves, caverns -- yes? -- holes, not fit for human habitation. But all right, men lived very well in caves. Why not a modern cave dweller organization? It could last for ages. Marx says no. This -- there is a fundamental difference between the old cave dwellers and the modern proletariat and he describes the difference by saying that the modern proletarian, as distinguished from the old cave dweller, returns to a cave in an alienated form. We have to come back to this term alienated. The savage in his cavern feels at home in his cave as fish in water, but the cellar habitation of the poor is an inimical power, an inimical power which he cannot and may not regard as his home, where he cannot say, after all the hardships outside, when he comes home, here I am at home, for a very simple reason: he is in the home of someone else, in an alien home; namely, which far-fetched fact does Marx think of here? Pardon?

"Property tenants."

Yes. In other words, he is a tenant and he can be thrown out every day. So he does not even have a home as a cave dweller had and therefore -- but to return to the principle which we will gradually explain the key phenomenon is alienation. That modern workers may have all kinds of modern conveniences, may have many conveniences, many rights which the mass of men never had, is uninteresting for Marx because the fundamental character of his existence is what no existence of oppressed people before was: alienated, alienated. And we must gradually see to understand. What is the -- yes?

"Are you saying that in previous class societies, according to Marx, man was not alienated?"

That is a perfectly necessary question and I'm grateful although it compels me to make a parenthesis. One sentence: there is an essential difference between all earlier alienation and the modern alienation. There was alienation? Yes. But it is so radical -- the difference is so radical that you may call the modern world and the modern world alone the alienated world. We come back to that later. But more specifically or concretely, in the case of the bourgeois and the proletariat the oppressor degrades the oppressed. But -- that was always, but now something else: the oppressor must simultaneously degrade and enervate the oppressed so that this -- that makes the situation revolting, revolting not only for the spectator who is revolted when he sees a Spaniard chasing the Indians with his bloodhound, but it makes it -- the Indian cannot revolt because he is hopeless. You know, he is simply the prey of the bloodhounds. In this situation -- the situation of the modern proletariat is of this unique character: that it is revolting to the spectator and revolting to the victim. Therefore, the corrective is in the situation. In the situation Spaniards-Indians no corrective in the situation because they were so powerless they could simply become slaves and remain slaves and try to flatter their masters, perhaps, the individuals, so that he would have it a bit better; but here the corrective is in the situation. He -- the oppressor must degrade the oppressed and make him sensitive of his degradation. That is the disgusting thing. Now one can illustrate this in various ways. He -- the bourgeois cannot allow the proletariat what the worst slave owner had to allow: that the oppressed became accustomed to his degradation and takes it for granted and thus became reconciled to his slavery -- because of the revolutionary character of the relation. It is the constant transformation of the living conditions. More simply, the bourgeois must compel the proletariat to become literate. He can't do his

job if he can't read and write, whereas the former oppressors prevented the oppressed from learning to write. But other education is needed, technical education; even to some extent legal education. And -- so, in other words, he must raise the level, not necessarily of external living conditions, but the level of expectations and also more shocking is the disappointing of these expectations. That, I believe, is the practical point which Marx tries to drive home. People circumstanced as the proletariat will necessarily feel extremely humiliated. Look at another point: when in olden times one tribe fought another. Tribe "A" won. The maids, the surviving maids, of tribe "B" were enslaved. The people of tribe "B" couldn't complain. They would have done exactly the same thing to tribe "A." The principle to which both referred was identical: people who are licked in a war deserve to be slaves. Yes? I mean, there was no appeal possible. But now the oppressors go out and tell the oppressed every man is born free and equal. Our society is radically different from all former societies because it is a just society and still oppressed. That won't do. There is no longer a principle to which -- people can no longer oppress with a good conscience. In former times they could oppress with a good conscience because the oppressed themselves could not deny the right of oppression. That was -- is the new situation and this teaching of the rights of man -- I mean, Marx does not go into that but it is perfectly in the spirit of Marx or of Hegel to introduce that. That is part of the mechanism. That is not an accident. In other words, it is not an accident that the older changes were made in the name of positive law. You remember that the war of the Dutch against the Spaniards in late sixteenth century was made on the basis of positive documents, these laws of the low countries, and in the English revolution of 1688 to some extent. The old -- it was -- and to some extent, even in the Declaration of Independence insofar as there was an appeal made to the English law -- yes? -- which allegedly the then British government had transgressed. But still, certainly in the American Revolution and more visibly still in the Fren French Revolution there was no appeal to positive law. There was an appeal to natural Law, to the right of man as man, and that was not an accident because the bourgeois revolution, revolutions, were breaks with the positive, with the inherited, and with the traditional in a way in which no such break had ever occurred. And the bourgeois class is the first radically revolutionary class, according to Marx. Therefore they had to appeal to natural law, to universal principles as distinguished from local principles, and these principles -- of course, they affect everyone in their society. You cannot speak of the rights of man all the time and when there is a revolution and you need the strong arms of the Paris workers and then send them home. Of course you can do that, but that creates difficulties. You see, the situation is different than that of the Spaniard and the Indian, to take this example. Man'circumstanced as the proletariat will necessarily feel extremely humiliated and are able successfully to abolish exploitation. That is the message of the Communist Manifesto. In conclusion, communism is evidently reasonable to the proletariat and I would say in this presentation, given the situation as it existed at that time in Western Europe it is not merely rhetorical. You must not forget, the great change in the situation of the working class came afterward and at that time such an anti-communist as Carlysle, Thomas Carlysle, said exactly the same thing about what was going on in Manchester and other places as what Engels said. As a matter of fact, Carlysle said it before Engels and Engels' book on The Condition of the Working Class in England is based on Carlysle, among other, but these other people like Carlysle were reactionaries. They tried to go back, say, to the pre-Whiggish ideas, Archbishop Lord, you know, because that was a great story. In the fight between the Stuarts and the Whigs the Stuarts stood for a social policy. I mean, Tawney has presented this, I think, most clearly in his book on -- how is it called?-- capitalism and the spirit of religion?

"Religion and the Rise of Capitalism."

Religion and -- yes. Yes, the first chapter, I think, for that. Well, and so that -- that was the situation. Yes, but -- nowllet us go a bit deeper, and again a very simple observation. Communism may be reasonable for the proletariat but Marx was not a proletarian. He was a poor man but he was not a proletarian. Why then does Marx take the side of the proletariat. He speaks of the fact that in a certain stage of the development members of the non-proletarian classes will join the proletariat. Marx's view -- Marx joined the proletariat because he thinks that the cause of the proletariat is the cause of man. Communism, in other words, is evidently reasonable according to Marx's claim not only for the proletariat but -- I now use a German Hegelian term -- ansich, in itself; not only for the proletariat, but in itself, and therefore the non-petty human being who thinks beyond his own interest and his interest of the class will be induced by this reason to this participation. What does he -- yes?

"Well, doesn't that imply a common good or common interest?"

Yes, in a way. The common good, very good, but we have only to improve slightly on your suggestion. Under the condition of -- as long as there is political society, Marx says, there cannot be a common good because political society means coercive society and that coercive society exists as long as coercion is needed and, according to Marx's analysis, coercion is needed because of the antagonism of classes and therefore there cannot be a common good. Therefore we have to use -- and there will be a common good in the final society. The final society will have a common good, but that common good will be no problem and therefore there will be no need for coercion. But I suggest this improvement on your formulation. The fact that Marx takes the side of the communists presupposes one thing: that communism -- the cause of the proletariat is the cause of man. Marx is guided by an idea of man. That would be the more acceptable conclusion. You can start from that and now let us see what that means. I give you one formulation which comes from the -- also from the Manifesto. What is that -- what will be after the proletariat has won? Universal freedom, surely, but Marx does not leave it at this freedom, this point. Freedom, we have learned from Rousseau or from Kant, the freedom of each, requires the freedom of all. That was old stuff by Marx's time. Yes? I mean, you cannot be free, rationally free, if not all are free. That was the key point of Rousseau and Kant. Marxgoes beyond that and that gives us an inkling of what his idea of man is. Not merely the freedom of -- Marx is not primarily concerned with freedom in general. Marx -- nor with the freedom to pursue happiness as you see fit. . . . The free development, free development, of each. In other words, not -- if you have a fancy notion of happiness, a idiosyncracy, that you can follow that: that is not a great good. That may be practical because of the complexity of any other solution. It may be convenient. That's not necessarily in itself a sensible position, but that everyone should develop his faculties: that is sensible. Now Marx therefore says this future society is characterized by the fact that the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. That's the formula. There is perhaps another formula which we can use.

"What does he mean by free development?"

Pardon? (Repeats question). Well, have you never heard of a poor boy who is musically gifted and then he had to become a miner -- yes? -- and he could never develop his musical faculties. Have you heard of that? You can imagine it. And another boy is mathematically gifted; another boy is gifted in other respects and

is prevented -- yes? So in all societies as we know them, in all scarcity societies at any rate, quite a few human beings are prevented from developing their faculties. Now what Marx says is, well, but some men develop their faculties in a tremendous way. . . . Marx would say this: with all admiration for these great men he would say this, that there is some defect not noticeable perhaps on a purely artistic sphere, but if we take a broader view of the work of art there is some defect in any development of an individual, however gifted, if it is bought at the price of the non-development of others. Yes? That's the point. Just as, according to the more common formula, the freedom of each -- which means that you can -- the freedom of each in the common sense -- freedom before the law and this kind of thing -- yes? -- presupposes the freedom of all, because what is the ground -- your freedom is not secure except if your freedom is based on a ground which is universal, i.e. which gives freedom to everyone else. That was the simple argument of Rousseau and Kant.

"Is there a concept here of love too, of mutual supporting and what not?"

That doesn't enter here. I mean, that would be secondary. That is Feuerbach but that's not Marx. Marx was too tough for this kind of thing and -- or you can also say too legal. Now -- but you must not forget another point, a point of which much is made by present day liberals, that while you cannot recognize potentialities of young children because of the slums in which they live. How many people can never dream of developing their faculties -- yes? -- because of the terrible conditions under which they live? And so the free development of each is possible only in a society based on plenty, but a plenty reasonably distributed. That's the point. Yes? Yes, Mr. Johnson?

"Wouldn't this point to something like a technocracy?"

Not in Marx or Hegel. Marx -- there is, of course, these great difficulties at which the whole thing ends: the formula which goes back either to Saint Simon or to Prouhdon -- I don't remember at the moment -- no government of men, but only administration of things. Technocracy is, of course, government of men: government of men by the technocrats. Now that the administration of things is simply not possible without government of men was not sufficiently considered by Marx nor by Lenin, because all these terrible things Lenin and so did were, of course, meant as provisional measures, as you know. But that you cannot have a large society without some people telling others -- that's government of men. Yes?

(Inaudible question).

Yes, that is not developed. You know, Marx -- that is always the box into which Marx can put inconvenient questions, butsimply saying I can't say what the proleteriat. . . . (several inaudible words). There are obviously two alternatives. The first is the modern liberal. He who likes to become a musician should become a musician even if he is wholly ungifted for that or the other is some experts who have judgment on gifts tell him and that might possibly -- can lead to this conclusion: that someone has a gift for something without having an inclination for it. Yes? It's a hard question, but we come to a passage later when we come to the German Ideology where Marx seems to have had such an idea that if all these necessities which bind us now were away everyone would develop all faculties -- and that gradually everyone would develop all faculties. Everyone would have all the faculties. You see? And the famous story with Lysenko. Marx -- you know, Stalin's ukase regarding Lysenko was also a sign that Stalin was at least, in

spite of his bloodthirsty character a good theoretician on this point: because it's absolutely necessary for Marxism to accept Lysenko because if we have a biological inheritance of which we will never get rid the natural inequality and diversity will, of course, exist as long as human beings exist. And you will always have specialized human beings except some geniuses or fakes. Yes? But the majority of men will have special gifts; the division of labor will be a natural phenomenon and the division of labor cannot -- to properly abolish the division of labor you have to abolish the genes. . . not to refute, but to silence the opponents of Lysenko and it is all Marx who started that.

(Inaudible exchange). (Followed by following question).

"Well, so then your only criterion is the common need."

Yes, but also you have to take into consideration the gifts. You see, because they -- for the very simple reason, the gifts are implied in the needs. The common needs require excellence and then you have to consider who is thus gifted. Yes?

"But ultimately it's a freedom to compete in one's development rather than freedom todevelop."

Yes. There does not develop the germ, but the germs differ. That's the empirical situation. The undeveloped human beings differ regarding . And now you can say, all right, each to develop his germs equally. You can also say that perpetuates the natural inequality because men are unequally gifted; there is no question about it. And I don't know of natural inequality. Then you have to do something about the germs, i.e. by eugenics of some sort you have to bring about that only a certain high class of human beings will come out and universally gifted. Something of this kind Marx dreamt of. Yes, Mr. Benjamin?

"It seems to me that the basic thing that Marx is doing though is not trying to make everybody be everything, but to have nobody be a fake and what's important is not that they develop all talents but that they not be reduced to the category of either being just a musician or just a political scientist, but being men."

Yes, but still what does this mean?

"This means basically that they do that which is natural for man, for they as individuals to do. . . ."

What is that? I mean, what is that? I mean, there would be a simple old-fashioned answer: moral virtue. And the question is whether you can here speak of moral virtue in that sense. You know, all are courageous, moderate, just, gentle, and what have you. That would be -- you know, you can't leave it at that, and I think this statement in the first part of the German Ideology -- in the forenoon a musician, in the afternoon another thing -- is a very terrible give away of Marx himself regarding the key difficulty, but we come to that later. I said -- yes, at any rate Marx, to come back to the point -- Marx's whole argument presupposes an idea of man and -- because every idea of man implies an idea of human perfection. Without this the whole argument doesn't work. Yes, all right, that's the old story, but what's the difficulty for Marx in his argument, an idea of man?

(Change of tape).

. . . for example here, somewhere in the second -- towards the end of the second section, two pages before. His opponents say, "Ideas are modified in the course of historical development. Religion, morality, philosophy, politics, law, preserve themselves in this change. In addition there are eternal verities like freedom, justice, and so on, which are common to all social conditions." Now what's -- how does Marx reply to that?

"He says the consciousness mirrors the environment."

Yes. First thing: there are no eternal verities. What is the status of the idea of man? That's the question which we have to raise. All ideas depend on being because ideas have to do with what Marx calls the consciousness, the consciousness, and the consciousness depends on being. Therefore, the consciousness of a feudal serf differs from the consciousness of a modern bourgeois. Therefore, their ideas differ. Therefore, their ideas of man differ. The idea of man must be, according to Marx, a product of history. His idea of man was a new idea which was hardly more than 40 years older than Marx and I don't believe that you can trace it beyond Fichte of whom I spoke in -- at my initial lecture. It is -- the idea of man is a historical product. Now what does this mean. We are at the threshhold, if this metaphor is bearable, of an old friend of ours. I call that friend by his name: relativism. If all ideas are products of history then the idea of man as Marx sees it is a product of history and will therefore be superseded in due time by a new idea of man. How does Marx protect himself against that? All ideas are products of history, and that -- we make one tacit premise -- I make one tacit premise in this argument: namely, that history is an infinite process and then you have this simple situation. Here are the stages of history and here you have the ideas corresponding to that and that goes on infinitely. Of course, there might be a cosmic catastrophe and the whole thing might stop, but that would be a purely external end. In itself, history is unfinishable and therefore relativism is necessary. How does Marx protect himself against that? Let me -- there is a passage which possibly Mr. -- in the first -- no, not Mr. -- who reads the next paper? Mr. Benjamin. Yes -- will have to discuss. "Communism as the positive -- " Aufhebung -- this word -- how does he translate that word? -- preservation, both preservation, destruction and surpassing.

"Transformation."

Yes, it is also the preservation; preservation, destruction, and enhancing. "Communism as the positive aufhebung of private property, as of human self-alienation, and therefore as real appropriation of the human essence through man and for man; therefore as complete and conscious return of man to himself as a social, i.e. human, man." The word is return, return. History does not have the linear character. The linear character means relativism. History has a cyclical character. We must understand that problem: not in the old sense. There is a beginning and a return to it. Therefore, it is finite. Therefore it is finite. You see, when Marx speaks of alienatich he implies, of course, that man was originally with himself or himself, not alienated. The beginning: man is with himself. At the end he is again with himself. In the -- in between there is alienation. You don't believe that? Tell me your objection.

(Inaudible reply ending with question of whether this implies the "return to nature").

No, that -- I didn't talk of -- there is something in common with a return to nature, but it is not a Marxist word.

"That's true, but man has been alienated in the stage of nature and also is not alienated in the classless society, but I think the differences between them are too great to say that this is a simple return."

Yes, sure, that is just as in Marx's teacher, Hegel: the beginning and the end are amazingly different. A man returning to himself after fully -- having fully exhausted the possibilities of alienation is a much higher creature than in the beginning, but still, if there were no such beginning there would be no guarantee of the end. That's not -- surely it has something to do with the state of nature although -- and the proof is very simple. Why was Engels so anxious to prove the fact of original communism? The notion original communism, private property, final communism, corresponds strictly to Rousseau's state of nature, despotic society, a natural society on the human level, i.e. the modern republic. That is necessary. I mean, Marx in contra-distinction to the ordinary evolution -- well, you know what happened: that after Marx, after these early writings, as the same time as Marx published his first economic book, 1859, there appeared another book if I am not mistaken. We were reminded of it very forcibly -- of it last year on this campus: Darwin. And Marx accepted Darwin with enthusiasm and, of course, Engels, in a way, still more, and therefore we know Marxism generally in the Darwinistic transformation. That's not the original form of Marxism and if we take the vulgar Darwinian view. . . . There is, of course, no question of self-alienation, of alienation. Man was a brute. Yes? And, you know, these famous monkeys who were compelled by floods to -- or, no, not by floods -- first there was the jump -- no, what happened? They had to jump down from the trees, I believe, and then they had to walk on their feet -- yes? -- and so gradually they became human -- you know? -- verbal symbols and all that. That is not the Marxist view because once you say these men were not with themselves; they were not even human. Yes? And therefore you can at least try to understand the process in purely progressive terms: from these hard monkeys to Charles Darwin, ever better fellows. But from -- then, of course -- then you have also an infinite process. There is -- you know, there is no end, no such incision possible as Marx has in mind. Marx -- the mere -- I'm not concerned with this passage. The very term alienation implies that man was originally not alienated. Otherwise it doesn't make sense. Yes?

"I don't see that. It seems to me that all it implies is that man has a basichuman nature and he is alienated from that basic human nature. I don't see what it has to do with whether he ever was not alienated."

Pardon?

"I don't understand what history has to do with it. I mean, all alienation means is that man has a basic human nature and is in some sense alienated from that basic human nature, but it doesn't have to mean that -- "

That is really misleading. Marx -- I mean, that there is a certain basic human nature like the digestive system and the five senses, of course Marx would admit, but it is a misleading term for Marx, because when you speak of the basic human nature you imply that this basic human nature is the key for everything human and that Marx absolutely denies. History, the changes, are much more important than the basic human nature. Therefore psychology in the ordinary sense of the term is uninteresting. The relations of -- I mean, there is -- you can say there is a basic human situation: men living together with other men from nature -- yes? I mean, in the Marxian -- from nature, producing, producing. This is the fundamental situation which always exists. Out of this, and that is the key to everything,

but as the key it is not sufficient. We have to make some further steps. You have to understand how this basic phenomenon, men in society producing what they need for living, produces law, produces government, produces religion, produces philosophy, and goes this particular course which is called the history of the world culminating in a return on a much higher level to the same situation where men as social beings commonly produce their means of living. But we must -- there were some others who had difficulties. Yes?

"AmdIdtot understand your point aboub relativism to be a criticism of Marx in that in terms of his own theory put forth of history which is supposed to be absolute truth for him -- in terms of his own theory that any theory or any ideas are a product of history? Is this essentially the point that you were making?"

I didn't state it, but I -- in order -- lest you think I evade an issue I say that's exactly where I'm going.

"Well, then I wonder, if you were giving a criticism of Marx, whether he did not in fact have a relativist humility to his own theory?"

Yes. I mean, humility is a laudatory term, the appropriateness of which would have to be established because there is as much arrogance as humility in relativism. "We know better."

"Well, then I'll use another term."

Please. Yes, in other words, that he was --

"He recognized that his theory was merely a product of a given historical stage."

No. That -- no, that -- I mean, there was one man who was clever enough to try that; clever enough, I mean, he was exposed to Western thought in our century and he is, I think, a man of unusual intelligence. I don't believe there is another Marxist writing in a Western language who comes within hailing distance of that fellow. His things are not accessible in English as far as I -- in German, also in Hungary: Lukacs. He did that in a very interesting book called History and Class Consciousness, 1922, and what happened? He was thrown out, naturally, and he had to live it down. He had to eat his words and had to become the most abominable -- how do you call this -- flatterer of political --

"Sycophant."

Sycophant, yes, that's the word -- of Stalin, in order to live it down. So, no -- but I must confess that purely theoretically speaking Stalin was, of course, right because Lukacs' interpretation would mean, in effect, that Marxism will prove to be in the end an untrue doctrine which was socially immensely powerful. In other words, according to his interpretation, Marxism is as true today as the ideals of the French Revolution were in the 1770s. Now of these theories Marx had found that they were eminently useful in order to prepare the French Revolution, but of course never true. They proved to be wrong. So Marxism will bring about -- will be excellent for bringing about the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but once these changes take place we will awake and see something wholly unexpected: Stalin has come up.

"Well, along -- right on this point, though -- I can't produce the documenta-

tion, though, but I recall that there were a number of instances in which Marx chided his followers at the end of his life and said that they should not become Marxists and the auspices of this person here probably are a product of what Marx -- "

No. He meant by Marxists stupid people who memorized without understanding certain things he had said, not -- he did not reject his doctrine. Marx was a very tough fellow in this respect. But I -- yes?

"There's further evidence though even in the introduction by Engels to this Manifesto in which he points out that certain of Marx's evaluations of the relation of the Communist Party to other parties at the time the Manifesto was written of course have been superseded by events and then Engels said, but then the Manifesto has become a historical document which we have no longer any right to alter."

That is not -- that is directed only against what the people in Russia now call Talmud and that means that you stick to every formula of Marx and regard it as the final truth and that of course, nonsense. . . . The doctrine as stated by Marx regarding the process was wrong. Marx underestimated the terrific power of survival and productivity of capitalism. The whole imperialistic phase was not -- at least not sufficiently seen of Marx and the so-called imperialism studied by Luxenbourg and later on by Lenin have become -- therefore they call it Marxism-Leninism, number one, and that goes without saying, but the fundamental point, the fundamental point: the relation of -- I mean, production as the fundamental phenomenon and all other things developed from that -- yes? Secondly, that this struggle -- the struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie is the final struggle which will be followed by the communist society at a certain stage, but which one cannot in detail predict. But that it will lead to the classless society and this classless society has not merely the character of a very convenient and happy system of production and consumption, but will be the fulfillment of all hopes of man. That has never changed, neither in Marx nor afterward. I mean, that you have for the first time now a leader of communism who does not even claim to be a theorist, (I mean, Khrushchev), is of course very interesting and there are all kinds of things going on there which don't fit into the theory. You know the many things which are pointed out by critics. That I know, but that Marx regarded the fundamental view he developed as final there can be not the slightest question. I read to you another passage. We -- of course Marx says the theory of communism is not enough. The real thing is the establishment of it which will be brought by history, but we must --"nevertheless, we must regard it as a real progress that we have acquired a consciousness which transcends or surpasses" -- the German word is uber----- "which transcends or surpasses the historical movement." We know the end. That this end was interpreted by Marx later as the end only of pre-history and the real history is what man does in classless society does not affect the crucial point. The Marxian doctrine is meant to be the final doctrine regarding what is known to man as a historical process and therefore regarding the essence of man. There is no question about that. I mean, that -- the tactical changes -- and even -- and -- because fundamentally these are only parts of the tactical changes, that the bourgeoisie was cleverer and more inventive than anyone believed or at least than Marx believed -- yes? -- and therefore the development of imperialism first and then the more recent enormous rises in productivity which were in no way foreseen by Marx -- yes? -- so that the capitalist society is no longer dependent on a literally understood world market in the way in which Marx took it for granted that it would be -- all this kind of thing: that belongs to the secondary things, does not affect the overall prospect by virtue of which

communism is what it is. Yes -- no, you were the other one.

> "When you used the words 'cyclical view of history," were you using that term in a fairly limited sense, in a non-usual sense? It seems to me Marx has a very linear view of history in comparison to the Greek mystic view of -- "

Oh God. Well, I -- excuse me. These simple formulas which you use are known to me and I did it with my eyes open. I used it as something which sounded, to begin with, as a paradoxy. Surely not cyclical in that old sense, but nor is Marx's view simply linear progressive. That's the point and if I use the term cyclical I am on very good grounds because that is a Hegelian term from which the Marxian notion stems. This is a cycle; the cycle alone. When you arrive at the end, at the point from which you started, then you know you have finished the way and for Hegel too the end is infinitely richer than the beginning, but only the fact that you return to the beginning without thinking of the beginning -- are compelled to return to it -- gives you a guarantee of the end. And that -- and, as I say, the very term alienation proves that this is an essential part of the Marxist teaching. Since man is originally by himself or with himself, i.e. not alienated, he is primarily a being which produces in society things for use. Now what -- what does this mean? If you start from a simple common sensical view of man: man begins, no traditions, no inheritances, no alienation in any form -- it is the productive element, all right, but surely he does not produce merely turnips or acorns or whatever it is. He also produces thoughts about the whole in which he lives. Lightnings and thunder: he doesn't limit himself to run away; he thinks somehow about it, foolish thoughts, unscientific thoughts, surely, but he produces myths in the same moment in which he produces tools. Now if that were so and that would simply be the common sensical view, then man is in a strict sense alienated from the very beginning because he is given over to these products of his mind which I called now myths. That the myths come later and reflect the primary production, the turnips or the tools -- yes? -- that is only another formulation for the fact that man is originally not alienated, because if these people catch a hare or collect acorns, whatever they do, that's -- there is -- they know what they are doing. They are fully at home in their world. Yes? But when they say there is some ancestor whom they haven't buried, or what, who is sending the thunder then they are alienated. Now what Marx -- do you see that? If man were -- there is an essential connection between the concept of alienation and the primacy of material production. The intellectual production is already the alienation and the end of the process will be that you have an intellectual production which destroys the alienated intellectual production, i.e. all myths, religions, philosophies: Marxism. There is an essential connection between these two points. But -- now I come to the question with which I must conclude this argument -- how can we know that man is originally by himself and with himself, i.e. a being which is, so to speak, fully enlightened, knows -- I mean, doesn't say anything about things which he doesn't understand and knows hunger -- food, food, so testing, by trial and error he finds acorns are good and certain kinds of mushrooms are bad and so on and then -- and he produces. And -- so, but he does not strictly -- he is not basically in error. That is the point. That man is not alienated means also, in other words, that he is not basically in error. How do we know that this is man's original state, or, in other words, how do we know that the production of things -- well, food, shelter, and so on -- is prior to the production of myths? The whole Marxian doctrine depends on that because if the production of myths is coeval with the production of things, then the production of myths might affect the production of things and then it is impossible to give a materialistic philosophy of history. Then you must proceed in a much more cautious way. More simply

stated, but I think that the mo[illegible] simple statement is l

stated, but I think that the more simple statement is less clear than the one which I have chosen, why is the so-called economic activity the fundamental activity? That question we must answer because that was all presupposed, but I hope you -- in other words, it is -- we have first an idea of man. This idea of man is exposed to the great difficulty that all ideas are historically conditioned and therefore in Marx the idea of man may be provisional and to be superseded by an entirely opposite idea which no one can know, naturally. Marx disposes of that by conceiving of the historical process as a fundamentally cyclical process and that is implied in the notion, the historical process is one of alienation and abolition of the alienation. Man alienates himself first into products and then he recovers control of his products, takes them back. That is the abolition of alienation, but alienation implies that man is originally with and by himself; originally. And that means more concretely that the production of things is prior to the production of thoughts, of myths. This in its turn presupposes that the so-called economic activity is man's fundamental activity. What is the basis for this assertion? If -- well, there is a kind -- what would you say if you were -- what is the reason underlying, the seemingly plausible reason? The seeming plausible reason is that we must first eat before we can think. Yes, that's true. But that, of course, is based on a very grave error if one regards this as sufficient because what comes first in time is not necessarily the decisive thing. The condition is not the essence. In other words, this beast called man which must eat before he thinks yet has the capacity to think already before it eats -- that belongs to it. And that he must first in order fully to activate the power of thinking -- he must first eat -- does not mean that you can explain what man does afterward, after he is no longer starving in terms of the food or the productive activity preceding the thinking activity. Therefore Marx must give as an account of why he can nevertheless say although this food producing being is from the very beginning a thinking being -- he must give us an account why nevertheless the food producing activity or the productive activity, generally speaking, the production of things, is more basic, i.e. not merely prior in time, than the production of thoughts. Yes?

(Inaudible question).

Well, we cannot -- obviously we cannot have any empirical knowledge of that. That goes without saying. No documents can possibly lead us back -- yes? -- and if we find stones or instruments and so they don't tell us enough -- they don't tell us anything of what men thought. So that is a construction and that is wholly legitimate because if man has come into being there was not yet any tradition, any accumulation of experience or errors. Yes? We can't help thinking of that although we cannot -- never get a scientific answer to it. There is one answer -- I mean, we must start from -- there are two alternatives, at least of interest to us here. One is to say man was from the outset an animal capable of thinking in a way in which no other living being on earth is capable of it and this must have played a role from the very beginning in ways which we cannot find out in detail. In other words, men at the beginning must have been as much open to the strangenesses: thunders, earthquakes, whatever have you, wholly unknown strange animals and whatever it may -- strange diseases, whatever -- and must have tried to give an account of that. This account could not, for reasons which I believe will be universally admitted, but have been mythical accounts -- yes? -- and not scientific accounts. You would admit that. So, in other words, from this point of view the myth production is coeval with the material production. That would seem to be the most natural suggestion, but Marx says no; the material production is more fundamental than the myth production. Now if he means to say the material produc- must be -- must precede in time the myth production because you cannot think,

however crazily, if you are starving, that is an irrelevant consideration as I tried to show because what is prior in time, if we want to speak of it that way, is the human constitution because that food producing thing which -- being -- yes? -- was -- had already a human stomach and human constitution also in other respects. And Marx owes this reasoning why the thing production is essentially more fundamental, or the fundamental, compared with they myth production or the thought production. To the honor of Marx we must say he did not shirk that responsibility and tried to show why economics is metaphysics. That is only another expression -- yes? -- for what I said. Economics, let us say, has to do with things production, not with thoughts production, and the economics is a science of thing production in its various stages. This science of thing production is, according to Marx although Marx does not use the term, the fundamental science: metaphysics. That sounds a very fantastic assertion, but it is also -- and it is a fantastic assertion, but on the other hand I believe it does more honor to Marx than to make out of Marx a positivist -- you know, a man who refuses to think about the fundamental issues. You know? In the vulgar -- in the later form of positivism is so: there is, of course, no metaphysics -- that goes without saying -- not even in the young Marx, but what he proposes in fact in some of his youthful writing is such an equation and I will try to explain this next time. We don't have the time now for that. But do you see -- do we agree as to the problem? Do we agree as to the problem? Rabbi Weiss.

"What is the idea of man as a person who can develop his potentialities, his capacities. . . . "

Oh well -- I don't get -- I mean, I will answer the question as I understood it although I know that I have not understood it. Now the idea of the development of the human faculties is at least as old as Aristotle, but the question is, of course, in Aristotle it was understood these faculties are very different in different human beings. Hence, the hierarchy of these faculties. Yes? And that there could be a full development of the faculties of each was from Aristotle's point of view both undesirable and impossible. So we are concerned, then, with a more precise formulation: that a just society is a society in which each develops all his faculties and where, perhaps, men have become equal as regards these faculties. In this form I do not know the doctrine earlier than Fichte, a German philosopher a generation before Marx and Marx knew this man, but that was not Kant yet.

"What I meant was if at the end of the historical process the goal is the development of each person's faculties and this is in some sense a return to the beginning -- "

In some sense.

"-- and at the same time the beginning -- in the beginning man is basically just a creature who produces things, well then how does -- "

Oh, that's easy. I mean, surely these men who are supposed to develop their faculties in the classless societies are altogether the product of that process. These savages at the beginning who lived in caves -- yes? -- and ate raw meat and I don't know -- and all thinskind of thing -- they of course could not possibly develop any faculties except those of running, hitting, and -- you know, and cutting and this kind of things surely not, because of scarcity. It was a return only in one point. These first men -- yes? -- these first men were not alienated. They

were not under the spell of their own creations. In all history man has been under the spell of his own creations. Now I'm sorry, I must tell you what Marx means by that -- I mean, although it must hurt your feelings. God, for example, is, of course, from Marx's point of view such a creation and all gods, all mythical beings, but not only that; man -- the human institutions, the state, the society, government, law: these are all human creation and man regarded them not as his products but as somehow above him. And finally the thing ends in the rule of money or the economic laws, whichever side you would think, which, according to Marx, are ultimately, but only ultimately, man's creations insofar as they depend -- there would be no economic laws without capital and capital itself is a human c creation and only by taking it back, by re-appropriating what man had originally put out of himself -- that's the image: man exteriorates something, externalizes it. Yes? First step. And then, second step, he regards this external as his gods, as his ideals, his standards, what have you -- yes? -- that is the alienation. Man regards himself as a creature of alien powers whereas he -- these powers are his creations and that is not abolished, according to Marx, by the scientific consciousness, which to some extent takes these things away, but because the most subtle and refined form of alienation is that of capitalist society where all these -- where money and capital rule and apparently with -- as a kind of eternal laws. And the end of the process is the re-approriaation. Man recognizes himself to be the creator of gods. By this very fact he takes them back. Now this notion of -- and that will become clear in Mr. Benjamin's paper -- it will be next so I can say that -- this is Hegel, only Hegel did not speak of man. Hegel spoke of the mind, not simply the human mind, but the fundamental notion is this: there is -- the fundamental phenomenon -- the beginning is mind. Mind alienates itself and the first alienation for -- the key alienation for Hegel is nature. Here -- this is alienated mind, but then there is also a kind of alienation on the human level. That's -- and the end of the process in Hegel too is that man recognizes mind -- that everything is mind or the work of the mind. There is nothing outside of mind. That is the Hegelian schema which Marx takes over, replacing Mind with a capital "M," which Hegel can also call God, therefore -- replacing Mind by matter. That makes it in many respects more common sensical because everyone of us knows human beings and no one has seen Mind with a capital "M." Therefore Marx is very -- you know, therefore also the crude language which he frequently uses: the man of common sense talking about these absurd German speculators, and yet, as Marx recognized all the time in very powerful passages, Hegel, he says, took care of the self-alienation but still in an alienated form. Hegel saw that the fundamental phenomenon is alienation, but he did not see it sufficiently because of his erroneous beginning, not with the true beginning, man, but with the fantastic beginning: Mind with a capital "M." Now the key problem in Hegel, if I may mention this in passing and that must be the end of what I say today, is nature. That man and the characteristically human has a mind character, consciousness character: that is not too difficult to grant. But what about nature? What about nature? A hopeless problem. Hegel must say, in order to maintain his "monistic thesis" that this is alienated mind. Nature -- and that is what the downfall of Hegel, historically speaking, this philosophy of nature. Then Marx replaces Mind by man. Well, you can't say trees are men, rocks, mountains, are men, and yet Marx ascribes to man what Hegel ascribes to Mind-God. You see, in a certain sense it still makes sense to say nature is mind, using the traditional formula, because he's a creature of God, of Mind. Yes? To that extent it makes sense. But when you replace Mind by man and what -- what do trees, mountains, elephants -- it can't, of course, be said that is alienated man. You will be alienated in the French sense. . . if you say that, but Marx must say this in a way, not so stupidly literally, but he must

say it in a way. How -- how can he prove ithat this is in a way man? Because it is in its nature susceptible of being conquered by man. It becomes in this sense human. It becomes material for man and therewith man stamps it with -- as human. And in this sense -- and I will -- I believe I can show this more clearly next time -- it is so that man as the conquerer of nature is a god, takes the place of god. Yes, but if this is so the science of man is metaphysics, but in what capacity, may I ask, does man conquer nature? Not as speculator. There he leaves nature alone. But as worker, as industrialist, as engineer, as an "economic being." So it is the economic activity of man, the material production of man, which establishes the unity of man and non-man; and since that is the key division of things, man and non-man, and the humanly fine thought is the highest thought and that highest thought is material production, economics is metaphysics. It is still a fantastic thought, naturally, but given the premises which Marx has and which so many today would accept without any difficulty, that there are only men and non-human things, the question of their unity -- I mean, either you reduce man to non-man by this simplictic formula, man is only -- there is only quantitative difference between man and beast, and then you come into great absurdities which Marx always avoided -- then you have the question of their unity and then Marx is, at least, respectable, that he tried. Whether his -- I don't believe his solution is tenable. Now, is there -- Mr. Cropsey, I was very unjust to you and since we are supposed to teach justice.

"Do we have to teach it by example?"

The only convincing way.

(Transcriber's Note: At the time when this set of transcriptions was begun, one tape appeared to bemmissing which was not subsequently located. It was believed to be a recording of the sixth meeting of the seminar held April 18, 1960, during which Dr. Strauss apparently lectured on Marx's early writings).

Marx seminar: seventh meeting. April 20, 1960.

. . . because of your supersonic speed. Now when you said at the beginning "a new philosophy" I thought that this showed a basic fallacy because -- but later on I thought that you said this deliberately. In other words, you are aware of the fact that Marx did not regard these thoughts as philosophic and yet you said, criticizing Marx, they are philosophic; right or wrong is another matter. Philosophy cannot be avoided. But I did not -- you gave three arguments why philosophy cannot be avoided at a certain part of your argument and you spoke so quick that I couldn't follow.

"Yes, well in that part I wasn't talking about the impossibility. I said that -- I thought Marx had tried to prove three things in the course of the German Ideology and that the three were incompatible. . . ."

Yes, all right. Yes, but which weretthese three points?

"I think that he tried to prove, first, that philosophy is impossible, that it couldn't be pursued, the reason being that men are determined in a certain wayaand therefore thought is not free."

But could one not say the conclusion -- I mean, from the fact that philosophy was actual it follows that it was possible.

"I think he would deny that because I think he would say -- well, philosophy was not actual in the sense that philosophers thought it was actual."

But still, in a sense it was actual. Otherwise Marx couldn't criticize it.

"Well, i.e. in a trivial sense it's actual, in existence."

Yes, that is not so simple but what were the two other points?

"I thought the second way he tried to prove philosophy -- he tried to philosophy, was to prove it trivial; that is, by saying it didn't really matter and that it didn't change the course of history."

I see. All right. Yes?

"And the third, alguablitive, was that it was difficult because [illegible] ity was conditioned by their particular economic situation and therefore men differently situated have a different view of reality and therefore couldn't communicate with each other."

Yes, that is what you --

(Student inaudibly appends another clause to former remarks).

Yes, but strictly speaking that would be a kind of proof of impossibility, the last point, not only a difficulty. Yes, but would not -- would you not also have to consider this point: that according to Marx the philosophic possibilities have been exhausted by Hegel. I mean, in other words, whenever you try to philosophize you will either be a Hegelian or pre-Hegelian and therefore you come into a dialectical whirlpool which leads you eventually to Hegel and Hegel is demonstrably

wrong. Now therefore the critique of Hegel is so crucially important for Marx. You remember that there were at least two remarks which we read last time to this effect: that Hegel -- Marx accepts Hegel's bold view. The Hegelian philosophy is the end or the peak of philosophy. There were two points where I -- I'm not sure that you are right. Is consciousness according to Marx here essentially alienation as you presented it?

"No. I think he said that consciousness -- the appearance of consciousness signals the appearance of alienation, but they weren't identical."

Ah ha. Because otherwise the communist society would be a return to a pre-human state so that -- so consciousness is secondary, but not in itself alienation.

(Inaudible remark regarding the analytical scheme).

Yes, now I recognize a difficulty. First you have the relations of production which would always remain. That's no way abandoned. Then this gives rise to the political set up and then finally consciousness in the more abstract sense. Yes? To which belongs religion, poetry, philosophy, and sonon. Now politics will disappear in the communist society, but thinking will not disappear. Yes? So if -- I think this difficulty was reflected in what you said. How -- I mean, if we have this order: production, politics, thinking, why should only the middle one, politics, disappear, and not the third one? Yes? This, I believe, you had in mind. But there was another point which had to do with the question of natural inequality and there I did -- what precisely does Marx teach on that subject?

"I don't think there's very much mention of it at all in the German Ideology," but I think that when he treats of property it comes out, it's implied, that the natural inequalities of men aren't so great, the reason being that he ascribes all inequality of property to inequalities that derive from social relations. . . and therefore he doesn't ascribe any inequality of property to men's talents or to the inequality of men's talents."

Yes. Well, is this not a defensible thesis? I mean, must one be really very bright to dig that ditch? (Transcriber not certain of accuracy of last phrase).

"Well, even -- it takes a certain talent. I'm not sure -- "

Yes, sure, the talent to acquire property of which Madison speaks, but -- in the famous passage in Federalist No. 10 -- but you -- from time to time you hear big businessman talk and they write and so. Do they strike you as the most intelligent members of society. I think that with all due respect to big business I would not go so far. So -- but still, there are differences of intelligence, differences of talent, without any question. What -- how do they arise according to Marx?

"Well they might -- I said I don't think he treats of this in the German Ideology, but to be consistent I think he would have to argue that in some way or another society is responsible. . . ."

Well, let us then come to that when we read the passages. Now there is only one purely historical point, point of information. We have read, discussed last time Marx's criticism of Hegel and here he deals with the post-Hegelian Germans and the most famous among them is, of course, Feuerbach, of whom -- who is also

the primary target here. But the situation was generally this: the Hegelian school split after Hegel's death into two schools, the so-called old Hegelians and the young Hegelians. The old Hegelians were those who stuck to the letter of Hegel's teaching and gave it even a more conservative interpretation than it had in Hegel himself, so more emphatically monarchistic, more emphatically religious than Hegel himself was. And the young Hegelians brought out the revolutionary implications of Hegel and therefore they turned away from the letter of Hegel by asserting that Hegel had deliberately accomodated himself to the Prussian state of his time and this was not the true Hegel. That was only the appearance of Hegel. What does Marx say on this subject by the way, or is this not -- or does he not discuss it in the first part? I really don't remember.

"Well, he touches on it. . . ."

Yes, but Marx denies that Hegel accomodated himself. He takes him literally. In this respect he agrees with the old Hegelians. But still, since Hegel was finished, according to Marx, and especially by Feuerbach, the old Hegelians were of no interest. The interesting people were the young Hegelians and there are two individuals whom he discusses in the German Ideology: Bruno Bauer and Stirner, S-t-i-r-n-e-r. Unfortunately these parts are not translated in this easily accessible translation and so we can't read them here. The critique of Stirner is of a certain interest and I may speak of it when we come to the third part of the German Ideology, but before I turn to a somewhat coherent discussion of the first part of the German Ideology I would first like to find out what Mr. Cropsey thinks about Mr. Kesselman's paper.

(Largely inaudible reply dealing with the question of how Marx disposes or fails to dispose of the question of nature).

Mr. Kesselman: ". . . . On the one hand I think he shows that society must develop because of the needs of men and their dependence on nature and therefore the implication would be that they choose to abandon. . . and on the other hand he seems to look to this as the original condition of man -- as the -- as to some extent the goal of the future development of society too so that I don't think he treats it here. . . ."

Mr. Cropsey: "Yes, that is a paradox here and I think it will become intensified when we take to the economic writings proper, but I thought it might be worth mentioning here because in one passage later in the first part of The German Ideology Marx speaks of the need for man, so to speak, to get on top of nature, strictly speaking, because -- as appropriators -- in fact, before men, in a way, control them, surely. And then, but in another respect what he seems to drive at is a kind of return to a natural condition ofthough admittedly on a higher level and then still another complication is added by the economic factor where it turns out that the whole economic apparatus has to be formed in the light of a strictly natural relation between men and the non-human things. . . which natural relation is the essence of the productive act. The act of production is a kind of return, when properly analyzed, to the most fundamental facts of nature, i.e. the or matter and motion tion. I would really wonder if Marx ever got himself altogether straigtened out with respect to that question, but I thought that it might be useful to bring it up here as a place. . . that it might be discussed."

Well, I think that Marx indicated the general answer to that question in what we discussed last time, especially the Theses on Feuerbach. The Theses on Feuerbach are a critique of Feuerbach as a materialist and this implies already Marx is

not simply a materialist. He agrees in crucial points with the idealists, that is, needless to say, chiefly the German idealists, and the difference is this: idealism stands for activity, for labor, for production, for the conquest of nature. So the materialists, so to speak, see only the power of nature and man as one natural being among others. Marx -- that is his return to nature -- against the Germans he says -- the German idealists -- he says man is a sensual being, a natural being, and not a mere self-consciousness in his essence. But this particular natural being which is man is distinguished from all other natural beings by the fact that he can revolt against nature. This unity of the two is characteristic of Marx and, as will become gradually clearer, not today I think, that is the essence of communism as Marx understands it. We only have to consider the moral equivalents of the two things to see that, the moral equivalents being for materialism, pleasure, for idealism, duty. The unity of both: that is the Marxian moral doctrine, but I cannot develop this now because it would, at the moment, be only confusing. Now, to repeat, man is that part of nature which alone can revolt against the whole of nature. That is, I think -- Marx is not the first to have this thought, but Marx says it probably clearer than any of his predecessors. And so -- the power of nature, to repeat, that is the materialist heritage as Marx understands it; the conquest of nature is the idealistic heritage, again in his interpretation. And -- or the German philosophers also were the philosophers of freedom versus nature. Yes. This freedom means the freedom of man to revolt against nature, to say "no" to nature, to conquer nature. That is an essential part of the Marxist doctrine, but for Marx-- but whereas, according to the German doctrine, this is made possible by a fundamental ontological difference between man and non-man, the difference between freedom and nature, freedom and nature, between the consciousness and nature. This difference is no longer stated in these terms by Marx. Yes, and therefore he can sometimes use very crude materialistic formulas, but he doesn't mean them quite as crudely as the ordinary materialists of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries did. Now there is one point I think I should add in connection -- which is important regarding the fight against the German ideologists. There is one simple formula which characterizes these German ideologists, i.e. the people left of Hegel. The right is absolutely uninteresting to Marx. Atheism, conscious open atheism, is characteristic of all these men starting from Feuerbach and that means, in other words, Hegel, to say nothing of the earlier philosophers, idealistic philosophers, are disguised theologians, even disguised Christian theologians, and the whole controversy partly takes on this form: that everyone tries to discover the secret theologian in his opponent and Marx finds that Stirner is a disguised Christian theologian and Stirner replies in kind and then it becomes, of course, a sheer play at this point. But still the atheism is the common basis and the question is only, one can almost say, who is the most -- which atheism is the most consistent one. For example, Stirner, who Marx discusses in the third part -- the third part is not what is called the third part in the translation; that is the fourth and fifth part -- Stirner simply says as long as you have to do with any universals you are still a theist. For example, well, Feuerbach had said God or gods are creations of man, of man, and the task consists now after this delusion has been seen through to take back these delusions to man and no longer love a product of man in which man has -- into which man has alienated himself, but to love man; philanthropy instead of theanthropy. Now -- but here the -- what is man? Yes -- is -- there are only individuals but every demand, every imperative, every notion of man's destiny, speaks in terms of universals and according to Stirner it is therefore disguised theology. Strictly speaking, you can't say more than, "Be thyself"; not -- do not assimilate yourself to some universal ideal, (that's only a disguised god), to some universal concept. Do not -- all such ideals transcend the real men and are, therefore, crypto-theological. The only thing possible to say is "Be thyself," which, of course, suffers from the defect that it

is again a universal as Marx doesn't fail to point out. But we must now turn to the details of The German Ideology. Let's read -- Mr. Reinkin, do you have the copy? You are such a superb reader. Take the first sentence.

(Begins to read).

No, no, before; the preface.

"The preface."

Yes. "Hitherto men -- "

"Hitherto men have constantly made up for themselves false conceptions about themselves, about what they are and what they ought to be -- "

Yes. You see, hitherto always; from now on no longer. From now on it is possible for man to have true conceptions of themselves. Yes? That's implied. Yes? Go on.

"They have arranged their relationships according totheir ideas of God, of normal man, etc. The phantoms of their brains have gained the mastery over them. They the creators have bowed down before their creatures. Let us liberate them from their chimeras, the ideas, doctrines, imaginary beings, under the yoke of which they are pining away. Let us revolt against the rule of thoughts. Let us teach man, says one, to exchange these imaginations for thoughts which correspond to the essence of man; says the second, to take up a critical attitude with them; says the third, to knock them out of their heads and existing reality will collapse."

Yes. That is Marx's brief description of the spirit of Germany after Hegel. Yes? Not his own work. Hitherto men had wrong thoughts. Now they can have true thoughts and the exchange of the true thoughts for the wrong thoughts, that is the revolution, the greatest revolution of all time. What does Marx say?

"These innocent and childlike fancies are the kernel of the modern young Hegelian philosophy, which not only is received by the German public with honor and awe, but is announced by our philosophic heroes with a solemn consciousness of their characteristic dangerousness and criminal ruthlessness."

Yes. Let us stop there. So, in other words, the absurdity of the German ideology, i.e. of this left Hegelian, post-Hegelian movement, is this: that they believe substituting one kind of thoughts for another kind of thoughts is the salvation of mankind. These people -- and that is what is Marx's first -- these -- what they do is merely to substitute one kind of thoughts, idea, one ideology for another ideology. These people, far from being revolutionary -- Bruno Bauer and the others -- in fact only reproduce the thoughts of the German petty bourgeoisie. Of course the petty bourgeois would not recognize these thoughts in this terrific formula, but Marx proves it as follows: the practical consequence of these new thoughts is a legitimation of those institutions and of those political aspirations which are in fact the political aspirations of the petty bourgeoisie. It is a tempest,in a teapot, in other words, and it appears immediately once one looks at those German things, say from France or England, and then one sees how parochial this whole affair is. And let us turn to page four of the translation at the beginning of the fourth paragraph.

"I only have three paragraphs."

"Well, the beginning of the --

"The German criticism?"

The German criticism -- yes.

> "German criticism has, right up to its latest efforts, never around with philosophy. Far from examining its general philosophic premises the whole body of its inquiries has actually sprung from the soil of a definite philosophical system, that of Hegel."

Yes, stop here. In other words, not only have they not questioned philosophy as such. They have not even questioned Hegelian philosophy. They have not -- they took philosophy for granted. The relation of the old Hegelians and the young Hegelians, as Marx makes clear in the sequel, is that whether you accept the reigning thoughts, the thoughts accepted by the ruling part of society, or whether you criticize these accepted thoughts. It -- they remain within the realms of thought. Let us -- philosophy is a realm within itself. That is the whole implication. And the other realm is reality, but reality is, of course, the only real realm and therefore that is a mere delusion. Reality is something radically different than thoughts. Well -- but this is presented as a thought. That's the obvious difficulty. Now let us see. Let us turn to Marx's own beginning on page, on the bottom of page six.

> "The way in which men produce their needs of subsistence depends, first of all, on the nature of the actual needs they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production does not simply as being the reproduction of the physical subsistence of the individuals. Rather, it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their lives, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their lives so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, or with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production."

Let us stop here for one moment. Marx begins the whole argument -- we can't read that -- the German philosophy, the Hegelian philosophy, claimed to be presuppositionless, to translate the German word literally. That word played a very great role in the whole nineteenth century. It was applied also to science. Science is presuppositionless. It approaches the things without any previous presuppositions. All presuppositions are to emerge through the analysis, through the thinking. Marx says no. We must start with presuppositions. Otherwise we can never arrive at any content. But the presuppositions must be non-arbitrary. The presuppositions must be necessary. And if we question the existence of human beings then we can close shop immediately. We will never find out anything about human relations, which is sensible as far as it goes. What we find is human individuals and their conditions -- and their conditions. You see, this formula is important. What is not man is a condition of man. Now Marx speaks here only of the terrestrial conditions, but obviously the sun and the stars too are -- and which Marx is very far from denying. Why does Marx disregard them here, although -- the heavenly bodies and their motions, which are at least as much a part of the whole as minerals on earth? Well, because he wants to give a doctrine of history and history takes place on earth. Therefore, we do not have to go into that. That is not legitimate. So what is man? What, then, is man? What is the nature of man? Marx gives here only a brief indication. The beginning of man's specifica-

tion -- the beginning -- man becomes distinguished from the brutes by producing their means of life. The brutes do not produce them, according to Marx. He doesn't go into the question of bees, for example. That's unimportant for him. Man must -- even if man chases a brute, Marx implies -- a rabbit -- that's something different from a dog chasing a rabbit, as will appear. But what is the condition for the fact that man produces his means of living? What's the condition for that? What does he say? It is conditioned by their bodily organization, by their bodily organization; nothing about the mental organizations -- Marx does not regard this as worth mentioning here and later on we will see that this dogmatism, this disregard of the non-bodily, is essential to Marx's position. Now what he develops in the sequel is this, something to which we will return on another occasion: production leads to division of labor. Think of what is going on on a chase -- yes -- where you don't have firearms. Some have to -- the different members of the chase have to take a different function and also the difference of the sexes is alluded to in this connection. And the division of labor in its turn leads to property. Then he gives a very rapid survey of history. He mentions three forms of organization: the tribe, the polis, and the feudal society. No attempt is made, and I believe Mr. Kesselman has become aware of that, at proving a necessary progress there, a necessary progress there. We must come back to that later. That is very important because if there is no necessary progress there is no necessity for the emergence of communism and that Marx would admit. He would only say we have a wrong notion of necessity. By a non-teleological necessity certain changes took place which led to feudal society and then from feudal society to bourgeois society. Here we are now in a bourgeois society in this situation. Given this state of affairs communism is necessary. It is a purely academic question and even a meaningless question for Marx ultimately whether it could not have been different. It happened and therefore there were necessary causes for its taking place. We will take this up on another occasion. Now let us turn to page ten in the translation: the paragraph beginning "this whole view of history."

> "This whole interpretation of history appears to be contradicted by the fact that -- "

Now then he develops the ordinary, vulgar view of history, according to which history is political history and not economic history. He does not answer this question in the immediate sequel. The book is not finished -- was not -- was never printed, as you know, by Marx. It was published after his death and one must assume that he would have changed that. He gives the answer much later in the translation on page 62, if you would be so good to turn to that.

> "Nothing is more common than the notion that in history up till now it has only been a question of 'taking.'"

Taking, namely conquering. Yes. Yes.

> "The barbarians 'take' the Roman Empire, and this fact of 'taking' is made to explain the transition from the old world tothe feudal system. In this taking by barbarians, however, the question is, whether the nation which is conquered has evolved industrial productive forces, as is the case with modern peoples, or whether their productive forces are based for the most part merely on their association and on the community. Taking is further determined by the object taken. A banker's fortune, consisting of paper, cannot be taken at all, without the taker's submitting to the conditions of production and intercourse of the country taken. Similarly the total industrial

capital of a modern industrial country. And finally, everywhere there is very soon an end to taking, and when there is nothing more to take, you have to set about producing."

So, in other words, that is an attempt to prove that production is always the basic fact and not such things as conquest. I only refer to that so that you see that Marx did not leave it at this very inadequate remark on page 10. Now this notion, this cleavage between political history and economic history is -- has an important pre-history in Hegel himself, for what is the movement of history according to Hegel? Yes, surely, the mind, the intellect, reason. That is clear. But Hegel was very far from being abstract. He had very concrete notions of what happened. In his Phenomenology of the Mind which Hegel -- which Marx justly regarded as his greatest writing -- the beginning of the historical process is as follows: the beginning is political, Hobbian, the war of everybody against everybody, and -- but it is even much more political than in Hobbes because the objective is recognition, as Hegel calls it. Take the simple case of two individuals. They fight for the sake of admitted to be superior by the other. It is also -- what Hobbes meant by pride is implied. That is the basic thing. Now there are two possibilities. One: one of the fighters is killed. History is at an end. The other is, however, that one loses his nerves as we would say and submits. It is absolutely unpredictable who will lose his nerves and whether someone will lose his nerves. The submitter becomes the slave of the fellow who has shown courage. That is the master and slave relation according to Hegel. You see the crucial implication: there are no natural slaves. Whether you are a slave or a free man depends on an act of the will basically, but that is only the beginning. So we -- no history without a distinction of masters and slaves, but what is the further history? I can give here only the barest sketch. The master forces the slave to work for him and what does the master do? He enjoys the fruit of the labors of the slave. Well, he fights also on occasion, but his life consists chiefly in enjoyment, i.e. that is an end. There is no further development there. How does the further development come? Entirely from the part of the slave. And what is the slave doing? Working, transforming nature, and out of this basic labor of the slave the higher forms of labor, intellectual production, emerge dialectically. So you see, Hegel himself to some extent prepared Marx's notion by putting a greater emphasis on that work -- on the activity of the slave, the worker, than on the work of the lord, the political ruler. Now that is of -- in Hegel himself that is infinitely more complex, but that is an important point which we cannot completely disregard. Now let us turn -- we must look at a few passages: in the translation, page 14, the second paragraph.

"In direct contrast to German philosophy, which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven."

Yes. That's the clear formulation. Yes? The idealistic philosophers starting from the highest and trying to understand the lower in the light of the highest, and Marx starts from the lowest and tries to understand the high in the light of the low. Yes?

"That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion,

metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history. . . . "

Now let us stop here. That is, of course, an extreme overstatement which is contradicted by Marx later on. They have a history but they have ano independent history. That's what he means. Yes.

". . . no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life."

That's the crucial sentence. Marx sometimes also says consciousness doesn't determine being, but being determines consciousness. That's -- has the same meaning. Yes?

"In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second it is the real living individuals themselves, as they are in actual life, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness."

Yes. Now that is a return from -- not only from German idealism, but also from its predecessors like Descartes, in a way even the British philosophers, Locke and Hume, to the common sense use of the older view: the consciousness is only a part of man, however important it may be. It is not man. Now how does he go on? He must give some reason because what he said up to now is insufficient.

"This method of approach is not devoid of premises. It starts out from the real premises and does not abandon them for a moment. Its premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation or abstract definition, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions. As soon as this active life-process is described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with the empiricists (themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the idealists. Where speculation ends -- in real life -- there real, positive science begins: the representation of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of men. Empty talk about consciousness ceases, and real knowledge has to take its place. When reality is depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of activity loses its medium of existence."

Now let us -- we may stop here. Here we have another reference to this positivism of Marx which we discussed last time. The rejection of philosophy: only positive empirical science can give us revelation about what is, but we have discussed last time at some length that this positivism has -- is fundamentally different from present day positivism and the chief difference, to repeat this point, is that present day positivism denies wholes. It tries to understand what presents itself as a whole, say capitalist society, liberal democracy, communism, as the product of more fundamental elements which are present everywhere so that the differences between such wholes come out only as quantitative differences whereas Marx is guided by the Hegelian view that quantity necessarily transforms itself into quality. There are essential differences, according to Marx, not according to the positivists. But still we cannot leave it at that because -- as I mentioned last time, because Marx -- one cannot begin to study facts without hav-

ing, without looking for something. We need, in other words, -- empirical assertion needs organizing principles. Now the principles with which Marx approaches the facts, namely the fundamental character of the economic relations, if we may say so, are already results of empirical research, according to Marx, but of what kind of research? Yes?

"Doesn't -- you said that he went back to an older view in that one might say he rejects Descartes' autonomous reason proceeding to self-evident truths without reference to opinions; and on the other hand he doesn't go back to the older view in the sense of accepting -- "

Yes, sure. No, no, he brushes them aside. Yes, sure. And that is a famous shortcoming as is shown in all historical studies of the Marxists, perhaps not in economic history. I don't know that. But surely whenever they try to understand intellectual history -- yes? -- they do not take seriously what these authors say because they know better in advance. Yes? Sure. But the question for us now here is granting that empirical research is the only way in which we can find out anything about empirical facts, where do we get the principles, the criteria of relevance without which no empirical study is possible? Let us look at the bottom of page 15. "The difficulty begins, on the contrary, there. . . ."

"The removal of these difficulties is -- "

No, no, before. The sentence before.

"On the contrary, our difficulties begin only when we set about the observation and the arrangement -- the real depiction -- of our historical material, whether of a past epoch or of the present. The removal of these difficulties is governed by premises which it is quite impossible to state here, but which only the study of the actual life-process and the activity of the individuals of each epoch will make evident."

Yes. Now let us see. . . . In the immediate sequel we will find a more precise statement, after the heading, "History." Yes?

"We shall select here some of these abstractions, which we use to refute the ideologists, and shall illustrate them by historical examples."

Yes?

"(a) History. Since we are dealing with the Germans, who do not postulate anything, we must begin by stating the first premise of all human existence, and therefore of all history, the premise namely that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to 'make history.' But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life."

Now let us stop here. That is really the whole argument of Marx. Why is the economic interpretation of history manifestly true, that only people fooled by theological or philosophic delusions fail to see it? Why it is so? We must eat before we can do anything else. Well, eat and some other things which Marx

mentions. The satisfaction of our bodily needss precedes everything else. What comes first in time is therefore the fundamental condition out of which everything else must be understood. Yes?

"Marx says that man differs from all other animals in being able to produce his means of subsistence, but what is it about man that enables him to do that?"

Yes; a perfectly pertinent question. Sure, because the other thing -- food applies to animals as well. Sure, that's the point, but let us see whether Marx does not -- how shall I say -- whether we cannot give him a rope with which he hangs himself. That is, generally speaking, a more convincing form of criticism than merely saying you have forgotten that. Now let us turn to page 19, the second paragraph.

"Only now, after having considered four moments, four aspects of the fundamental historical relationships, do we find that man also possesses 'consciousness'; -- "

Yes, which were the other elements? I mean, he has to live. He has to live with others. Yes. All right. So now consciousness comes out in the first place. Yes?

" -- do we find that man also possesses 'consciousness'; but, even so, not inherent, not 'pure' consciousness. From the start the 'spirit' is afflicted with the curse of being 'burdened' with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness as it exists for other men, and for that reason is really beginning to exist for me personally as well; for language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men. Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal has no 'relations' with anything, cannot have any."

Now let us stop here for one moment first. What is Marx's argument? Consciousness presupposes language and language presupposes society and therefore consciousness is logically, at any rate, after society and this society is, of course, a society of production. That is no longer taken up. The question, of course, is -- which was raised by you before -- do not the individuals working together already possess consciousness from the beginning so that you cannot possibly say the production precedes in any sense language. Let us see what Marx says in the sequel. "Consciousness -- " Yes.

"Consciousness is therefore from the very beginning a social product. . . ."

Product, product. Yes? I mean, in other words, society is first and then the product, language. Yes?

". . . product, and remains so as long as men exist at all. Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious. At the same time. . . ."

Now listen: at the same time. Man from the very beginning does not merely

have a consciousness of this mountain at the end of the world -- yes? -- let us assume it's a high mountain -- and of the sun, moon, and stars in the evening and animals, trees, and other human beings, and so on. At the same time he has what?

> ". . . it is consciousness of nature, which first appears to men as a completely alien, all-powerful and unassailable force, with which men's relations are purely animal and by which they are overawed like beasts; it is thus a purely animal consciousness of nature (natural religion)."

Yes. Well, more literally stated, nature religion and distinguished from religion or any higher religion. Now is this not amazing? Is not fantastic? Men are overawed by nature as the brutes and thence he has a brutish consciousness of nature: nature religion. Who has ever heard of brutes possessing a religion? Do you see that? It's absurd. Now what is behind that. Pardon?

(Inaudible remark).

Yes, sure he means something of this kind -- doesn't make any -- fetishism he probably thought of. That doesn't make any difference. But the point is here original man has not only a consciousness of cats and whatever, maybe around in trees. He has also at the same time a consciousness of nature and here nature is, of course, not understood as something to which man belongs or of which he is a product, but nature is here understood as a wholly alien, omnipotent and unassailable power toward which men are -- take a purely brutish position. They are impressed by it like the brutes and hence they have a purely brutish consciousness of nature (nature religion). There is no question. I mean, whether Marx would have kept it if he had published it I don't know, but -- so people are quite clever in deleting give away sentences, but that would only mean that we would -- we would have to reconstruct that sentence in our own minds as having the impression of that. But that was the point I made a few minutes ago when I did not remember that passage. Marx does not take the present day view of a gradual difference between man and the brutes; you know. Marx assumes an essential difference and that implies a certain superiority of the Marxist doctrine and also of Marx's ideology over the positivistic ideology which is compelled to regard it as a great problem whether we must not give human rights to robots. You remember that famous problem of present day political science. The Marxists are not such fools to worry about that because they know that there is an essential difference between men and brutes. Now what -- theessential difference between man and brutes is that man is a productive animal and not non-productive like the brutes. Now you can say beasts are also productive animals and Marx has disposed of that in a passage of Das Kapital which I read to you and which we will read again: the bee does not have a conceit, an image, of the hive before he builds the hive or whatever he does in the hive, as the architect has a conceit, an image, of the house before he builds the house. And let us -- well, teleological production, if you want this expression: that is characteristic of man. But let us leave it at Marx's expression: production. But why on earth should the production be limited to so-called material production? The urgency of the need -- we must eat before we can do anything else -- is surely an important consideration. But in -- Marx says, without good reason, at the same time in which man, for example, tries to catch a hare by some primitive methods or pick an apple he has some awareness of the whole which no brute has. The whole -- there is an enigma for him there and he responds to that enigma. That is primitive religion, myth. You can give it any derogatory term you please. That doesn't do away with the fact that there is no good reason for doubting that man's myth production is coeval with his tool production or his production of means of living; to which Marx will probably answer, yes. After this

passage he must admit that. But he will say yes, but the myths -- this is all bunk; that are imaginations, whereas the tool which he makes out of the flint: that's real. Yes, but the question is, then, this: are men not influenced and deeply influenced by their imaginations, especially if these imaginations are so -- collective imaginations? And you know, all the trouble which Max Weber took in his Sociology of Religion to show that athere are certain -- to show that there may very well be an influence of religious notion on economic matters was absolutely sensible. And of course Engels himself has said on some occasions the Marxists don't deny that the superstructure -- here is the infra-structure -- yes, relations of production; the superstructure, the ideologies: that they have an effect on the infra-structure. So? Yes, but say -- but ultimately, ultimately the infra-structure is the cause. How do they know that except on the basis of the dogmatic assertion and the dogmatic assertion has, of course, a great plausibility because it is not limited to the Marxists but is shared by many others and is, perhaps, a principle of the modern scientific mind: that what is prior as a condition is the -- of the higher or later -- is a sufficient cause of the higher. In other words, Marx has a very -- derives a very powerful support from the anti-teleological character of modern science, so that is not a peculiarity to Marx, of Marx. You know? This basic principle that what is the primary, what is primary in time -- but to repeat, Marx does not in any way prove that's primary in time. He says, "at the same time" the natural religion, the nature religion, say, some primitive notions, I don't care how -- by the way, in the meantime the students of comparative religion have found out that these primitive religions are by no means primitive, those of which we know; that these are all elaborated cosmological schemes and not just elements of a primitive imagination. I mean, if there was such a truly primitive religion consisting only of isolated elements it has not yet been discovered. But the main point is, as I said, this remark about this simultaneity. Yes?

"In German does "at the same time" have the same ambiguity that it does in English?"

Yes, sure.

"The phrase; because in English you could read that not as meaning simultaneous."

But what?

"You could mean it to be a phrase that means -- such as, on the other hand."

Yes, but in German it means at the same time, literally translated.

"It means chronologically."

Yes, it does not always mean -- you know, but it is -- well, there is --

(Inaudible remark).

(A few indudible words by Mr. Strauss followed by); a time occurs there -- you know, sure. No, I think even if he would have said, which is possible also in German to say, simultan -- yes? -- simultaneously, it would not have -- because that would simply trace -- pushiit back to the Latin because simulus: that's also primarily temporal. No, no. That is -- that -- I think that truth compelled Marx

to write that. But as I say, he would probably -- his argument would probably be this: the tool -- yes? -- say, for polishing or whatever they do or for cutting, that is real. It really cuts, whereas the sacrifice they bring to some demon has no effect except in their imagination. Yes? That he would say. Therefore, it's not real.

"I'm just wondering if he isn't admitting an earlier stage of religion than that where all religion is is a dog's fear of lightning or a beast's fear of something strange and unknown, when man is not yet completely -- "

Yes, but the question is really Marx -- even no one except some simple minded religious people who believe that the elephant is the pious animal or even a hen is -- you must have heard that, a kind of folklore -- yes? -- you know, that the hen always looks to heaven after having taken some water -- you know? -- but no man in his senses has ever credited brutes with religion and Marx, in a way, is compelled to do so -- to do so, because of the dogmatic position he takes.

"Yes, but he does that by making a specific definition or inferring a definition of religion which is different than those who would normally speak of it would use. By religion he means the sphere of nature. Now for those who are willing to concede that, nature is a religion."

Yes, but look; let us take a simple example. A man is slain or even an animal is slain and is lying there. Some animals run away. Horses, for example, don't like that. And -- but men have all kinds of reactions. One can look dispassionately at that corpse. Others feel that's something uncanny. Well, at any rate, a human being is as such in any stage of the development capable of thinking about this thing and then all notions, all kinds of notions about afterlife, very crude notions, emerge. Brutes don't. They forget. They forget so -- as Nietzsche says on a -- you remember that occasion -- it begins to think, what is that, but then it has already forgotten what it wanted to think about. Now man doesn't forget in this way and therefore he has coherent thoughts, however crude they may be.

"But from this kind of argument the normal position is that man also forgets like the beasts until he has produced language, so that like the beast he would react without consciousness until -- "

Yes, but it is absolutely impossible to speak empirically or even quasi-empirically without assuming man to possess language. That is -- one can't go back behind that and -- that is a literally insoluble problem, as you know, because we will never find anything in any cave, in any geological stratum, which will make intelligible to us the genesis of language. Man is that being characterized by language; how the first man came to possess it is an unanswerable question. We cannot go back behind that. Let us look at a few other passages which are relevant to that here. Now let me see. There is another point, I think, which we should consider, on page -- yes, a relevant passage, on page 31, oline 11, following.

"This conception. . . ."

Yes, of certain young Hegelians. Yes. Yes?

"This conception is truly religious: it postulates religious man as the primitive man, and in its imagination puts the religious production of fancies in the place of the real production of the means of subsistence and of life it-

se self."

Yes. So. But wone can only say this view -- it's one-sidedness is as true and as false as Marxism. I mean, if we want to proceed empirically we have no right to say that thing production is a reflection of myth production as we have to say that myth production is a reflection from thing production. We must be open minded, empirical. Now let us turn to page 20, at the end of the first paragraph.

> "It is mere herd-consciousness, and at this point man is only distinguished from sheep by the fact that with him consciousness takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious one."

Yes. Now that is again only the essential difference between men and brutes: consciousness. Hence, consciousness is not a product. It's coeval with man. Now from all this it follows that world history strictly speaking exists only -- no, I'm sorry, that is a summary of the intervening remarks which we cannot read. It's too long. Now Marx gives a survey of world history and contrary to Hegel's teleological philosophy of history which conceives of the whole history of the world — of all history as world history; for example, what was done in Africa originally tended toward all later development, toward China, Mesapotamia, West -- Western Europe, and so on and so on. From Marx's point of view world history exists only since there is a world market, meaning an actual relation of all human inhabitants of the globe. Prior to that there was no world history. Hegel's philosophy of history is pure ideology. Now there are a few more passages which we should read before we can make a discussion. On page. . . .

(Change of tape). (Tape resumes just at the end of a question from the floor).

Yes, but what is it in fact?

"It's a reflection of the productive forces of the way he lives."

A historical product, let us say. So there is no essence of man to begin with, but what different generations called the essence of man is simply man and human relations as they have developed up to him. That's all to that. But the question arises still: is there not an essential difference between man and the brutes presupposed by Marx? Yes?

> "In the Beginning of Philosophy (?) when he speaks of species essence isn't he adopting a belief in the species essence of man."

No. You see, that is a very bad translation and that is due to a great ambiguity of the German word which is translated by essence. Now the German word which he uses is this. I write it in two words lest it is too long for your view: Gattungs Wesen. The Germans write that in one word and you can easily see that's how many you can translate. Gattungswesen. Now gattung is species. Yes, but wesen is not simply essence. That has the same ambiguity which the Greek word has from which it is derived and which the Latin word does not have. The Greek word is usea. Now what is an usea according to Aristotle, in the first place? This; or a dog or a tree. The essence as a species is an usea only derivatively, in the second -- in the second treatment. Wesen means, in ordinary German usage, a living being, especially a human being, but generally Wesen, and Gattungswesen means he is a social being, a social being. That has -- but you mean to say this

is a statement of the essence of man. Sure, but that -- I'm not responsible for that. I only want to point out that Marx must assume an essential difference between men and brutes and must therefore assume that there is an essence of man, but for him -- his justification is this: what man originally is, his basic constitution, let us say, mental as well as bodily, is uninteresting. The interesting thing is -- are always individual men or masses of individual men -- yes? -- and they are always -- have made something out of themselves or have been molded in a specific way and that is the man with whom we have to deal in all social science and in all social thought. But that is, of course, theoretically, a very unsatisfactory answer. A few more passages. On page 35 of the translation, line 9, following.

"He does not see how the sensuous world around him. . . ."

Feuerbach. Yes? Feuerbach. He means Feuerbach.

"/Feuerbach/ does not see how the sensuous world around him is, not a thing given direct from all eternity, ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society; and, indeed, in the sense that it is an historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its intercourse, modifying its social organization according to the changed needs. Even the objects of the simplest 'sensuous certainty' are only given him through social development, industry and commercial intercourse. The cherry-tree, like almost all fruit-trees, was, as is well known, only a few centuries ago transplanted by commerce into our zone, and therefore only by this action of a definite society in a definite age provided for the evidence of Feuerbach's 'senses.'"

Yes. Let us stop here and let us read a parallel on page 113, paragraph two of your translation.

"The socialist opposes to present society. . . ."

The socialist is here some fool. Yes? -- who Marx attacks. I mean, lest you are mistaken. Yes. Sure.

"The socialist opposes to present society, which is 'based upon external compulsion,' the ideal of true society, which is based upon the 'consciousness of man's inward nature, i.e. upon reason.' It is based, that is, upon the consciousness of consciousness, upon the thought of thought. The true socialist does not differ from the philosophers even in his choice of terms. He forgets that the 'inward nature' of men, as well as their 'consciousness' of it, 'i.e.' their 'reason,' has at all times been an historical product and that even when, as he believes, the society of men has been based 'upon external compulsion,' their 'inward nature' corresponded to this 'external compulsion.'"

Let us stop there. Yes. Now that -- you see the same thought. One can also present Marx's thought as follows: all philosophic thought or almost all philosophic thought -- Hegel would be a conspicuous exception -- is radically unhistorical. Therefore they speak of the essence of man and think that the essence of man can give us crucial information, but man and the world are historical. They are in a process of change. By historical change of the world Marx means such things as our environment, the nature as we observe it now, is, as we observe it now, the

product of human activity, as the example of the cherry tree. In other words, there is -- when we speak sometimes of the common sense world in contra-distinction, say, to the world as presented by theoretical physics, the common sense world does not exist. The common sense world differs in different historical situations. To repeat, Marx admits that there is an essence of man but he says that is very uninteresting. All -- if we -- the essence of man doesn't tell us anything as to what we could, should -- or should -- do now; nothing whatever. That can be found -- nothing whatever. That it would not in itself give us sufficient information was always granted. But that it gives us no information whatever is the crucial point. We have to act in this world as we have it now and all possible, reasonable tasks are tasks of men living now and only by understanding this situation now are we -- and only by that and not by any reflections on the essence of man or the moral law or anything of this kind which is trans-historical -- can be of any significance. That is an absolutely crucial part of Marx and Marx has played probably a greater role than any other individual in "liberating" modern man from the old fashioned notions of the importance of the essence of man and any other "abstractions" of this kind. What do you say to this proposition of Marx? I believe that is crucial. Is it possible? Is it -- how does it work in practice? Let us give Marx all possible benefit of the doubt. How does it work in practice that by understanding our situation we will know what we have to do? This knowledge of our situation includes, of course, also historical knowledge. We have to know the genesis of our situation, naturally, and to that extent the analysis of the present situation must be -- is inseparable from an intelligent knowledge of t the past out of which the present grew. Well, if this -- look at, remember the Communist Manifesto. If this is the situation of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie: the progressive proletarization of the intermediate classes and of a substantial part of the proletariat and the ever increasing degradation of the proletariat and simultaneously with that the ever increasing revolt of the proletariat against it. Well, you can have a selfish interest as a kind of parasite and because you don't like to fight -- to continue your life if it lasts long enough as a parasite of the bourgeoisie or as a bourgeois, but as an honest man with your eyes open you have no choice. So given this analysis there seems to be no alternative. Well, and if there is no alternative you do not need criteria in which direction to change. You see when Marx says, "Philosophy has hitherto only interpreted the world, but what matters is to change the world," the common sense reaction would be, yes, but in what direction? And if you -- and then you must have principles justifying this or that direction. That is philosophy so you come back from -- and a philosophy which looks at what is, which is contemplative and which is not changing, giving you the standard. But Marx says we don't need -- that is absolutely -- either -- both it doesn't exist, such standards don't exist, and second, they are not necessary.

"When he talks of degradation doesn't this already imply -- the use of the term -- "

Yes, but how would he argue? Yes; very true. How would he argue?

"Well, this is -- he would argue that this is not degradation that he is imposing on people. This is -- they see themselves as degraded."

Yes, and all parts see it according to the standards. It appears as degradation in the light of the standards of the bourgeois society. Whether that is sufficient is another matter, but where does the difficulty come in first? Yes?

"In long term predictions. If one would want to predict when the people would feel degraded in the future, but perhaps you might say that would be impossible."

Yes, given -- yes, there is, of course, a famous difficulty that this increasing pauperization did not take place -- yes? -- and quite a few other things did in fact not take place. That creates a great complication. There are situations which are simple, where one has really no choice. We know that in private life. They might also exist in public life. But where does the -- and of course that Lenin was sure in 1917 the revolution of the Western workers was just around the corner -- you remember? -- and he was very disappointed and there were similar expectations at the end of the Second World War, that in France and Italy and so the communists would take cover -- you know? -- again disappointed. But then they would simply say, oh well, Marx underestimated the resilience of bourgeois society, that Marx thought in terms of hundred years and we may have to think in terms of two hundred years. That is not terribly important. But where does the difficulty come in? I think, I believe in the first place because, as at least Engels already admitted and as today is rather obvious for other reasons, there is an alternative which they admit. The alternative is the destruction of civilization, maybe even the destruction of the human race in terms of the super weapons which you have now. There is -- people may detest the prospect of a communist world society so much that they would use every means against that and would use things which would bury both sides and not only one side as Khrushchev would. So that alone, I think, shows. In other words, the question of choice cannot be disposed of. There are, even in the case of an extreme -- what we regard when we say he has no choice. That is not literally true. He always has the choice, for example, of committing suicide; or he has no choice, he must undergo this operation. No, he can prefer to die, and so on. So the simply choiceless situation doesn't exist for man. We speak of it ordinarily but that presupposes -- we always make some tacit presuppositions when we say that. Rabbi Weiss.

"Well, why can't one also choose to act in one's self-interest as a member of the bourgeoisie?"

Oh sure one can, but Marx had no doubts that they are going to do that. But they will be licked because they will be ever less -- you know? -- and if you have then at the end Senator Kennedy's family and Governor Rockefeller's family and some other families and 178 million Americans in a state of ever increasing, ever more hopeless misery that -- sure they may hold on to their millions, but that will be a very simple process.

"It's a matter of victory then."

Yes, sure, sure.

(Inaudible remark).

Yes, well they are what Marx -- well Marx would probably -- yes, people who are so much benefitted by a given social order would in almost all cases love that order. That's Marx's premise. Yes? He would admit that there are some individuals, some sons of millionaires and billionaires who might even then become traitors to their class. That, of course -- he admitted that, but generally speaking the men who are benefitted by a certain state of affairs like that state of affairs. I think that is not a particularly Marxist thesis. Yes? People, people believe --

love or believe to love what is profitable to them. That I think was an old insight and --

"What I meant was that knowledge of the situation doesn't necessarily lead to action on the part of the proletariat."

No, no, but the proletariat would be --

"And the action by identifying with the proletariat."

No, but still, if the situation is as Marx described it, objectively so, could an honest and intelligent man fail to be a communist -- if it is so clearly drawn that it is only a selfish interest of a small part of the society which is responsible for this immense misery. I mean, if that is the true analysis there would be no question. The question is whether it is the true analysis, but even that -- even granting that I say there is no human situation in which one can say there is no alternative and therefore the question of choice comes up. I believe that part of the reasoning behind fascism in some so-called gentleman fascists -- I believe had this character: rather the destruction of the world than the victory of communism. That showed at least that -- the possibility of such a choice. It failed in this form, but there is no -- I can only repeat that both Engels and Lenin -- and Engels, I'm sure, Lenin, I'm almost sure -- say that. The communist -- the victory of communism is the only alternative to the destruction of civilization. Yes, but the destruction of civilization is an alternative. Even the destruction of the human race is an alternative and today clearer than ever for well known reasons. Yes, but this raises another theoretical question: the passage we read. Is it true that man and the world is simply historical? Are there not certain basic phenomena apart from digestion and so which are, which are not affected by change? Basic facts, empirical facts -- that we live on the earth, we are terrestrial beings, that there are various species of animals as well as of plants, however they -- some might have become extinct and so on, but that man is surrounded by them, lives from them and through them to some extent, the heaven above him: are these not crucial points which -- is not the phenomenon of human love, love of the two sexes, fundamentally the same in spite of the historical variation which exists there in externals? In other words, that's what poetry is fundamentally about: this permanent core of man which shows in spite of the infinite historical variety. That would be one consideration. Now we have to consider another point which has very much to do with the point raised by Mr. Cropsey before: in the translation on page 51, line 7. "The second progress -- " no, "the first progress --" yes? Or begin there with -- page 51. Yes. Perhaps begin with the --

"The first advance beyond natural, estate-capital was provided by the rise of merchants whose capital was from the beginning movable, capital in the modern sense as far as one can speak of it, given the circumstances of those times. The second advance came with manufacture, which again made mobile a mass of natural capital, and altogether increased the mass of movable capital as against that of natural capital."

Yes, let us -- now let us -- let us stop here. What I have in mind is this term which he translates by "natural." Pascal, the translator, has a note there on the translation of this word. The German word is naturwuchsig. You could say grown; grown in opposition to made. That is a part of it. Wachsen is to grow, what has naturally grown. Now this -- the whole historical process is, according

to Marx, a victory of that which has not naturally grown over what has naturally grown. That has very much to do with that problem. What does that mean? What does natural growth mean?

(Inaudible reply).

Oh, not necessarily; without consciousness of that growth. That, I think, is the precise point. Take a simple example. People speak, have different languages, different dialects. No one made these dialects. They just developed and are there and perhaps from time to time someone notes, to his surprise, that people talk now differently than they talked two hundred years ago, but that's all. And then someone, say a king, wants to have a unified language for the court and for the country: such things as happened in Italy, in France, in England. Here the process by which king's English developed or surely the French of the Academy is no longer an unsupervised process, but there are people who sit there and purify the language consciously. Now in other things that's still more obvious. Certain social institutions come into being. No one knows how. They are there. They are convenient. Inconveniences are felt at a given point. One makes a change. In the course of decades other changes: unconsciously the social organization has changed. Entirely different matter: people establish a social order; for example, a constitution. Now generally speaking what is natural, what has grown without human supervision, is from Marx's point of view the lower and the -- for example, the difference between the countryside and the city has very much to do with that. The countryside is the more natural. The city is the more conscious, the more reflexive and reflected. So the whole process, historical process, consists in ever more -- in pushing back ever more the limits set by nature and by natural developments, and that goes together, as Mr. Cropsey has pointed out, with the fact that Marx's whole doctrine presupposes in another sense a return to nature, a return from all ideologies, from all abstractions, to man's sensual, sensuous reality and activity. Yes; I think these were the most important passages which I found in the -- in this part. Mr. Cropsey, would you bring up your point?

(Question as to whether Marx ever implies the sociality of non-human animals).

Not explicitly which I remember, but perhaps he would say there are gregarious animals, but not strictly speaking social animals. Something of this kind is meant.

(Inaudible remark).

Yes, which he took over from Feuerbach.

"But one thing: when he speaks about the beasts and the men he makes a distinction between them, but the distinction isn't sociality."

No, no.

"It's with respect to the positing of the end before the end is realized so that the question of any peculiar human essence becomes even more complicated in some places and one could even say why is there not a historical process among non-human social beings on the ground of the fact that there is no clear distinction between human and non-human social beings?"

Yes, but I think Marx would say there is -- the terms which he uses are production, as we have seen here, and production means conscious production, and

therefore consciousness is the difference between men and brutes and only such conscious beings which can learn from experience and transmit this experience to the next generation so that the next generation lives differently from the first generation can be historical. I think that is probably what he means there.

(Inaudible remark by Mr. Cropsey regarding genetics as a political question in Marxist-oriented societies).

I believe that has no direct relation. I think the Lysenko question had this meaning: if Lysenko -- I mean, if the Western geneticists are right the natural inequality of men will be as perpetual with men. Yes? The genes will take care of that. Now, in other words, the equalization of men through the equalization of living conditions, education, and what have you, will be only skin deep. You have to begin again from scratch in the next generation because of the heritage, of the biological, genetic heritage, and therefore we must postulate as good egalitarians that Lysenko is right; that acquired qualities can be transmitted. Is this not the point? I think that's the issue.

(Inaudible remark).

No, because the fact of -- I mean, say, that we live in different dwellings than men fifty years ago, a thousand years ago, five thousand years ago, whereas storks and other birds -- and other beasts -- have the same kind of dwellings repeated identically in every generation. That's an undeniable fact admitted by everyone and which shows -- I mean, if one wants to express it so simply -- man has a history, whereas the other animal species do not have a history. That I think is really -- has nothing directly to do with Lysenko.

> "Well, my speculation is that what he asserts which leads to the growing egalitarianism among human beings is, if sufficiently extended, it's true. . . in the direction of the egalitarianism of all living things in a way, given sufficient time. It's got nothing whatever to do with the political question it's true, but when he denies the peculiarities of the human beings on the traditional grounds, then the species themselves begin to break down."

Yes, but Marx never drew -- I mean, yes, but Marx never drew this conclusion nor -- and I think communists are not vegetarians, to put it very simply. They do not assert an equality of the various animal species with man. I think that -- I really believe that's a different issue which leads to Lysenko.

"I think they ought to be vegetarians if they -- "

No. No, no; Marx still -- no, Marx is not a positivist and he would simply say, taking the evolutionist scheme, that the change in -- the quantitative change, say in certain species of monkeys or apes, the quantitative change from a certain moment on became a qualitative change and -- a leap, a leap, the favorite phrase of Marx as it was of Hegel and therefore man cannot be reduced to the brutes and we misunderstand everything, small or large, if we do not admit that. What our task will be in the next meetings is to understand what we have only touched upon hitherto: why Marxism, communism, according to its own interpretation, is a synthesis of materialism and idealism; materialism and idealism understood in the way in which Marx himself understood them in his early writings. That -- and that requires indeed that we consider also Marx's moral philosophy because he had to develop a moral philosophy if only in order to criticize the ideologists of his time

Marx seminar: eighth meeting. April 25, 1960.

(As tape begins it appears that the student scheduled to deliver a paper has not appeared). The best thing to do is simply to begin our discussion as if he were not and see whether he hands in a paper to us. Now the assignment which was given to Rabbi Weiss was the fourth and fifth part of The German Ideology. It is in the translation simply the second part called "True Socialism." It is the least interesting part of the book but we -- since we have to depend on what is available in English we had to assign this part. Now I will -- I suggest that we discuss a few passages in this section which are of some interest. I remind you only of The German Ideology, of the character of The German Ideology as a whole. This was written by Marx fairly early, around 1845, when he was about 27 years old, and it was not published during his lifetime. It was published long after his death. I do not know at the moment whether it was published -- no, it was not published by Engels, I believe. It was published only by Mehring or so; in other words, in our century, and it -- the fragment -- Marx took the great trouble of discussing a few doctrines in Germany at that time and it was very -- is characteristic which kind of doctrines he discussed: only those left Hegelian developments. In other words, he was not interested in the conservative reactionaries. That he thought had been disposed of and the question was only -- what he tried to show was that the radical liberal or radical democratic doctrines which were developed by some people from the Hegelian school, that even they would not do, measured by the standard of freedom, and therefore communism alone was the solution. Now Rabbi Weiss are you prepared now?

"Am I prepared now?"

Yes.

"I have a paper. Is that what you mean?"

Yes. That is what I mean. Then please -- we cannot permit you to take breath.

(Tape resumes after the reading of the paper).

Now -- well, I will take up the points which you made, but first one point regarding the reliability of Marx's criticism of, say, Mr. Grun -- yes? -- the chief -- and a certain Dr. Kuhlmann who are representatives of that German socialism. I would say I would have no doubt that in such matters Marx is absolutely reliable and I mean, he was not compelled to make such cheap tricks, you know, and denigrate a man merely in order to win a victory, and I would say what he quotes is sufficiently proved. Grun must have been a very superficial and arrogant individual and that is what it amounts to, but that -- of course, one could say who cares for -- there are so many around at all times. Why should we bother about Mr. Grun in particular? That is perfectly true, but why did Marx think it worth while? If you turn to page 97 in your translation in the third paragraph Marx gives the reason. "If one considers the opposition of communism to the world of private property in its crudest form. . . ." Do you have that?

"Should I?"

Yes. Or let Mr. Reinkin read it. He is really very trained in that.

"If one imagines the antithesis of communism to the world of private property

in its crudest form, i.e. in an abstract form in which the real conditions of that antithesis are ignored, then one is faced with the antithesis of property and lack of property. The abolition of this antithesis can be viewed as the abolition of either the one side or the other; either property can be abolished in which case universal lack of property or destitution results, or else the lack of property may be abolished, which means the establishment of true property. In reality, the actual property owners stand on one side and the propertyless communist proletarians on the other. This opposition becomes keener day by day and is rapidly driving to a crisis. If then, the theoretical representatives of the proletariat wish their literary activity to have any practical result whatsoever, they must first and foremost insist that all phrases be swept aside which obscure the real sharpness of the opposition and which hush it up. Such phrases actually give the bourgeois a chance to safeguard their interests by insinuating themselves among the communists on the strength of their philanthropic enthusiasms. All these rotton qualities are, however, to be found in the catchwords of the true socialists and particularly in 'true property.' Of course, we realize that the communist movement cannot be destroyed by a few German phrase-mongers. Nevertheless, it is essential to resist all phrases which obscure and dilute still further the realization that communism is totally opposed to the existing world order. It is particularly necessary in a country like Germany, where philosophic phrases have for centuries exerted a certain power, and where, moreover, class divisions are not so clearly marked as in other countries, with the result that the German communists are less keenly and decisively aware of the real issues."
"Further?"

No, that's all. That's the justification. In other words, in order -- Marx did not believe that the fight would be won or lost in Germany. He thought much more of England and France, but still Germany plays, of course, a certain role and therefore it is necessary to awaken the German proletariat and this awakening is prevented by those true socialistsphrase-makers. That's the reason, the practical reason, and therefore Marx goes out of his way to criticize these German socialists but also the German radical liberals because he felt that they befuddled the true issue by making the Germans believe that the liberal democratic state can be the last -- can be the end of the movement. We talked about that. So -- no, I would say I have no doubt that Marx, in his criticism of Grun as a scholar has very much to -- is absolutely right and also what he says about the arrogance of these people: you know, superficial readers of Hegel believing that they are the top of the world because they know Hegel and then want to teach the French who know much better what is going on in the field of the social struggles. That I think is a point which is -- makes on mere impression of absolutely -- of being absolutely sound. That doesn't mean, of course, that Marx's position itself is true. You mentioned a few points which we have to take up later coherently: for example, that Marx's rejection of the essence of man cannot be literally true. Otherwise Marx's own position would not make sense. And we have to see with what right does he attack these Germans for having had recourse to the essence of man. You -- one part of your criticism, if I understood you correctly, was this: that Marx is "a naturalist" and then, on the other hand, he rejects, as you made clear by your very tough examples, he rejects nature as a standard. Yes? Well, what he says, Marx says, is today, of course, trivial. I mean, people wouldn't use such examples perhaps, but nature is not a standard because an urge of a young juvenile delinquent to kill his mother is as natural -- yes? -- as his desire to be kind. You know, this kind of thing is trivial, and now the question is how can -- today it is, of course, clear. Today they say there are no standards. There are no standards. All values are subjective. How does Marx get out of that fix? Was

this not a question which you, at least, implied in what you said? But how does he get out of that?

"Well, I don't know. I think perhaps man is -- man can be different and still not be regarded as strictly a part of nature. . . ."

In other words, there are essential differences within nature.

"Yes."

Yes, but still even that -- are not there all kinds of human actions natural in this sense and yet some are preferable to others? Where is the standard? Yes?

"Is he using the greatest good of the greatest number? He's talking to men and he can say what men really want is this realm of freedom that we are working for the possibility of."

Yes. However that may be one could perhaps say the full development of each man's faculties. That is one point. And he would have to show why the human equivalent to what you said about the apes is a defective form of developing one's faculties. Yes? You know? Good. So Marx -- that is not the difficulty in Marx. But then at the end you made this point: the determination of -- you found a difficulty in the fact that Marx says human thought is determined by social conditions and yet Marx says or implies that it is possible to know the truth. How could one defend Marx against this criticism as far as stated?

"Well, it's possible, as I mentioned earlier, to have truth as a standard and yet it is truth to be determined at a given stage of history."

Yes, but what does that mean: truth as a standard? Is the determination of the consciousness by a social condition in itself incompatible with human knowledge?

"No, not if at a given point the social conditions are such that it is possible for -- to arrive at truth. In other words, the truth is -- the final truth is determined by the final stage of history."

Yes, but let us proceed step by step. I mean, what you imply is -- otherwise your argument wouldn't make sense -- is that thought, insofar as it is determined socially, is necessarily erroneous. Marx would say regardless of whether it is erroneous or true it is socially determined. Where does the difference come in? Now in the first place what Marx implies is there is always some knowledge of truth. Think: we could not possibly live for a day -- I don't say for an hour -- without having some true knowledge. We would constantly jump into one another if we were not aware that this is a solid human being; you can't walk through him; you have to -- yes? And we couldn't possibly eat without having some awareness of the fact that this is a thing fit to be eaten, and so on. There is always knowledge of truth to some extent and there is always also error. Now the question is -- what Marx means to say is regarding the most important -- yes -- no, regarding the most urgent things men always have sufficient knowledge. Otherwise they could never have lived. But regarding the most comprehensive things men have hitherto been absolutely in error; namely, hitherto men have always had false notions about the whole of society and what is really the ground of it. Now at a certain moment, Marx says, men can understand this materialistic basis of society, can see that,

and this, however, is not merely a venture of thought. This is itself socially conditioned. As he makes clear, if there had not been capitalist society Adam Smith could never have developed his doctrine of labor. The fact that everything had become an object of basically the same kind of production so that the difference, for example, between agricultural and industrial production had become less important. Only that enabled Smith to develop his general notion of labor as the origin of all wealth. Similarly, by -- because this was somehow -- affected all European countries and the backward countries like Germany included, but in Germany that became visible only in the most abstract way. The Germans didn't develop naturally -- didn't develop economics, but they had the clearest reflection of that on the ideological level; meaning, Hegel. Hegel realized and Hegel realized more clearly than any other philosopher that thought itself is essentially production. Hegel did not see that this was only a reflection of the basic form of production, of material production. That he did not, but he approached it. In other words, the development -- capitalist society is accompanied by a certain awareness, by a certain dim awareness, of what is the true reality. Capitalism can never have more than a dim awareness because the capitalists as capitalists are sold on capitalist society. In the moment their thought would endanger the further existence, the survival, of capitalist society they would stop. But there are some men who have no interest in capitalist society because they are only its victims and these are the proletarians. Therefore, the proletarians, again in a dim way, go further than the brightest representatives of bourgeois society. But there can be some men, some men induced either by the theoretical difficulties presented by Hegel or by the practical problems because they see that the liberal democratic state does not bring freedom and they arecconcerned with freedom -- some individuals can be induced by either or both of these difficulties to take a further step: to step out of capitalist thought and these are Marx and Engels. Well, to some extent the earlier socialists, but Marx and Engels -- according to their claim they took the decisive step. They were -- surely, what determines them is the crisis of capitalism and the crisis of capitalism which they are able to see from the point of view of the proletariat. This possibility exists. You see, there were, after all, marginal capitalists -- yes? I mean, Engels could live as a businessman quite well, but Marx was a so-called intellectual, you know, and he was very poor throughout his life, you know, and he had all kinds of experience. So that's easy, but some people even are rich and can nevertheless be sufficiently public spirited to be induced either by theoretical or practical difficulties to see what corresponds, what demands, what outlook corresponds to the proletariat's. That has happened. Then you raise the question: well, the proletariat may still be -- that may -- the proletariat may be able to seize something against which the bourgeois is constitutionally blind -- to which the bourgeois is constitutionally blind. In other words, the proletarian position may still be a relative position. That was your point. What's the -- yes, surely, but what is Marx--- Marx has considered that. What is Marx's reply to that? What is the peculiarity of the proletarian class compared with all other classes, past or present?

"Well, for one thing it represents the vast majority of mankind."

Yes, but that -- you could say the peasants presented the vast majority of mankind for many many centuries and that is no guarantee of truth. I think there is only one formula possible. The proletariat is the absolute class and therefore the proletarian consciousness which doesn't have to be present in each proletarian individual but that consciousness by virtue of which a proletarian can only understand himself consistently as a proletarian is therefore the truth. That is, of course, the burden of Marx's point: that the proletariat is an absolutely unique

class: that class, the only class which ever was and is, which cannot liberate itself without liberating man as man. And that is the point which one has to question, but Marx has, of course, seen this difficulty very clearly. I will take it up later.

"Would that -- wouldn't the proletariat still be a class even though -- "

Yes, but a class -- a class in which -- in which and through which class disappears.

"But it hasn't disappeared yet."

But -- yes, but it has -- but since its activity, its revolutionary activity is the transcending of class therefore, for the first time, relativism is about to be transcended and therefore -- that is the basis for Marx's claim that the historical materialism or intellectual[illegible]--however you call its position -- is true. I mean, that was a criticism of Marx. I think the formula stems from Max Weber, if I remember well, that one must apply Marxism to itself, i.e. to understand the Marxists in the light of their class situation and so on and so on. Yes but that is -- Marx would say he did from the very beginning. The fact that Marx was not technically a proletarian -- I mean, in the literal sociological sense -- is not important because the French noblemen who took the side of the bourgeoisie and were in a way the leaders of the bourgeoisie in the French Revolution, at least in the early part, of course were also noblemen and yet they had become traitors to their class and by this very fact they became, they could become, the spokesmen of the other class. One could even say if one wants to do this kind of thing that there is a particular probability, high probability, that these switching men should be in the best position to understand, in the better position than the proletarian who is completely wrapped up in the immediate tasks of his class: you know, strikes and what have you, whereas this man who had had the leisure, the non-proletarian leisure, to acquire a broad horizon would be in a much better position to spell out to the proletarian [illegible] behalf of the proletarian what the proletarian intends. Yes?

"Well, until the final stage of history is reached the proletariat is not yet the absolute class."

No, it is the absolute class. It is, because it is destined by its situation to -- but you can say one thing. You can -- one thing is to call man to revolution -- yes? -- prepare the revolution; and another thing is to achieve the revolution and to live after the revolution. Now things -- I mean, a revolution would not be a revolution if it did not have surprises and the surprises -- just as a war would not be a war if there were not surprises -- and then it is simply a , not a war or revolution. And now what men will do and think after the revolution cannot be, at least not be fully, known in advance. Marx admitted that and that is a part of the communist law as you know. Therefore, it is impossible to describe in detail the post-revolutionary society. You know, that's axiomatic with communism, but still they say allot about the post-revolutionary society in advance and they are forced to say it because one wants to know a little bit whether the end, whether the outcome of the revolution is not likely to be another form of the old mess. Yes? You know? Marx has to prove that the revolution is not the substitution of one form of tyranny for another form of tyranny, but that this isrreally the resurrection, the regeneration of man: terms which he uses. That is -- that is the difficulty, but, in other words, Marx avoids the

relativistic difficulty by a modification of Hegel's view: namely, that there is a peak in the historical development and at that peak not necessarily full knowledge but knowledge of the decisive truth is for the first time possible. We don't need more and who wants to have all details filled up? But if we know the decisive thing that's all we need and Marx claims to give that and one must look into that, of course, but Marx has considered that. This -- there was one Marxist and I must say I think the most intelligent Marxist in the Western world outside of Soviet Russia, I mean, and that was Lukacs, whose name I mentioned before, who fell for this criticism of Max Weber and said yes, we must apply Marxism to itself. And he came to this conclusion: that Marxism has -- is about -- say, the doctrine of Marx is related to the proletarian revolution as the doctrine, say, of Rousseau -- yes? -- or any of these men, to the French Revolution. Now this is a beauty because Rousseau believes or let us assume some of his disciples believe that this revolution will mean, will be, the emancipation of man from all tyranny. What came out? Bourgeois oppression. How can we know that the Marxist revolution will not lead to Stalinist oppression? Yes? We know it perhaps: that he was righter than he should have been. So, in other words, you cannot apply Marxism to itself without abandoning Marxism. Marxism is an absolute position which cannot be relativized or it is nothing. That, I think,,is all. Now let us turn to a few special points. We have here -- well, Marx begins with a critique of the ideological character of this true socialism, i.e. they -- what does it mean? As he puts it, one formula is this: these people separate the consciousness of certain historically conditioned spheres of life from the sphere of life and measure it by looking at the true absolute consciousness, i.e. the German philosophic consciousness. In other words, they believe that thought can be understood in and by itself and not by transcending it in the direction of social reality. They take the theories as something independent. Yes? And not as something radically derivative. Let us see a few more passages: on page 87, line 7 from bottom.

> "All epoch-making systems have as their real content the needs of the time in which they arose. Each one of them is based on the whole of the antecedent development of a nation, on the historical growth of its class relations with their political, moral, philosophical and other consequences."

Yes. Let us stop here. You know, every system -- for example, Spinoza writes a book, the Ethics, in which he tries to teach man, man, how he can achieve felicity and that it was written in the seventeenth century is absolutely uninteresting to Spinoza. From his point of view he could have written it any time. It so happened that it was written for the first time in his age. Marx says no: the true content of that book are the needs of the time in which they emerged, i.e. we would have to understand Spinoza as the first man who openly did not belong to any religious community -- he was a Jew by origin but was excommunicated and did not become a Christian; who lived in Holland, the first capitalist society. That's the key to the Ethics. Now I think if you would try to do it you would see that it won't help. That won't help; that it would perhaps explain, to some extent, his political writings: that wouldn't do. So -- but still that is, of course, the assertion of Marx. Now then the point which you referred to: what is the characteristic of these Germans? The unhistorical character. They speak of the essence of man. In other words, they disregard the crucial importance of the specific, of the historical, and therefore they talk also about nature: a certain sentimental view of nature to which they have no longer any right -- that is what Marx implies -- is to give the solution. Nature is harmonious and beneficient and if men would only follow nature there would be not any conflicts. That is, of course, an infinitely old story. It is only -- how shall I say -- outlandish in the nineteenth

century after what has been done to nature and to the concept of nature in the modern century and Marx's criticism is here, of course, absolutely victorious, but it is in no way peculiar to Marx. Hegel and many, many others would have said the same thing. There are a few points which we might perhaps read on page 100. "He gives now an invitation to a walk" -- yes? "He addresses now an invitation to a walk to man."

> "He now invites 'man' to accompany him on a journey, an invitation which 'man' readily accepts. 'Man' enters the realm of free nature and indulges, among other things, in the following intimate confessions of a true socialist."

Yes. Stop here. Good. Now we don't have to read that because I would like to paralyze Rabbi Weiss' example by some more massive ones, by some more pertinent ones. Yes? "'Man' can see a whole lot of other things in nature." Do you have that? Skip the next paragraph.

> "'Man' could observe a quantity of other things in nature, e.g. the bitterest competition among plants and animals; he could see, for example, in the plant world, in his 'forest of tall and stately oaks' how these tall and stately capitalists consume the nutriment of the tiny shrubs, which might well complain: terra, aqua, aere et igni interdicti sumus; /we are forbidden from earth, water, air, and fire/; he could observe the parasites, the ideologists of the vegetable world, he could further observe that thereiis open warfare between the 'forest birds' and the 'infinite multitude of tiny creatures,' between the grass of his 'meadows' and the 'mettlesome troop of young horses.'"

Yes. In other words, this notion of nature as a sheer paradise of peace and benevolence and beneficence is just nonsense, as if there were no beasts of prey and poisonous snakes. You know? That is surely true. The question is how far experience? But this simpleton seems to have left -- Grun seems to have that. Now let us turn to page 102, the third paragraph.

> "The first fact asserted. . . . "

No, no, when he says, "These are lilies on the field." Yes?

(Begins to read again at wrong place).

No, no. Before. Before.

> "Yes, consider the lilies of the field, how they are eaten by goats, transplanted by man into his button-hole, how they are crushed beneath the immodest embraces of the dairymaid and the donkey-driver!"

Yes, well that -- but it's very funny, but it is, of course, a very old story going back to Machiavelli at least. In other words, there is -- yes, there is no providence, no providence of nature or of God in any sense. That is -- and he quotes as a counterpoise against this elementary view on -- a little bit later; the paragraph, "This whole prologue is a model of naive. . . ."

> ". . . of ingenuous philosophic mystification. The true socialist proceeds from the thought that the dichotomy of life and happiness must cease. To prove his statement, he summons the aid of nature and assumes that in it this dichotomy does not exist; from this he deduces that since man, too, is a natural

body and possesses all the general properties of such a body, no dichotomy should exist for him either. Hobbes, also by invoking nature, produced a proof of his /war of all against all/. . . ."

With much greater right -- yes? -- he says. That is not in the translation? "With much greater right could Hobbes demonstrate his war of everyone. . . ." Yes?

". . . that is much more conclusive than Herr Grun's attempt to prove a contrary hypothesis."

Yes. So you see he refers to the pre-history and, of course, one would even have to go back beyond Hobbes. Yes. So that -- I think that Marx is here easily victorious -- is not doubtful to me, but the question is whether it is not one of those victories which one ought to be ashamed of. You know? Yes, because they are so simple. We -- there are -- is another point, problem, touched upon whichy you have not mentioned in your paper, Rabbi Weiss, and that refers to the problem of equality, a problem which we have to discuss coherently after. Now turn to page 186, the second paragraph from the bottom. Yes, the difference between Mr. Kuhlmann and his -- yes.

"Herr Kuhlmann differs here from the socialists and thecommunists only by reason of a misunderstanding, the cause of which must be sought in his pursuit of practical aims and doubtless in his limitations. He confuses the diversity of faculties and capacities with the inequality of possessions and enjoyment conditioned by possession, and inveighs therefore against communism: . . ."

Yes. Do you understand that point, what he has to say? What does Marx -- well, perhaps we read the other relevant passage and then we take it together. On page 188, the fourth paragraph.

"The whole of this tautological. . . ."

No, he says this: "Both /possession and enjoyment/. . . ." Yes?

"Both /possession and enjoyment/ conform to his labor /that is, to man's labor/. This is the measure of his needs. /In this way, Kuhlmann distorts the claim that a communist society has, on the whole, always as many natural faculties and energies as needs./ For labor. . . ."

Yes. No, and finally on page 189, line 10 from bottom.

"So far everything had gone well. But one of the most vital principles of communism, a principle which distinguishes it from all reactionary socialism, is its empiric view, based on a knowledge of men, that differences of brain, of intellectual capacity, do not imply any difference whatsoever in the nature of the stomach and of physical needs; therefore the false tenet, based upon existing circumstances, 'to each according to his capacity,' must be changed, in so far as it relates to enjoyment in its narrower sense, into the tenet, 'to each according to his need'; in other words, a different form of activity, of labor, confers no privileges in respect of possession and enjoyment."

Yes. Now that is the crucial point. What does Marx, then, teach regarding justice, because that is, of course, a question of justice which is involved: the

relation of equality and inequality. What does Marx, then, say, if we limit ourselves to these passages here? Are men equal or unequal?

"They are equal in their rights, but unequal in their capacities."

They are unequal in their capacities. Now -- yes, he doesn't speak of rights here. He speaks of possessions or enjoyments. Now what is the crucial point? What is the thesis -- I mean that men have unequal faculties was generally admitted. What is the problem? Where is the disagreement? What follows from the inequality of capacities according to the accepted view which Marx attacks?

"A. . . hierarchical society."

Yes -- in terms of possession; what's the relation of capacities and -- yes?

"An inequality of happiness. . . ."

So, in other words, he who has higher capacities should have higher possession or enjoyment. Yes?

"Yes, because he gets -- "

Yes, now let us illustrate it a bit to understand it because that's really a crucial issue. You all remember, I hope better than I do, Federalist No. 10. What is taught there?

"Unequal ability to acquire property should be justly rewarded by allowing the fruits of that -- "

They should be protected, but that means, of course, that the unequal capacity to acquire will lead to inequality of possession and hence, to inequality of enjoyment. Yes? And since -- and that is a natural and just relation. Yes? He who earns more, has the capacity to earn more, should enjoy more, and that is, of course, based on the premise that the people good at earning are the industrious and rational part of society. If we accept this premise that the lazy and irrational are those in need one could say, from a tough point of view, but one could say -- that would be still just to say, well, if they are too lazy and too irrational they have only themselves to blame and the others get their just reward by living in fine houses, having beautiful gardens, and many servants, and so on and so on. That is just as it should be. Now what does Marx say to this position? There are violations of that thought, but we don't have to go -- but generally speaking one can say mankind have, at least the political thinkers have thought there should be some proportion between faculties, not necessarily the acquisitive faculties in particular, but faculties and possessions or enjoyment. What does Marx say?

"That every person has the same basic physical needs and therefore -- "

Yes, that is obvious but what's the relevance of that? By the way, it's not quite obvious. Pardon? But the problem concerns the relation between these two things: faculties or capacities and enjoyment. Yes? And we have here a hierarchy of capacities. The just solution would be the strict correspondence of enjoyment to capacity so the most capable man would enjoy most and the least capable man would enjoy least. What's wrong with that according to Marx?

"This is capacities for production and. . . ."

That is here not specified. That is here not specified. As a matter of fact he speaks also of the intellectual capacities so it has nothing to do with that. For example -- pardon? Yes? First we must try to understand what Marx means -- yes? . . .

"Is it that the stupid man who has little capacity still exerts himself to the utmost; in a sense, then, exerts himself just as much as the brilliant man and therefore has a right to equal enjoyment of things as the brilliant man."

One could say that, but is this a point which Marx makes here? Yes?

"Could they enjoy equally?"

Is this -- but first let us see what Marx means here. Yes?

"They must alsohave equal enjoyment according totheir needs rather than -- "

That he implies although the famous formula does not occur here, but Marx's conclusion, I think, Marx's point which he makes is this: the difference, the inequality of capacities does not justify inequality of enjoyment. This subtle question of subtle joys and so doesn't enter. He speaks of the stomach. There is no sensible connection between the fact that this is a first rate nuclear physicist and that he should eat five pounds steak a day, and the other who is not capable to do more than to carry burdens should only have a quarter of a steak today and perhaps even a quarter of a steak in the week. That's the point which Marx makes here in the first place. Yes? From everyone to -- he doesn't say, but he alludes to that. There is no directconnection between capacities and needs. We have to recognize the inequality of capacities, but this does not mean -- yes, this does not mean equality of needs. For example, the nuclear -- the top nuclear physicist may be a man who needs only a room with a table -- yes? -- and a bed and curtains perhaps. There are such people who debest everything superfluous. He is perfectly happy with that, and he is a bachelor, in addition. And then you have another man who is very dumb, but has a family of ten -- yes? -- and they have all kinds of -- they want -- they must have flowers on the table and they must have all kinds of other ornaments of life: needs, needs. They need it if they want to be happy. So it is perfectly possible that this one man -- you know, there are unequal capacities; there are unequal needs. But there is no proportion between them and the assignment, the just assignment, would be with a view to the needs, not with a view to the capacities. What society demands -- it demands more, higher things, from the most gifted members because they can give more, but it assigns not with a view to capacities but with a view to needs. That is, I think -- that's the Marxist thesis. Yes, one would have to go into all kinds of details to see to what extent it is true and the crucial question, for practical purposes, as you all know, is that of incentives. Yes? You know that: it is possible that there are nuclear physicists who would not work so hard if they would not be properly -- what they regard properly -- compensated. You know? And the question, therefore, is whether the need of incentives will disappear in the communist society. That is what Marx, of course, implies and that is the moral regeneration of man; nothing short of that. Yes?

"Is this property incentives. . . ."

No, no. There could be badges, badges. Yes? You know? That could do, but the question -- but still, from the point of view of moral regeneration badges are as bad as free trips to the Bahamas. Yes? You know what I mean? Because it is extraneous to the genuine needs as well as to the capacities. I will not go into the question which is I believe a major subject of present economics: namely, that -- how to determine needs. You know? For example, whether the needs -- you know, sometimes people have very funny desires which are also called their needs and whether you would not have to have some body of wise men who determine what a need is. Yes? I mean, one can say, for example, say that the need for some time in Arizona for someone suffering from TB can be more clearly established than a need of honeymooners, for example, to go to Arizona or maybe even to places further West. (Laughter). Well, I didn't want to make a joke, but it was there. Now, Mr. Cropsey, you have not had your say on today's problem.

"Well, there are a lot of important things. With respect to the last remark, I should say economics now doesn't concern itself much with needs."

Yes. What term do they use, demands?

"Preferences or wants."

Yes, because clearly when you speak of needs you imply a distinction between natural and non-natural needs and necessary -- and natural is sub-divided into necessary and non-necessary. Yes? The old distinction and that, of course, is an objective distinction which is incompatible with the relativism of present day social science. Yes.

(Remark by Mr. Cropsey comparing Marx's view of the extraneous character of rewards to Kant's view as to the immorality of obeying the moral law for the sake of the reward).

Yes. Yes, sure, but it is not -- Marx tries, of course -- that is true. One could state it as follows. Marx says morality is bunk. Morality is nonsense. As soon as man has become free there is no place for morality, for any "ought." Men will do as a matter of course the human thing. Yes? That's the point. Yes, that is however what one could also call the fantastic thing in Marx and we must get -- try to get a more precise formulation for this very general remark, fantastic. In other words, whether men really, given the conditions, will have no other desire than to develop all their faculties. That is -- that would be a bit closer to what Marx himself said. We come to that. Yes, Mr. Faulkner.

"Professor Cropsey's question is very interesting. Is Marx rebelling against the notion of duty?"

Absolutely. He -- also as he is rebelling against pleasure. That you must -- well, I can only anticipate that. Both the hedonistic and the moralistic morality are wrong and hypocritical.

"Both Kant and utilitarianism."

Yes, and Epicurus and any -- anyone. The only one who would perhaps at first glance survive, but only at first glance, would be Aristotle, but only at first glance. I will discuss this coherently, but I have to -- I believe, then, I will now begin, if Mr. Cropsey and the class don't mind, with a kind of coherent

discussion because we won't have a paper next time and I think we should devote this time at our disposal, the last time, to a coherent discussion of Marx's philosophic premises. The situation, as you will recall, is this.

(Change of tape).

One has to understand both steps of Marx: (a) the philosophically-based turn to economics, and the economic teaching. If the economic teaching should prove to be wrong that would surely be fatal to Marx. That's clear. But, on the other hand, one must also -- since a merely negative criticism is not very helpful it is necessary to understand the foundations and the foundations are not economic, but they are philosophic: the reasons inducing Marx to find the base in economics. Now let me therefore devote the rest of today's meeting as well as next meeting to a coherent discussion of Marx's philosophic premises. This cannot be done without some repetitions of points made before, but you understand that. Now what's the starting point? Hegel: philosophy has been completed and by this very fact history has been completed. Marx agrees with Hegel half: philosophy has been completed. Hegel is the culmination of philosophy as philosophy. But history has not been completed. The practical problems have not been solved. Hegel's constitutional monarchy, so-called, is not a solution to man's political problem. Nor have the theoretical problems all been solved, as Hegel claims. Therefore, a new theoretical effort is necessary but this effort can no longer be philosophic. The thought required for the solution of the problems, both theoretical and practical, is trans-philosophic. I say trans-philosophic because it presupposes the great development of philosophy; it presupposes that and transcends that. It is not, as in present day positivism, a simple oblivion of philosophy. And this trans-philosophic study has the character of an empirical study, especially of social reality. This -- so, in other words, the same:what our social science claims to do. But what is the difference? The empirical study of social reality means for Marx the empirical study of the contradictions inherent in social reality and therewith a criticism of social reality. We do not discover a harmony. From this we can infer that according to Marx and I believe according to the truth what is now called social science is an attempt to discover the harmony in social reality by hook and by crook, and the best way, of course, is to abolish value judgments. Then you don't have to -- don't get any contradictions. So the study, the empirical study of social reality, necessarily turns into criticism of social reality and thus it produces indignation, revolution. There is a unity of theory and practice, which does not mean a coincidence of theory and practice. They must be distinguished. And it is, rather, this way: that in Marxian social science social reality criticizes itself. No, more precisely: social reality criticizes itself. It has this conflict and antagonism within itself. But social reality becomes fully conscious of this inherent criticism in and through the scientific analysis and therefore without Marxism no revolution. Only through the medium of this consciousness can the revolution take its proper place. That is to say -- and that is partly an answer to points which -- made by Rabbi Weiss -- the task, what we have to do, is prescribed by the present conditions. To understand the present conditions means to reveal what we have to do as intelligent and honest men and not everyone is intelligent and honest. That is another matter. I read to you a few passages, -- so, in other words, there is no ought. There is not -- here is the ought and here is social reality. We do not have to look there in order to find out what we ought to do. We only have to look here. Here we find our task defined in concrete terms, because even if there were an ought it would be too universal to be applicable to what we here now have to do. But Marx denies that there is an ought. There is no ought. Here in this reality there are tendencies, antagonistic tendencies, and the more concrete we are, the more we enter into it and understand it

we see our task described. So criticism -- analysis is criticism and criticism is an imperative. They are inseparable. I read to you a passage from Marx which is important and not only for this question but it illustrates it very well and that is from his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, which was not available to us in a translation. "The critique of religion, the purely cognitive critique of religion, ends with a teaching that man is the highest being for man and hence with a categoric imperative" -- mind you -- "to revolutionize all relationships in which man is a degraded being." Now, to repeat, this categoric imperative is not here. It reveals itself here, but that, of course, has great conveniences, what Marx says, because it answers one question which Kant could not properly answer: why was the categoric imperative discovered by Kant around 1785 and not five hundred years before or two thousand years before? Marx can answer it: this categoric imperative, to regard man as the highest being, could not have been discovered before in the situation. Let us -- but man is the highest being not simply, but the highest being for man and that, I think, shows both the difference between Marx and positivism and quite a few other things. Now I make a second point. Marx -- the main point -- the first point I made was this: to understand the trans-philosophic character of Marx's thought. Marx's thought claims to be trans-philosophic and that means to involve a break with philosophy as such, but it presupposes philosophy, as is indicated by the word trans-philosophic. Marx's position is more precisely a synthesis of two philosophic positions: the synthesis of the intra-philosophic alternative of materialism and spiritualism or idealism. Briefly this: looking at the history of philosophy back we can say there was a tug of war at all times between something which we may call materialism and something which we may call spiritualism or idealism. This conflict was never solved. Marx says it could not be solved because the solution would have been a philosophic solution. That's impossible. The solution can be found only by leaping out of philosophy. Now what is that? What is the issue? Marx states it naturally in terms of the most recent forms which this alternative has taken, the most recent forms being Feuerbach, materialism; Hegel, idealism. Now what does Feuerbach say? In a nutshell: there is always something given. Man cannot, the human mind cannot construct the whole. The thinking being is man, not a mere mind lost in the human body. The idealist position of Hegel: what is that crucial point? The fundamental phenomenon is production. To understand means to produce, to construct, not to contemplate, and this production necessarily leads, according to Hegel, to the historical process. Every product becoming objectified, calling forth a new productive action and so on: the historical process. Hegel is understood as a philosophic counterpart to Adam Smith who had taught in the clearest form that wealth is a product of labor and not a gift of nature: product of human activity. Hegel says the same thing philosophically. I remind you of one or two passages in Marx's National Economy and Philosophy -- no, that is not the passage I had in mind. No, I can't read that.

Why -- now we must raise this question. The synthesis of the basic philosophic alternative, materialism or idealism, is trans-philosophic. Why is that so? Why can philosophy not solve it? Now what is the synthesis of materialism and idealism? Answer: communism, and communism is not a theory but an order of life, a way of life. Why is that so? Now philosophy means, as Hegel understood, in its highest form full self-consciousness of the consciousness, but the consciousness is only a part of man. Philosophy presupposes that: the division of labor. Philosophy is the activity of a part of man or of some men. It is not the activity of man as man. Transcending philosophy means transcending the division of labor and that's communism. In other words, divided labor is always social labor. There is a tacit working of society in my private working. Divided labor is

always social labor. Applied to philosophy, philosophy, the philosophic labor, belongs to society without knowing it. Philosophy, claiming to give man the highest self-consciousness, does not give it to him because philosophy does not reflect on its own derivative character. The restoration of man's wholeness includes the aufhebung, the removal, transcending, of philosophy. Let me see. There was one -- which we have read here, but which one must repeat. Yes, that occurs in this writing on National Economics and Philosophy which we presented here. "One sees," Marx says, "how subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, only find in the social condition its opposite and therewith lose their existence as such opposites. One sees how the solution of the theoretical opposites is possible only in a practical way. It is a real task of life -- or a task of real life -- which philosophy could not solve precisely because it regarded it as a merely theoretical task. Now I turn to a third. This transcending philosophy presents itself as a return from philosophy to common sense, we can say. You remember the tough expressions which Marx used all the time: common sense. But we must correct this immediately. It is a turn toward present day common sense; the common sense of any earlier age wouldn't be of any help. Social science, the trans-philosophic social science, leads therefore, because it is a turn to present day common sense, necessarily to revolution. One formula which Marx uses in order to describe the difference between his view and philosophy is this: that philosophy has tried to interpret the world, to contemplate the world, to understand the world as it is, but what matters is to change the world. Now we would raise the question: all right, in what direction do you want to change it? For Marx perhaps the question is no question once you enter into analysis of present day society. There is no alternative. There is no alternative. You know? I mean, either you side -- after you have understood the situation -- either you side with the manifestly rotten and dishonest -- and some people would say yes, I side with it -- apres moi le deluge -- the deluge comes after me and I don't care. But you cannot do this with self respect. So there is no alternative. That is -- is this so? I read to you the end, or at least in this edition, of an early writing of Marx, his critique of Proudchn: The Misery of Philosophy. Proudohn's book was called The Philosophy of Misery and Marx turned it round and called it The Misery of Philosophy, namely of Proudohn's philosophy and in a way of philosophy as such. This ends as follows, a quotation from George Sand, a famous French authoress of the nineteenth century. "Struggle or death, bloody war or nothing: thus is the question posed in a -- unabitlit -- "

"Inescapably?"

Yes, that is not strong enough, but it can do now. Inescapably. All right. "Struggle or death, bloody war or nothing" -- bloody war, that's of course revolution. Or nothing. Congretely, communism or the destruction of civilization, communism or the destruction of the human race, perhaps. Is communism preferable to destruction of civilization: a question which we must raise. The very necessity of raising the question proves the need for philosophy because that cannot be settled by social analysis as Marx understands it, to say nothing of the fact that Marx shows in effect that this is so by his stepping forth a moral philosophy and we got a specimen of it in this statement, from everyone to his capacity, to every one according to his needs. For the time being I repeat again the statement I read before. "The critique of religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest being for man and hence with the categoric imperative to revolutionize all relationships in which man is a degraded being." A categoric imperative implies the possibility of not living up to it and that man is the highest being for man is such a normative teaching. Furthermore, in proportion as the social situation

lacks the simplicity which Marx ascribes to it, here the perfectly just cause of the proletariat, there the perfectly unjust cause of the bourgeoisie, the necessity of philosophy becomes still more evident. In situations of extreme simplicity we don't have to appeal to deeper reflection, but if the situation is not extremely simple the necessity arises.

Now let us consider the other side of the matter. That's the fourth point I wanted to make. We turn from philosophy to the empirical study of society. Yes, but we turn to that on the basis of a presupposition which precedes the study, the empirical study of society: namely, that the basis of all social phenomena are the relations of production. Why are the relations of production the most fundamental? Marx suggests, first you have to eat before you can think, but that is, of course, a very inadequate argument because the condition of something is never the sufficient cause of it. We have seen last time already in a passage in the first part of The German Ideology Marx admits in passing, but unfortunately only in passing, the simultaneity of thing production and myth production. The earliest man, savage, however he might be, cannot but think about the whole while seeking food, shelter and so on. Perhaps Marx meant it this way: thing production or tool production is the production of something real. This stone is now fit for being used for cutting the throat of a deer. It cuts so it works. It is real. In other words, thing production is -- effects a change in the world and a change of the world, but myth production produces merely something imaginary and therefore ineffective. Zeus does not become an effective force by being thought to exist, but of course that would seem to be a great fallacy because are the myths -- while they may not affect real things by miracles -- but they may very well be effective of man. To say nothing of the Marxist admission and emphasis even that the so-called superstructure affects the economic infra-structure. Perhaps the following passage is of some help -- which occurs in The German Ideology. "Earlier such philosophic delusions could have currency in Germany, but today they have become completely ridiculous since international trade has proven sufficiently that bourgeois acquisition is wholly independent of politics while politics is wholly dependent on bourgeois acquisition." In other words, we look at today, today, and there we see the root of everything is -- are the relations of, the economic relations of production. Well, what Marx effected was only to show, at least to his satisfaction, that the political issues of the time can only be understood as reflections of the class struggle. He did not really show it regarding the intellectual life of his time. But what would follow from that? That would not justify a universal theory of history, that this was so at all times. The very fact that he says today would seem to show that there was a change. Already in the eighteenth century, politics had become so much dependent on trade that, for example, when the French state wanted to make a loan a private man had to vouch for the state to the Dutch. Well, in other words, we have in modern times a very great power of the economic considerations and of the economic needs, of the economic relations. Does this prove that this was always so? Is the fact that the economic historians have to dig up the history of economics from most out of the way places, not from the great productions of the past -- that surely proves that these people didn't believe that economics was so important. The most famous example: the greatest and most realistic historian of pre-modern times, Thucydides, is absolutely silent about any economic background of the Peloponnesian War. The present day economic historians try to find that because they cannot imagine that people are so foolish to fight if they don't fight for markets and something of that kind. That -- we don't know. We don't know. But the certainty that it must have been so is, of course, a purely dogmatic certainty. I mean, when they fought -- the Greeks -- and and we find these examples: they were very much concerned with the physical possession of the field of battle so that the enemy had to come in hand, or

whatever they had on their heads, to ask for the corpses for proper burial. That was a major consideration. You can say that was crazy, superstitious. I don't care. But it was a great fact, and the ascription to all earlier men of -- the assertion not to the earlier men, but the assertion that even then the struggle was always economical is unfounded, of course. But it -- in other words, the relative justification of Marx is -- of Marxism -- is that in modern times the economic considerations manifestly play a much greater role than they had played in earlier times. Political economy as a science is a product of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. This alone shows the state of this, but Mr. Cropsey can tell you much more about that than I can. Now Marx would perhaps also argue as follows. Let us look at the most important phenomena because that has a much greaterppopular bearing than philosophy can have had: religion. What is religion? Well, here Marx depends on Feuerbach. Now, religion is a supplement, let us say, an illusory satisfaction for what cannot be satisfied in reality. Therefore it -- I'm trying to give the thought already in the Marxian form, not in the Feuerbachian form -- therefore religion depends ultimately on the real dissatisfaction and its specific character. If people are dissatisfied in one way they will produce religion "A." If they are dissatisfied in another way they will produce religion "B." Religion means always this or that religion, can only be explained in terms of society, i.e., of this or that society. But this, of course, presupposes everything. Even if we grant Marx's basic premise which is a very great question in itself, that religion is essentially a delusion, are all ills for which man tries to find a solution by religion or myth -- are all ills social ills? For example, the death of the individual is not as such a social ill and how much did it preoccupy the human imagination? I suggest this conclusion: the basis of Marx's social science is a dogmatic decision in favor of the basic character of the relations of production. Even if -- that Marx's doctrine were true would have to be proven by empirical analysis of religion, of philosophy, and so on; a proof which has never been given and whenever it was attempted it was done in a very superficial way, except in certain stretches of modern thought. That it -- for example, the thing which is called sociology of knowledge which is a decayed form of Marxism -- no, honestly, that one can show historically because Mannheim, who made this sociology of knowledge so famous -- his work is based on Lukacs' previous work on History and Class Consciousness. Yes, but what do these people prove? That a program, a part of the plank of the Republican or Democratic party program for the election regarding agriculture, is influenced by the various organizations of farmers. Well, which child did not expect that from the outset? The question would be -- an entirely different proposition would be really to show, which they -- really to show, for example, a connection between present day theoretical physics and our society as it exists now or a genuine work of art and that. That's a much tougher presupposition. It has never been shown in concreto in any way.

The next point I would like to make is this -- I do not know whether I still have time because of a certain unreliability of my watch. Yes. No, I think I have to stop. Well, next time I will develop, will raise this question to which Rabbi Weiss has referred in the first place: namely, the question of the essence of man and this is very much connected with the question of Marx's moral philosophy in the fullest sense of the term. And perhaps I can then -- will find time to say a few words which by now may be a bit clearer than they could have been at the beginning: in what way, to what extent Marx is right in saying, not metaphorically or as a kind of joke, but seriously that for Marx economics is metaphysics or metaphysics is economics and this is not a cliche, but literally true, and that -- all the problems are concentrated in that. But there is -- that is, however, only one side of the problem. The other side of the problem is the very -- is to understand -- I mean you have economic materialism. Let us assume that this is proven

true. That in itself does not necessarily lead to the notion that the economic changes will bring about a state of man which is the redemption of mangsthe moral regeneration of man. What is the connection -- how, by what means, not to say by what trick, does Marx succeed in linking up the economic teaching with this expectation from the future? How these two ultimate problems, i.e. economics is metaphysics, (b) the connection between economic materialism and the expectation of the regeneration brought about by the final class struggle, is related. That would be, I think, the ultimate task of an understanding of Marx. Whether I shall be able to give a clear answer to that question I doubt, but I will try. I will try.

(Transcriber's Note: The tenth through the sixteenth meetings of the seminar, May 2nd through May 23rd, 1960, consisted of lectures by Mr. Cropsey on Capital, Volume I. These shall not be transcribed, with the exception of certain remarks by Dr. Strauss that occurred during some of the classes. Mr. Cropsey's remarks will be paraphrased or transcribed to the extent necessary to make clear the context of Dr. Strauss' remarks in each case).

During Mr. Cropsey's lecture of May 2nd he addressed himself to the following theme: whether or not it is true that assertions of Marx that he says are relevant to capitalism only, i.e. have a purely historical character, do not in fact have a broader, indeed a universal application. In discussing this question, Mr. Cropsey quoted from Marx's preface to the second edition of Capital where Marx quoted approvingly the following comment by a reviewer, (page 24 of the Modern Library edition of Capital): "'The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. May, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of the individual organs, of the different conditions in which the organs function, etc.'" Mr. Cropsey's point was that the purely historical character of Marx's assertions is often hard to detect. He argued that Marx's non-economic works are a sort of meta-science which, generally speaking, can be placed in the category of methodology so far as Marx's assertion of the historicity of the sciences is concerned. Economics was the only science to which Marx turned his hand. Here one can examine how the methodological propositions can be transformed into something concrete. Part of the difficulty of asserting a pure historicity of the sciences shows up, said Mr. Cropsey, when Marx deals with economics.

Mr. Cropsey then asked whether Marx proves the connection between exchange value and the expenditure of socially necessary labor in the discussion of the labor theory of value. His answer was that Marx does not, but that the theory is rather based upon an assertion that what all things have in common is labor. Two commodities are exchanged without observing a principle of commensurability between them. Qualitative heterogeneity is overcome by quantitative homogeneity. In the Ethics, said Mr. Cropsey, Aristotle refers exchange to a merely empirical occurrence: men agree to exchange articles on the basis of their demands. Marx sees only one thing as quantitatively comparable: both articles are objects of human labor. It is not so obviously true, he continued, that the only thing they have in common is that they are objects of human labor; they are also objects of human want as well as consisting of matter in motion etc. But for Marx the act of exchange is a social act and as such is humanly relevant. Nevertheless, the labor theory of value is simply asserted and never proved, except by exclusion. Recurring to Marx's view of the historicity of economic laws, Mr. Cropsey argued that Marx couldn't have overcome the problem of qualitative heterogeneity without resorting to something that does not have a dimension in time, i.e. labor power. For Marx all stages of production had something in common. The subject, mankind, and the object, nature, remained the same, and Marx tried to find his way between these permanent things and the transitory. In a discussion with Dr. Strauss, who was barely audible on the tape, the formulation was made that Marx tried to develop a social physics. That is, the economic laws that Marx asserted were meant to have universal applicability in contra-distinction to those formulated by earlier economic thinkers, and the historical character of Marx's laws was present, according to Marx, only in that they could not have come to sight until capitalism had reached its full maturity. This, generally, was the basis for some remarks by Dr. Strauss to open the meeting of May 4, 1960, which were as follows:

Well, the points which I want to make have become necessary, I believe, after Mr. Cropsey's very incisive and clear statement last time so that we do not lose track of the philosophic problem. I said one should begin from the fact that Marx's doctrine or position presents itself as trans-philosophic, a turn from philosophy to empirical study. Now this point has become much clearer last time because the empirical study proved to be much more precisely, social physics, because what Mr. Cropsey said amounted really to this. Marx discovered, as it were, that the social physics sought, for example by Comte and by many others, is ready at hand if you understand economics properly. Now in passing, this view of Marx that economics is a true, exact science of society is, in a way, confirmed by present day practice in so-called bourgeois society. Economics appears to be the most scientific of the social sciences and I thought for one moment we should consider why this is so and what we can learn from Marx -- at least what I learn from Marx -- why this is so, why economics has this great advantage. Now two reasons appear to me. In economics -- I mean, the general situation in the social sciences, I believe can be stated as follows. You have an -- you strive for exactness, but exactness doesn't guarantee relevance and the criterion of relevance has nothing to do with exactness and vice versa. But in economics it seems that the most relevant is at the same time the most exact and therefore it works there. Now what is the most relevant according to Marx? The homogeneous labor, homogeneous labor. That you have to find again in all forms of labor as well as in all forms of commodities. Yes? And so the most basic, the most substantively relevant is the very root of all possible exactness. I read to you one passage at the beginning of today's reading assignment:

> If we abstract from the material substance of the circulation of commodities, that is, from the exchange of the various use-values, and consider only the economic forms produced by this process of circulation we find its final result to be money. This final product of the circulation of commodities is the first form in which capital appears.

We abstract from the matter, the material substance, and limit ourselves to the form. That is not materialistic language; that's the language of mathematics, traditionally understood. Yes? In this sense only is the Marxian position, just as the modern scientific position, materialistic.

The second point is this: omoney. Money is a conventional thing, but there is an essential difference between money and all other conventional things, as follows; let me take this example. We cannot think without using language. Thinking is a natural process. Language is essentially conventional. Money is also conventional and has to do with the quasi-natural process of exchange. But there is this difference: there exists no universal language. People have tried to make it, but that was an effort which hitherto has always failed, of individuals. But in the case of exchange or of money you do have something, a universal means, which emerges without any inventor discovering it, namely gold and silver, as Marx said. Now that, of course, is also, as becomes clear even on the basis of general knowledge . . . that it is not -- gold and silver are not strictly speaking the means of exchange universally, but they are quasi-universal. In other words, here, in the field of money, in the field of exchange, the convention has a quasi-natural character which it does not have in other fields. That, I think, are important points. But let me come back to what Marx intended.

The social physics of capitalist society: but that means also that only capitalist society or, at any rate, pre-communist society can be understood as social physics. That was the point where there was a slight disagreement in formulation, I believe, between you and me. Now here the crucial point is this and that became very clear last time in the discussion between Mr. Cropsey and me, that the fact that the communist so-

society can no longer be understood in terms of a social physics is based on the premise of Marx that the communist society is based on a moral regeneration of man. I used non-Marxian terms -- because if that were not you would always need these lousy incentives which you need in capitalist society. There are two formulations of Engels which are helpful, which I have here in his writing on Scientific and Utopian Socialism, where he says:

> These laws /of exchange and so on/ are unknown to the producers and must be discovered only through long experience gradually. These laws are effective without the producers and against the producers as blind working natural laws of their form of production.

The product rules the producers. Therefore there are natural laws. There is the social physics. Now -- but what will be the situation in the communist society?

> The laws of their own social doing which hitherto looked like foreign natural laws dominating man are in communist society applied by man with full knowledge of the matter and therewith these laws are controlled by man.

Here you see the ambiguity. The laws are still effective but they are now used, now consciously used, whereas in capitalist society they are effective and not used, not controlled. Here you have both the case for your interpretation and against it. In one sense the laws go on, but only man uses them now consciously and therefore he is no longer simply subject to them. The other view however is they are no longer effective there -- these laws. We must leave it at that.

Now the crucial point however for any limitation of the social physics is the assumption of a moral regeneration. The moral regeneration consists -- in the communist society all men live spontaneously according to the maxim, "From each according to his capacity and to each according to his needs." No other incentives are required, which means, of course, that each knows somehow what the capacities of each and the needs of each are. But how do they know the truth of that maxim, "From each according to his capacities and to each according to his needs"? Each desires -- everyone desires not merely just to live but to express himself, to develop all his faculties, and reason tells him that he cannot develop his faculties fully if everyone else does not do the same. This, in other words -- it is not only -- what I have naturally is the desire to develop my faculties. But what I do not have naturally is that I think of the other fellow: that he also develops it. How can Marx make this transition from what I desire to what reason tells me? To see the fallacy of Marx's maxim one has to consider the fact that it is a modification of an earlier maxim; namely this: that no one's freedom can be secure unless everyone is free -- Kant's and Rousseau's thesis. But that thesis implied, realistically, that it is perfectly possible for some men to be free while the others are not free. Only the freedom is not secure. There is no for that. That's another matter. And, after all, it is not difficult to show empirically that men can develop their faculties in an amazing way, whereas not all members of their society were able to do so. Think of Plato, Shakespeare, and other interesting examples. Now the expression of this utopianism of Marx, the superfluity of selfish incentives, is the distinction between the realm of freedom and the realm of necessity. Now the mere mortality of the human race which was emphasized especially by Engels all the time shows the untruth of this premise. If the human race cannot guarantee its eternity the realm of necessity is coeval with man. Now how does this untrue premise, the possibility of a realm of freedom, affect the social physics? That's the last point I want to make.

Marx sees the economic world as a whole in the Kapital because he stands outside of it. He is not a capitalist nor a believer in capitalism. Marx's economic world is a derivative world. The primary fact is not the world -- world is not the world of commodities. That is to say, the genesis of that capitalistic world becomes, for Marx, the guiding problem. Now there are two ways of standing outside of the capitalistic world. The first is the pre-capitalistic and the second is, we may say, the post-capitalistic. The first is represented by Aristotle most clearly; the second by Marx. And Marx was fully aware of it; in a crucial passage of the first part, page 66 following, he speaks of Aristotle's analysis of the fundamental economic facts. Now what's the difference between Aristotle and Marx? For Aristotle the starting point is a natural society, a society in which the exchange of commodities is not in the center of life. Yes? Is not in the center of life. For Marx the starting point is not the natural society in the Aristotelian sense but the anticipated communist society. So, in other words, the basis of Aristotle is truly empirical. There are such societies and have been. The other is merely anticipated. In other words, the Aristotelian economic world is one which can be taken in well in one view by every producer or consumer. There is no need for an economic expert there. The Marxian post-capitalistic world requires the infinite complexity of the social plan which is drawn up by economic experts. This alienation, in the sense of not being able for everyone to understand the whole exists, of course, as much in that post-capitalist society as it exists in capitalist society, although in different ways. Now this is connected with the deepest substantive difference. Aristotle raises the question exactly as Marx does and Marx knows that: what makes possible exchange of qualitatively different things? The eggs and the hats -- yes? -- we had last time. What makes it possible? Marx says because they are both products of labor. Aristotle says no, labor is the same as production. No. What makes it possible is that there is something equal on both sides: namely, need, need or want. The economists call it demand, but I stick to the Aristotelian expression, the need. What does this mean? Aristotle means -- what does this difference mean? Aristotle has in mind here as well as in the other points man's dependence on nature. The emphasis on labor and production in Marx is the emphasis on man's mastery of nature. You see how this general point I mentioned before is connected with it. Is there a possibility of a realm of freedom, i.e. where man is simply the master? Denied by Aristotle; asserted by Marx. And reflected in the analysis of economics: whether one asserts need or production to be the most fundamental fact.

Yes, and this is, of course, crucial for Marx in The Critique of Political Economy (sic) to which Mr. Cropsey referred last time. Marx tries to prove that the ordinary distinction into production, distribution, and consumption, is superficial, merely common sensical, and that a deeper understanding would show that the fundamental fact and the overarching fact is production. Consumption is not the end. The very needs, the needs which are satisfied by consumption, are themselves generated by production, and such -- all other arguments of the same nature. I think I leave it at that now because otherwise I take up too much time.

(Transcriber's note: During the remainder of the May 4th meeting part one of Capital, Volume I, was considered and then Mr. Cropsey began a discussion of part two that was completed May 9th. A discussion of part three then followed during which Dr. Strauss made the following remarks.)

Yes, well there is one point which I would like to take up which I regard as very important, but I believe I do it at a later stage and that has to do with Marx's interpretation of capital -- of the capitalist in contra-distinction to labor. The difficulty -- I think Marx is compelled by his principle and also by the whole situation to conceive of capital itself as labor, but he calls it dead labor, congealed labor, versus living labor. And that has something to do with a much broader issue which arose much

earlier in political theory than in economic theory, as far as I know: namely, the question, the proper relation of the past and the present. For example, in the traditional notion of liberty, of freedom, it was meant -- freedom under law. That was clear. But what about the law itself? The law could be the law of the past and in the traditional notion of freedom, say in the Middle Ages, it was taken for granted that the law is very old but this very old law protects present freedom. And now in connection with the modern doctrine of sovereignty -- the modern doctrine of sovereignty can be expressed as follows. The sovereign is the present sovereign because otherwise he wouldn't be sovereign. That seems to be trivial but it is of crucial importance. It means, then, also this: you are not free if you are subject to a law to the making of which you have not contributed. In other words, the law must be the present law, the present law. Now, as long as the old law guarantees your freedom the past -- as they say now today, the tradition -- is stronger than the spontaneity of the present generation. And Marx's doctrine is a strict parallel to that in terms of the economic problem. It is living labor which produces value, not congealed labor. We have to go into that, I believe, on another occasion.

But the point which is immediately connected with chapter three is this. Now you said, Mr. Nelson -- you said at the end of your paper -- you sketched the difference between Marx and Aristotle. Could you restate it? I have forgotten the precise formulation.

> "It has to do with the proper relation, the proper economic relation, between man and nature outside him. And the Aristotelian formulation -- I'm following Book I of the Politics -- the proper economic relation is that between man and the use that he makes of the -- "

I remember now what -- well, may I try to restate it. I spoke of it also. The place which labor or production takes in Marx is taken in Aristotle by need, by the needs. Yes? That's the fundamental difference and that has to do with a wholly different understanding of man; and now that has very much to do with the question of teleology to which we have referred more than once. I would like to say, we have here a few very interesting passages on that subject. As regards the term "social physics" I saw now somewhere, and that may by no means be the first occurrence but that is much older than the coming of Marx; that is in , a Frenchman of the eighteenth century, and he called social physics -- he called what is now called vital statistics social physics. That I mention only in passing. Now here the passage which I have in mind is on page 198:

> The elementary factors of the labor-process are 1, the personal activity of man, i.e., work itself, 2, the subject of that work, and 3, its instruments.

There is not a word said about the end. I mean, the labor-process takes the place of what in Aristotle would be productive art, i.e. what Aristotle calls art; and the art of, say, the shoemaker can, of course, not be defined with reference to the end. On the same page, at the bottom -- at the top: ". . . setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants." The form is absolutely secondary compared to the appropriation. Labor is primarily appropriation. So even the form, what Aristotle calls the formal cause, is absolutely subordinate. The product is outside of the process -- on page 201. The product, i.e. that at which we aim, the end, is outside of the process and since we have to consider the process the end is irrelevant. On page 203: there are no ends in themselves. Whether something is an end or not is determined by the process. So the labor-process is the overriding consideration. Page 205, top: labor-process "is the necessary condition for effecting exchange of matter between man and Nature. . . ." I believe it's that passage you had primarily in mind in your exposition. The human action is the condition; the human action, which as such is, of course,

teleological, is only the condition for such an exchange between matter and man which could then be understood as a mechanical process. There is something even clearer on page 199 in the note; note one, the quotation from Hegel. I haven't found the exact passage; I don't have this edition of The Logic and couldn't find the page, but I think the only passage in The Logic which I know where he speaks of the ruse -- of reason's cunning -- is one in paragraph 209 of Hegel's Logic -- no, in the Encyklopadie, in the Encyklopadie, paragraph 209. However this may be, what Hegel means and what appears, I think, also partly from Marx's quotation: there is a mechanism. There is a mechanism. Reason causes objects to act and react on each other in accordance with their own nature. In this way without any direct interference in the process -- carries out reason's intention. So the process itself is a purely mechanical or maybe chemical affair. But, of course, what Marx does not emphasize: one thing is the mechanism or the chemism or whatever it may be and the other thing is the use of that mechanism for which you establish that. Now what, then, is the reason for this quasi-oblivion of the end? I believe this: the end is embodied in the use-value, in the consumption. But in the infinite process, M-C-M, we abstract from the use-value. The use-value is subordinated to a process in which the use-value and therefore the end does not coccur except as a purely extraneous end of profit which the capitalist, of course, has. Now there is one more passage on page 218 which I have -- paragraph two:

> If we proceed further, and compare the process of producing value with the labor-process, pure and simple, we find that the latter consists of the useful labor, the work, that produces use-values. Here we contemplate the labor as producing a particular article; we view it under its qualitative aspect alone, with regard to its end and aim. /Shoemaker; shoe. Even the egg, properly understood, as having to be fetched away from the hen./ But viewed as a value-creating process, the same labor-process presents itself under its quantitative aspect alone. /And here Marx is simply silent about the end or aim./ Here it is a question merely of the time occupied by the laborer in doing the work; of the period during which the labor-power is usefully expended.

Of course the end is still there, but the end becomes almost invisible in the labor-process understood as a process. Now that, of course, is in perfect agreement to the thesis of his earlier Critique of Political Economy, according to which production, not consumption, is the overarching phenomenon. But it is important also to realize that this non-teleology appears -- reappears on the highest level. The highest is -- you may recall this from Marx's discussion of the moral problem -- you have ethics of duty and you have an ethics of pleasure. Both are one-sided, he says and even hypocritically. The true unity is satisfying activity, which as satisfying has something in common with hedonism as activity has something in common with duty, but it does no longer appear as a duty because it is satisfying. Now this satisfying activity is also called by Marx , expression of life, expression of life. Yes, but an expression of something has, of course, non-teleological character. You cannot -- I mean, you do not aim at something. That follows from the fact that you live -- that this life expresses itself. And therefore I think -- Aristotle would deny this only on the following ground. He would say , say, expression of life: that means, of course, the right kind of expression of life. Some form of expression is also exploitation, to take a Marxian example. But this one, through the virtuous life, is, of course, an end in itself and therefore it does not have an end outside of itself. But for us who are not always virtuous the virtuous life appears, of course, ordinarily as an end and must appear so. But still, for Marx, as we know, the virtuous life or the spontaneous expression of life or the full development of the faculties, as he also calls it, is a foregone conclusion. It follows without effort given a certain state of society. Incidentally, development of human faculties is itself, of course, also a teleological expression. Yes? You have them first undeveloped. . . . That was all I had to say on this

point because the other things can be dealt with, will be dealt with, by Mr. Cropsey.

There is also a remark on the materialistic philosophy of history which is interesting, I thought, on page 200 in the note:

> The least important commodities of all for the technological comparison of different epochs of production are articles of luxury, in the strict meaning of the term. However little our written histories up to this time notice the development of material production, which is the basis of all social life, and therefore of all real history, yet prehistoric times have been classified in accordance with the results, not of so called historical, but of materialistic investigations. These periods have been divided, to correspond with the materials from which their implements and weapons are made, viz., into the stone, the bronze, and the iron ages.

That, I think -- this usage throws some light on the meaning of the term materialistic theory of history. Material production -- and this has even to do in the first place with the production of material, which is not so clear throughout. And that only confirms what I said before -- I said on an earlier occasion -- that the primary supposition of Marx's whole analysis of whatever it may be is this dogmatic assertion that man is primarily a material producing being, to use his language, and secondarily a thought producing thing. And that is, of course, never -- has never been proven. And in some way or other that is bound to affect, although I cannot show this in detail at all, his very analysis of the economic phenomena. You know -- I mean, whether you look at a man, say, from the Aristotelian or from the Marxist point of view will naturally show in your analysis of economic phenomena as well. That is trivial. That's all I have to say.

(Transcriber's Note: The following exchange then ensued).

Mr. Cropsey: That passage on page 218 that Dr. Strauss referred to is a difficult one, where Marx contrasts the process of producing value with the labor-process, pure and simple. The process of producing value: that's connected with the absorption of homogeneous human labor and leads, under capitalism, to exchange value. Now the other alternative is the viewing of the labor process under its qualitative aspect alone, i.e. with regard to its end and aim. That has to do with the production of the use-values. Now from a certain point of view I think what this means is Marx criticizes the capitalist mode of production and economy generally because it elevates the quantitative, the one which leads to value and therefore to exchange value, and it doesn't do what the process of production ought to do simply, i.e. to aim at use-values, those things which are produced with an eye to the end and aim, and which would, if properly attended to, that is to say if the social situation were such as to make this possible, would have the following consequence. People would simply work. They wouldn't work for the sake of making this which they can turn into a larger sum of money. That's part of that fetishism of commodities. It looks as if the commodities are really good only for the sake of doing that with them and Marx says that's like genuflecting in front of the golden calf or something like that -- the Israelites in the wilderness -- or anything else. It's a superstition. That's not what the goods really are for, but that's only sort of a historical encrustation. Now apparently, then, looked at from the broadest point of view the productive process ought to have more that character of consulting the end and aim, I think, and less this other which is the capitalistic perversion of the -- yes. And so that, I think, is an extension of the remark that -- I mean, looking at this remark that Dr. Strauss made from a somewhat more technical point of view, but it comes to the same thing.

Dr. Strauss: Yes, but on the highest levels -- surely you do things for the sake of human life. That's clear. But how is the human life itself understood? And there it would appear that human life itself is understood as a kind of aimless production. You have enabled me to state it more clearly than I said it before. Lebens-- (?), expression of life for its own sake and that, of course, makes sense but it is very inadequate once we consider the absolute ambiguity of that and we have to find out what kind of expression it is. . . . What kind of human doings are genuine expressions of human life? Then you have immediately an end again and that Marx tries to avoid.

Mr. Cropsey: Yes. No, this is only a provisional remark and doesn't --

Dr. Strauss: Absolutely necessary to make, but I think that the difficulty reappears.

Mr. Cropsey: Well -- yes, surely. One would have to consider what this economic thing is all about, so to speak; that is to say, what kind of a social arrangement it's supposed to support, even under the best conditions, which this doesn't do. The subtitle of this book is "A Critique of Capitalist Production," as you know, and it is really more negative than affirmative, but still a great deal is implicit about the affirmative that Marx would haveiin mind.

(Shortly afterward, Mr. Cropsey commented on the following passage of Capital, Volume I, which is on page 198 of the Modern Library edition: "We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labor that remind us of the mere animal. An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labor-power to market for sale as a commodity, from that state in which human labor was still in its first instinctive stage. We presuppose labor in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality." Mr. Cropsey pointed out that even this is not supposed to be true of man atdall times and under all conditions, but that it apparently had to come to be the same as everything else. It reminded him of Rousseau, for whom the very passions themselves had to be brought into being. As Rousseau saw it, Mr. Cropsey continued, man didn't have a soul in the very early times in the same sense that he has now; that even that was historical and, for example, man didn't know resentment or avariciousness or the bad form of self-love, just as he utterly lacked memory. There followed the following question from the floor.)

> "How does this fit in with what Dr. Strauss suggests on the simultaneity of thing production and myth production in The German Ideology as indicating that Marx conceives of some kind of human essence as separate from animal essence?"

Mr. Cropsey: Well, I think I know the answer but your question is essentially directed to Dr. Strauss so I --

Dr. Strauss: I will answer him gladly. I would put it this way: you have the answer here. He says ". . . that stamps it as exclusively human." In other words, there was a stage in which all -- I mean, let me make a distinction, a rough distinction, between uninteresting things and interesting things. We are not concerned with the digestive system. Yes? The digestive system as such. So, for example, take instinctive self-preservation. Every dog, every cat, has it as well as man. And it means appropriation in all cases -- of bones or whatever it may be. Good. Well bones are perhaps a very bad example for self-preservation. I admit that. Now from a certain moment on projecting, conscious projecting takes place. In that moment production becomes exclusively

human, and even applying it to your question now which includes your question from some time ago, in that moment in which man is capable to project his imagination, say, a cave, even, which he wants to build -- in that moment there is no reason why he should not be equally able to figure out something, atrocious and primitive and what have you but still doing something which no other animal can do, about the whole, about where people go after their death. And that the latter should be a replica of the former -- you know? -- that -- I mean, say, where if he is a nomad he will have this notion of what death means and if he is a farmer he will have that notion of what death means -- is, of course, a mere assertion. That is -- would be my answer to your question. There may be a stage where man was sub-human. Marx says so here and Rousseau started that but, of course, in Marx's time Darwin has already made this a very popular view, at least among the more up-to-date men among whom Marx certainly found himself. And -- so that men were, of course, sub-human but from a certain moment on they became human in the sense of doing things which are exclusively human and in that moment -- there is no reason why his production from that moment on was not coeval with his imagination about the whole; and that issue is never met by Marx, never met. What one can -- I mean, the proofs which are given for the primacy of -- and the authoritative character of the substructure are not proofs. I mean, they are -- they have a certain -- they are not really proofs and this difficulty is, of course, concealed by the Marxist trivialization -- by saying, of course, there is also an effect of the superstructure on the infra-structure. But we are not concerned with this plain admission. We are concerned with what right do you call that the infra-structure and the other the superstructure. You know, that is the point.

(During the May 11th meeting the seminar began a consideration of part four of Capital, Volume I, during which Dr. Strauss said the following.)

Yes, I have a few points on this chapter which I would like to point out. Now two deal with the question of -- with a purely historical question: to what extent did Marx understand the earlier doctrines? And I must say, in this respect -- I'm not speaking nowoof the economic doctrines of which I know much too little but about the social thought in general, and in this respect Marx is very impressive in my opinion, and also for example, what is -- I give you two examples which show that. On page 400 to 402 he speaks of the difference between the ancients and the moderns. Marx was a very well read man, of course. I mean, he must have read the whole classical literature also from the point of view -- what he can learn from that regarding economic facts. Yes? I mean, in other words, originally he read it just for enjoyment but later on he did it as hard labor. And now here what he says about the difference -- what the division of labor means in Plato and this has a foundation -- yes, that this has to do with a use-value, of course, not with commodities. That goes without saying. Yes? He is perfectly right in that. But he doesn't meet the issue of Plato, the real issue: namely, that division -- one man, one job, is the condition of a good job. Yes? You know, and versus his painter and fisherman and so on. Now, and here is the point which I enjoyed very much: when he speaks of Xenophon and he refers to a passage in Xenophon's Education of Cyrus, Book VIII. And he says, "Xenophon, who with characteristic bourgeois instinct, approaches more nearly to division of labor within the workshop," i.e. the division of labor, shoemaker, carpenter -- yes, but subdivisions of shoemaker. Now I think Marx has here, although I would not be surprised if you wouldn't find any observation regarding Xenophon in the so-called bourgeois literature which comes so close to an understanding of Xenophon. The expression which Marx uses, "characteristic bourgeois instinct," is wrong, not to say absurd, but that Xenophon came closest of all ancient writers to the modern ideals -- I think that one can prove. I mean, I knew this passage but I thought of entirely different things in Xenophon and I stated this as follows. The originator of modern thought, properly understood, is Machiavelli, and the key passage in Machiavelli

is that all men have a natural desire to acquire, and so the -- that is a natural desire; hence, not blameworthy. Acquire means, of course, more and more. And the only difference, therefore, between human beings can be whether they are good or bad at acquiring and to be a virtuous man means to be a good acquisitor, i.e. a tyrant, who is much bigger than any bourgeois could be. And -- but here that is in this respect that has been anticipated by Xenophon, but the interesting point which Marx did not see and which, indeed, he couldn't see given his premises is that Xenophon is playing with these things, you know, like a somewhat naughty man who plays with extreme possibilities. To mention one example which has to do with economics in particular, the general notion is a gentleman has to be a gentleman farmer, not a merchant. But Xenophon plays with the interesting possibility of being a dealer, a merchant, in estates. You know that story. You buy rotten estates -- yes, buy rotten for cheap money, and then you improve it because you are a good farmer and then you sell it dear and you go on and on. You know? So you combine, have a synthesis, of a farmer and a merchant. So that -- but still -- that is one point.

Now the other, which has to do with the same question, is on page -- the note on page 426, where he says -- that is also interesting -- in the end of the note: "In the preface to Sir Dudley North's 'Discourses upon Trade' (1691) it is stated, that Descartes' method had begun to free political economy from the old fables and superstitious notions of gold, trade, etc. On the whole, however, the early English economists sided with Bacon and Hobbes as their philosophers; while, at a later period, the philosopher kat exochein of political economy in England, France, and Italy, was Locke." That is very sound and I think in the ordinary books on this subject you will not find remarks which come, as far as sound historical perspective is concerned, come even within hailing distance of that. And that he mentions Descartes is perfectly sound too. I had never -- I didn't know that passage. It's very true and is, of course, borne out by Locke who traces the real change which has taken place, characteristically, not to Bacon but to Descartes, although Locke was an Englishman and Descartes was a Frenchman. And there are other remarks of this kind and I believe -- Mr. Cropsey knows that infinitely better than I do -- the sketch of the history of economic theories which is embodied in Engels' Anti-Duhring -- you know, that part was written by Marx, the history of economic theories, must be very valuable still. I'm sure superior to what you ordinarily find on that.

Now we come now to a substantive question which has been up all the time, the question of human nature, because the previous discussion all turned around this question: is there some permanent, unchangeable element which would not be affected in any way by any traditions -- by any transitions from -- any historical change? And now there are a few references to human nature which I thought are very interesting. For example, page 435, line 2-3, which is not a quotation, where he speaks, "there arises an unnatural estrangement between mother and child" under certain capitalistic conditions. So there is a natural relation between mother and child. Well it's nothing very novel but nevertheless important. In other words, not everything is natural. That has immense consequences. I mean, the present day social scientist would not use that, I believe, except in a state of relapse into metaphysical thinking. Now on page 436, where he refers to Engels but doesn't quote, where he speaks of the "state of mind clearly distinguishable -- " yes, of the "intellectual desolation," and so on, "artificially produced" by capitalists, "a state of mind clearly distinguishable from that natural ignorance which keeps the mind fallow without destroying its capacity for development, its natural fertility . . . ." "Natural fertility" has teleological implications: able to, disposed toward something in the future. Page 440 -- no, then I must have made a slip because I can't find it -- oh yes, paragraph two: "in those industries first invaded by it, for lengthening the working day beyond all bounds set by human nature." And which means more than

you can't work 24 hours a day and need some minimum of sleep, which is also, by the way, not entirely uninteresting, this need for sleep, but Marx means here much more by that.

There occurs even a reference to natural right, although in a quotation only, but that's very interesting: page 536, line three. That is from a factory report, I suppose -- yes. "The children and young persons, therefore, in all such cases may justifiably claim from the legislature, as a natural right, that an exemption should be secured to them. . . ." By the way, this refutes a somewhat simplistic notion according to which in the bourgeois era natural right meant only natural right of property. You must have heard that "n" times, but that was a statement made I don't know when but I suppose around 1840-50 or so. Now Marx does not -- yes. What does he say in this connection? Mr. Steintraeger referred to that in his discussion. Marx's own comment: "However terrible and disgusting the dissolution, under the capitalist system, of the old family ties may appear. . . ." In other words, Marx feels as any decent human being would feel naturally, and he does not regard this as in any way class bound; obviously not class bound because the decent capitalists and the decent proletarians felt exactly the same about that. ". . . nevertheless, modern industry, by assigning as it does an important part in the process of production, outside the domestic sphere, to women, to young persons, and to children of both sexes, creates a new economical foundation for a higher form of the family and of the relations between the sexes." These are other constants: the family, thesexes, of course. I mean here, when he speaks concretely, Marx is not fantastic at all. But still we would like to know, does Marx mean there should be a new form of polygamy -- because when you speak of family you don't mean promiscuity. That's obvious. Does he mean a new -- no. Surely not, because polygamy, as is the general view, depresses the women too much. So you have monogamy, probably with easy divorce -- that's another matter -- but still family and a certain responsibility for the children, which, I suppose, would act as a restraint regarding very easy notions of divorce. Yes -- as for the development of the human faculties, there is also a passage here in this neighborhood, 529 following, and quite a few remarks in this very section nine which we cannot read. And indeed here -- what Marx says here in this concrete form is very sensible. Development of all faculties means simply here a development of -- no stunting of bodily growth and accompanied by development of the mental faculties and vice versa. That is perfectly sensible, but that has nothing to do with the question of equality because -- obviously not. I mean, you know, with the ultimate equality which Marx somehow had in mind.

And regarding this question -- yes, I repeat only the fundamental issue. I would contend, it is impossible to have an orientation in human matters without a reference to human nature as somehow supplying the standard. That is the old story, accepted until the end of the eighteenth century, generally speaking. But yet since the seventeenth century in conflict with that the notion of a conquest of nature and which was then inevitably -- and conquest of nature of course for the benefit of man, related to the nature of man and to man's natural wants. But it took on this character now: that not only do we have to conquer non-human nature in order to satisfy man's natural wants. No, we have to conquer the nature of man itself; and from that moment on -- well, it took some time until it became a matter of public knowledge -- the whole thing becomes unintelligible. Conquest of nature, including human nature, for what? And to that extent present day social science is an honest expression of our dilemma. Any old value you choose will do.

As for the question of equality, there is one passage which repeats something we have read in the early writings, but I had forgotten that passage so I couldn't find it. Here we have it on page 363, near the top.

(Change of tape).

. . . is bound to be a direction of human beings at the same time, and a direction of human beings is undistinguishable from an authority. You cannot always -- that is only the political equivalent to the argument which Mr. Cropsey made regarding the economics. You cannot always have your Soviet of that particular enterprise decide what should be done, because there is, after all, someone who is better trained -- yes? -- hand has better knowledge who simply is given the authority. And the authority can, of course, not merely be directive because how -- what can you do if someone is lazy or drunk or disturbs the peace among the workmen and so on. That is the point here; there are other references to that. Yes, and of course that is of some importance also for the judgment on the capitalist. However vicious and profit-seeking the capitalist may be he may very well be, happen to be, the directing authority in the enterprise and that is an absolutely necessary function. Marx usually presents it as if the capitalist were merely a profiteer and all the directing authority is done by poorly paid white collar workers or whatever he may have thought of.

Now let me see; there is probably one more passage. No, that's too long. Yes -- no, that is on page 391, indeed, and where he uses even the argument -- this point against vulgar -- against capitalist doctrine. The capitalists emphasize the necessity of an hierarchic order or of planning within the factory and oppose that hierarchic order and that planning in society at large. Now the -- what would follow immediately from that argument disregarding all other complications would be this: you need planning, i.e. a directing authority, in society at large. The vulgar word for that is government because you cannot do it with mere directions without some sanctions -- and, you know, sanctions you don't -- you know what that means. And therefore that point, I think, has to be considered for the whole notion of Marx's communism. The usual argument, of course, would be this, if one makes such points -- the arguments taken from present day communist states, which are very much governments, as you know, is that it is only transitional. It's only transitional and therefore they would regard such arguments as irrelevant, immaterial, and what have you. But the question is what is that final state to be achieved by the next hundred years or maybe earlier, maybe later, probably later. What is that? You know, is this really -- is this not mere -- than a promise unsupported by anything? Or otherwise Marx must show us what experiences we have in any sphere of human activity which supports this thesis, and this promise is, indeed, nowhere supported. That one must say.2 It's just a hope, an unsupported hope.

(Mr. Cropsey's next remarks were the basis for some comments by Dr. Strauss and are therefore transcribed below.)

Mr. Cropsey: Well, it was a foregone conclusion from the beginning that we wouldn't be able to give an account of this part of the reading in the time allotted because it's vast -- you know, it's well over 200 pages and very rich in details and in analysis of all kinds. But let me only try to give a very short indication of what sort of development occurs in this part of the reading. Now Marx had begun with some statements about profit, about relative and absolute surplus value, and you could say that he is trying to show by referring to the history of the mode of production how the directors of the means of production under capitalism are compelled by an inner necessity to intensify and radicalize capitalism itself in pursuit of profit. He has shown what are the arithmetic and other grounds for the quantity of profit and he has shown how a certain course of investment is indicated for capitalists. They must do certain things in order to benefit themselves. What they must do is suggested to them or, in fact, imposed on them by that technology which they themselves set in motion by harnessing science to their own purposes, to the purposes of production. I say their own purposes because it's taken for granted that the men work for themselves. The entrepreneurs work for themselves. They don't work for the good of society. At one point -- I won't look up the passage

right now -- Marx says that, in effect, that doctrine of Smith, the invisible hand -- that men are led as by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of their intention, their intention having been the private good but the unintended end being the common good -- he said that's absurd; not at all. When they pursue their private good that's what they get. They get their private good and the private good is easily distinguishable from the common good. What's good for one man could be very bad for all the others around him; and that's obvious too incidentally, and Marx doesn't let that point slip by. It's obvious so far as it goes.

Now then the point is what, more specifically, can the world look forward to while the mode of production is dictated by capitalistic purposes. And the key to that, I think, would be described as contradictions: that at almost every stage the profit-seeker is confronted by an impossible dichotomy of actions, developments, whatever. He tries to improve his profit situation. That leads him to invest more in machinery. That at the same time has the effect of worsening his profit situation, to give a very simplified example of it. What about the factory legislation? It's at the same time good and bad. Of course the entrepreneurs don't want it but it's imposed on them. Now once it starts to be imposed on them what must their attitude be? (A) They don't like it so they'd like to push it off, but (B) competition, the very character of capitalist production, compels them to want it and not only to want it but to want it generally and in its most extended form. Very simple reason; we find the same thing to be true among businessmen now confronted with unions. They don't want unions in their own plants, but once they've got them they jolly well want to make sure everybody else gets them too. That's the point. So now if the factory acts are passed and they apply to you and you're in the textile business and you're a big manufacturer and it's easy to enforce the law with respect to you because you're plainly visible, the first thing that you have to do is to see that, to begin with, the enforcement is made very good or very bad, either so you get away with it too or else that everybody else is compelled as much as you to obey the law. And now that spreads from one section of industry to another so it's not from benevolence that the factory legislation becomes extensive. It grows by an inner law. It must. That's part of what he says. Now, so what happens after that? Well then the conditions of industry begin to become more and more difficult. So the very thing that the capitalists must promote in the end turns out to be fraught with contradictions. I give you very simple and a very small number of examples.

Now one can't help but be reminded of things in Hegel. That's no surprise, but in the introduction to The Philosophy of History Hegel speaks about how the progress of man is, in a way, brought on by the vices and the passions that move men and so while they seem to be aiming at some immediate object dictated by low interests in effect they're bringing about the progress of mankind towards a high and maybe even permanent condition. I think that what Marx says has very much in common with this. The low impulses of men are shown to work themselves out, driving others down and down and down -- society always descending into graver and graver complications and difficulties which are, through the mysterious nature of things, the ground for the ultimate resolution of all the difficulties, but literally all the difficulties. Now why that should be true is not explained, I believe. In other words, why this is not a mere construction based on terrific speculations, hopes, and similar things, why there is the necessity for the good to emerge out of the contradictory: that is not clear on the basis of mere materialism. If that were to be based on some notion of the ideas, of a life of the immaterial, a real life within the sphere of the rational qua rational, maybe something could be said for this, but that's exactly what was bound to be so terribly objectionable on the part of the idealists. I mean, objectionable by the Marxists as it was held on the part of the idealists. So now why materialism should have this meliorative inner working: that is not plain. It comes out as a very impressive construction, there is no doubt, in Marx, but we find ourselves always plagued by the doubt as to the reality of the remote, the

more remote, and we see how, as in the case of some earlier constructions with respect to astronomy, the more time that elapsed after the construction of the system and therewith the making of the forecasts the greater the divergence between the observed things and the pretended foreknowledge, which -- please.

Dr. Strauss: I hate to interrupt you but I must do it because I believe that's a point where I can make clear something which I stated at the beginning and where some of you might have thought it was superfluous and -- yes, at this point I think it will become clear. Now let us look back at the two men -- you mentioned Hegel but permit me to go back for one moment to Kant. In Kant you had this construction: vices, not morality, bring about by the antagonisms they engender the rational society, the society demanded by morality; namely, in Kant's formula, a nation of devils will bring about that society by a mere mechanism of self-seeking. But Kant made it perfectly clear: institutional progress is not moral progress. In other words, the need of the moral effort of the individual remains in that final stage as much as at all times. But still, the interesting point is already in Kant: that the mere play of the passions without any higher motivation will bring about theestablishment of the rational society. Now that is only, however, the historical form of Adam Smith. What Adam Smith means simultaneously -- yes -- is here now said of the historical stretch. The private interests, without giving a damn for the public interest, bring about the public interest within a given -- within a society. In the Kantian construction the Smithian invisible hand is the key to the historical process.

Now Hegel comes surely closer to Marx still than either Adam Smith or Kant did, but because for Hegel the progress is at the same time -- is not merely institutional. I mean, the nation is not a nation of devils merely. Other things enter. But still, Hegel's reasoning -- Hegel's doctrine is in one respect more rational than that of Smith or Kant because he says what is working in these acts is Reason with a capital "R." There is a cunning of reason. And secondly, in defense of Hegel we must also say Hegel understood the final state to be a state and not a withered away state, and therefore Hegel had no doubt that the final state of man will have as many criminals, poor citizens, and self-seekers -- the despicable self-seekers -- or perhaps even more maybe -- than, say, you had in a Greek polis. In other words, you still need gallows, to use a simple symbol of that tough side of the state, whereas the fantastic thing in Marx is that you have, without reason effective as the hidden ground of the whole movement -- you get at a certain moment a moral regeneration of man which would make any forms of compulsion wholly superfluous. And that's it. Forgive me for interrupting.

(During the meeting of May 16th Mr. Cropsey raised certain questions, in commenting on Part V, chapter 16, which opened a discussion between him and Dr. Strauss. Mr. Cropsey's remarks and the ensuing discussion are transcribed as follows).

Mr. Cropsey: Now there are a number of remarks in this chapter 16 in which Marx speaks about the whole natural framework of the productive process and some of these remarks are very interesting and would be useful for us to consider if we had more time. I can only draw your attention to a few of them. For example, on page 561 to 563 he speaks about the growth of man's productiveness and, at the same time, how man -- that's toward the very bottom of the page -- "It is only after men have raised themselves above the rank of animals" -- 561, the fourth line from the bottom, fourth and fifth. "It is only after men have raised themselves above the rank of animals" and so on. So, in other words, the process of evolution is really an artificial thing. Then, on 562 at the end of that same paragraph he says, "The productiveness of labor that serves as its foundation and starting point, is a gift, not of nature, but of a history embracing thousands of centuries." That means hundreds of thousands of years, you know, so it's hard to

know exactly what beginning point he had for this thing, but surely it was what we ordinarily call in very remote pre-history.

Now, then on page 563 he continues in the same vein, about the sixth line from the bottom of the text. "This mode is based on the dominion of man over nature. Where nature is too lavish, she 'keeps him in hand, like a child in leading-strings.' She does not impose upon him any necessity to develop himself." Now I wouldn't want to push this too far, but it certainly raises the interesting question, what Marx expected would be the case in a condition of man in which nature didn't push at all; you know, in which there was virtually no pressure or no problem. I think Nietzsche was the one who really understood this thing and showed how, in a way, this was the source of a terrific objection to that condition of "The Last Man" if I'm not mistaken, or the end of human development. Another man long before said, "Sweet are the uses of adversity." I'm not sure he meant precisely the same thing, but he might have meant something similar: that the solution of all problems for man would be the basis for the most collosal problem of all and Marx, somehow or other, apparently knew something about the reasons that might underlie that, but it didn't work itself out.

Now -- yes, and then, well, on the next page he goes on to say, "Favorable natural conditions alone, gave us only the possibility, never the reality, of surplus-labor, nor, consequently, of surplus-value and a surplus-product." I point that passage out to you because one could say Marx's general tendency is to try to show how these things which are taken by the political economists to be natural phenomena are not natural at all. They're historic; that is to say, they required to be brought to completion or fruition by some acts of men under the influence of necessity, solving their problems of production and devising or being compelled to devise various modes of production under the influence of growing technology, the prior history of the satisfaction of wants, the development of new wants and so on and so forth. So Marx's constant struggle is to show that the political economists were wrong in this fundamental respect: that they took the present condition to arise more or less directly out of nature, and Marx was at pains to show that this didn't grow out of nature directly. It grew out of nature, if at all, only in such an indirect way that the manner of its growing out had to be regarded as still an operative, energetic force, i.e. history, and that what grew out of nature if it grew at all, in its present manifestation, will be replaced by something else that can equally be said to have grown out of nature with the radical mediation of history.

Dr. Strauss: This raises the more basic question. Could Marx -- let us try to see -- after all we are not interested in doing what Khrushchev does. Let us try to see whether one cannot make a case for Marx. Could he not say this: without necessity, without need, without misery, in other words, man would always have remained a kind of banana picking monkey? Yes? So it was -- man had to be forced to work. That's the old story. But this work changes man too and at the end of this process we find a being formed by history who has needs, which needs then explain sufficiently why he would work. Does this make sense? Acquired needs, not natural needs. The natural need is that for food, but acquired needs, for example, for -- say, for music. These qacquired needs cannot be satisfied except by a mild kind of work, and so you have, then, here a society in the realm of freedom -- you know, as distinguished from the realm of necessity. You have beings who simply by desiring to express themselves or to -- how is the word of Marx? -- to express their lives, lebens----------, to upturn their life, which in the rprimitive condition was simply a desire to run around and to lie in the sun, or to perhaps have some brawl from time to time, is now a desire which simply accompanied with a reasonably developed reason tells them they have to work four or five hours a day so that they can listen to music and paint in the afternoon. Could this not be? That, in other words, something -- non-teleologically developed needs, non-teleology: just the outcome of the

historical process, and they alone make intelligible the way of life and the ends of man in that state. Could he not say that?

Mr. Cropsey: I believe he would probably say something like this, but without making provision for one large difficulty. Both pre-capitalistsand capitalist economists recognize one way or another that leisure is a good. Now with a simple transformation, one could say, idleness is a good. As far as I know he has no provision for a relapse into that state of the banana picking -- almost. I mean, I understand that really that's pushing much too far, but there is no provision against a subsiding to a very low level out of mere laziness, say, because of the lack of pressure.

Dr. Strauss: In other words, Marx would be compelled to show on the basis of man as he is now, that isn't a possibility.

Mr. Cropsey: Yes, precisely. I mean, he couldn't know anything at all about what's likely to happen on the basis of something he can't see anyhow. Mr. Faulkner.

> "It surely means that certain institutions create the existence of these social conditions -- is enough to sustain, is enough to arouse in a man these needs. Now that these conditions are in existence, in other words, they can't just pass away."

Mr. Cropsey: Well, it's very hard to know, Mr. Faulkner, what could or couldn't happen because such a thing as what Marx contemplates has never really been known among men and one has absolutely no ground for asserting that energy is more likely to be called forth than lassitude is likely to be encouraged. I don't know; it might be that these men would be, under the freedom from all competitive and other drive -- it might be that they would become a very bland and easily satisfied collection of men. I don't believe it for a minute because, as a matter of fact, I don't believe that it would ever come to that, but apart from this on the basis merely of a prognosis I see nothing whatever anywhere either in empirical or a priori things to settle that question. I don't mean to say there's a stronger presumption one way or the other, but I think that there is no presumption --

Dr. Strauss: It's unfounded. Yes, but still there is one more point and that is not limited to Marx, incidentally. . . . Does not the anti-Marxist economic theory require a doctrine of the nature of man?

Mr. Cropsey: Yes.

Dr. Strauss: How does it get it?

Mr. Cropsey: Well, I think from earlier discussions one would have to say it's simply scraped up together. It's sort of put together, but -- acquisitive: it's the decayed elements of much earlier formulations.

Dr. Strauss: Yes, well the difficulty is raised, I think, especially by the Germans -- you know, the historical school in Germany -- that you cannot impute to man what you observe every day on a stock exchange -- yes? And there is a famous story about the relativization of economic man. The economists must face that. Don't they?

Mr. Cropsey: I believe that if it were a question of trying to find a better statement among the political economists Marx's stock objection to them would be very strong: namely, that they take to be universal the particular experience that they observe. So I don't mean to imply that Marx's shortcomings are met in the opposite school, but they

have a shortcoming which is characteristic, but it's different from Marx's.

Dr. Strauss: Yes. And may I bring up -- come back to another question which seems to me extremely interesting because it has a bearing much beyond the subject of this seminar: the question which you said -- I don't know which expression you used about the embarrassment in which you are constantly. Shall we go into these things which are not facts, so to say, which Marx assumes as facts and of which we know they are not facts? But do we not have the same problem in every or almost every political theorist or social theorist? Think of Aristotle. Aristotle asserts certain facts explicitly or by implication of which we know they are not facts. Yes? For example, Aristotle would regard it as impossible to have a decent degree of freedom in a large society. I mean, very much larger than a polis. We know that isn't true. So do we do in such cases what you, if I may criticize you, did: let us run away from these unpleasantnesses and not face it. After all, Marx is, whatever we may say against him -- that's a systematic thinker. And if -- everything hangs together. Now if, say, a number of things which hang together so -- and some of these, let me say, we know now are simply wrong -- yes? You know? Good. But still we have to understand the connection. It's not true? And that is by no means a purely historical thing. After all, it's of the utmost practical importance because the successors to Marx who saw that Marx's prognoses regarding capitalism were wrong did not, therefore, scrap the whole thing. They rewrote it and this process of rewriting is not always denied; and they claim that this rewriting maintains what was really important for Marx whereas these things were, as he wrote them, not so important. In other words, whether the trick of capitalism is the exploitation of the European proletariat, or the American proletariat for that matter, or rather imperialistic policies in Asia and Africa, is ultimately unimportant. Marx had an inkling of that, you know, when he spoke of the workers' aristocracy in Britain. Yes? Yes, there is a remark to that effect and so that -- do you see what I mean? I think we have to do, in the case of Marx, what we would also do in the case -- the famous goose and gander argument. Yes?

Mr. Cropsey: Yes. Well, I'm far from saying, or at least meaning, that I wanted to escape from the problem of the facts. I was only trying to point out that one could spend too much time arguing only about the details. But I tried to draw attention to this thing which I believe is true about Marx: that one could say that his whole structure stands or falls on the soundness of his understanding of history. If there was something really radically wrong with his understanding of history not enough would be left to make it worth while.

Dr. Strauss: Yes, but still -- but here I'm sorry to -- yes, but that is not so easy because it would, then, come down to a question which is -- can justly be described from Marx's point of view as accidental. Whether Marx -- originally, as you know, he seems to have thought in about fifteen or twenty years after 1848 the whole thing will blow up; and then he learned to his chagrin that capitalism was much more tough than he thought. You know, and even when he died things looked very bad in 1883 for him. You know, the German Social Democratic party was loyal but he didn't know what a bureaucratic party that would be. . . although he had some inkling of it. Well, at any rate -- and then we remember '18, how Lenin and Trotsky in Petrograd or Leningrad kept their fingers crossed: when will the German proletariat rise? Well, some rose but the Germans took -- the German Social Democrats took so wonderfully easily care of that rising. So there was nothing. Then I remember some crypto-Marxists who said in '44, well, after the second World War Western Europe is completely communist because communists are the only ones who really fight in the resistance, which -- that other point is partly true, by the way, but -- let us even say ninety per cent true, and absolutely nothing happened in the West. Yes? So, and then now, of course they have written it off, at least for the duration, and they think it will come about via Mao and certain things they expect from Africa.

Yes? That's clear. But what I'm driving at is this: whether the thing happens in twenty years or in three hundred years, what a Marxist could say, is really a purely quantitative question, i.e. not decisive.

Mr. Cropsey: But quantitative changes, I believe, are known by Marx to have some sort of a qualitative bearing after a while.

Dr. Strauss: Yes, but still -- but I must say let us not -- precisely I -- I happen to be opposed to communism in every way but precisely for this reason I cannot take the view which a businessman can take: if it comes after my lifetime I don't care. I care very much whether it comes after my lifetime and therefore the real issue is whether it is altogether feasible with -- I mean, that they may win militarily I regard as absolutely feasible but whether it can be at the same time the true liberation of man: that alone is, of course, the question.

Mr. Cropsey: But this, Dr. Strauss, is what I mean to be saying. I mean, that it might happen I too am perfectly aware but I think if it happens because two billion people rise up against one billion and -- like the same way that Alexander the Great did it, that is not at all a tribute to Marx's. . . .

Dr. Strauss: Yes. No, the question -- yes, but the question would then be this. What then -- I mean, we must -- along the lines which you gsuggested we must somehow be able to draw a line in a principled manner between the really basic teachings and the teachings which could be replaced, from Marx's point of view, by others. . . .

Mr. Cropsey: Yes. Well, that's part of the difficulty in Marx. Exactly because he was such a good generator of a system the foundation is a real foundation and what comes from the foundation really comes from it; and he reasons very strictly from the labor theory of value up to the rest and that's what makes it very hard to find this line of distinction between what really counts and what doesn't count so much.

Dr. Strauss: All right. To this I will give you a strictly orthodox Stalinist answer. (Succeeding remark of about a dozen words is inaudible).

Mr. Cropsey: Yes. Then in that case it's up to Stalin to say why we have to study it at all any more, because one could say it's all dated.

Dr. Strauss: Because Marx discovered, they would say, the decisive points to the extent to which it was possible to do so in 1848, following, and that we could say. We have to rewrite it but the basic principle is the realm of freedom at the end -- yes, and its general terms of communism to be prepared by dictatorship of the proletariat. That remains, and that -- at least this crucial step, they claim, has been proved possible because it has become actual. And then of course one would have to go into the nice question: is dictatorship of the Communist Party identical with the dictatorship of the proletariat, the issue between Trotsky and Lenin, on the one hand, and Stalin on the other. And so on. Sure.

Mr. Cropsey: Yes. That would surely be one of the questions, but I believe the other question, which is perhaps even more important, is whether it is not true that the ultimate success of the Marxist system -- assume it for the time being -- isn't exactly for the reason that Marx denied could ever be decisive. I believe if it ever comes to pass that this dominates the world it will be because there was a man and he thought certain things and his thoughts had a certain effect. And I believe that they were probably three-fifths wrong, but it makes no difference and what really matters is many people

were convinced and received into their minds an opinion which was a wrong opinion and that was what was decisive; and no nonsense about history and the material --

Dr. Strauss: Yes, yes; sure.

Mr. Cropsey: -- formula. Yes. But that, I think, is really why it's so important to see that his prognoses are not facts. They're wrong.

Dr. Strauss: No, no; that's perfectly true. But the question which we cannot take up here, of course, is to what extent, say, Lenin's and the later ones' modifications are only of such a nature that they are perhaps not yet refuted. Yes?

Mr. Cropsey: It could be. Yes. That's mere footwork. That's dancing around and helping out. Sure.

(At the end of the same meeting Dr. Strauss said the following.)

I think there is one question which is of general interest in chapter six -- or five -- and that is -- you referred already to that: Marx develops a doctrine of his own and then this doctrine is a radical restatement of what the classical economists had taught. But the classical economists had kept the appearances. . . and Marx goes to the literal reality of the thing. That's the c[illegible]. Now this I think raises an interesting question much beyond Marx, because all sc[illegible] social science raises this claim that it is not deceived by the appearances as common sense is, but brings out the hidden reality. In fairness to Marx one must say that starting that way Marx seesheohstumder necessity to explain the appearances, whereas the typical scientific social scientist simply dismisses them without trying to understand how the appearance arises. I would like to develop this next time shortly, if I may. Good.

(At the beginning of the May 18, 1960 meeting Dr. Strauss said the following.)

There were only two points which are of some general interest which do not fall entirely without the scope of my knowledge. There is a remark a bit earlier on page 440, note 3. That has very much to do with the question which we discussed in connection with The German Ideology. You remember: what comes first in time is not necessarily the cause of what comes later in time. Here Marx says, "The English, who have a tendency to look upon the earliest form of appearance as the cause of its existence. . . ." and so on. That has something to do with that and Marx sees this, of course, as a defect; obviously. That is of some relevance, I believe, for the question of historical materialism: that food supply and this kind of thing come prior to intellectual development in time does not yet say -- establish the fact that the thought, the myth production as I call it, is caused by the thing.

The other point is this more interesting question to which I referred at the end of the last class: that is around 592 and in this neighborhood. "The exchange between capital and labor at first presents itself to the mind in the same guise as the buying and selling of all other commodities. The buyer gives a certain sum of money, the seller an article of a nature different from money. The jurist's consciousness recognizes in this, at most, a material difference. . . ." -- meaning not a formal difference --"expressed in the juridically equivalent formulae: 'I give so that you give. . . .'" -- that's ordinary buying -- "'Iggive so that you do. . . .'" -- that's the buying of services, labor --"'I do so that you give, I do so that you do.'" You see, so in other words, this is the appearance: all labor is paid just as every apple or every pencil is paid. Now the point which he makes, page 594, the part at the top: ". . . in respect